




FORCED TO BE FREE: 





































As a doctrine of political legitimacy, liberalism introduced nations as the only 
legitimate units through which liberty was to be articulated.  In historical reality, 
liberalism has affirmed the concept of liberty through the self-legitimising acts of 
national liberation, thereby generating nationalism as its historical by-product. My 
thesis focuses on their common conceptual core, through textual analyses of several 
classical liberal authors, each of whom represents one century and is granted one 
chapter.  
Algernon Sidney (17th century) was the first author who defined nations as the sole, 
self-referential source of political legitimacy, whose liberty was to be achieved 
through establishment of their own legislative institutions, by which they self-
referentially legitimised themselves as ‘nations’. 
Rousseau (18th century) defined liberty as identification of man’s individual will 
with the presumed will of the entire society, which provided nationalism with a socio-
psychological mechanism and philosophical rationale for its subsequent emergence 
and functioning on the societal level.  
Rawls’s concept of justice (20th century) develops this mechanism further, as a 
perpetual reciprocal recognition between the nation’s individual members. This ritual 
recognition of one another as free and equal is reciprocally extended only between 
co-nationals but non-reciprocally denied to all non-members: as members of other 
nations, they are to be discriminated against, as un-free and un-equal.  
In John Stuart Mill’s theory of nationality (19th century), only in the nation-state can 
the individual be free, and ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ can only 
be achieved through the collectivist enterprise of nation-building. Mill thus 
established the ultimate conceptual convergence between the ostensibly opposed 
doctrines of liberal individualism and national collectivism.   
Through these paradigmatic cases, my thesis shows that the mainstream liberalism 
has always shared nationalist principles with the nationalism-proper, and that the 
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This thesis is going to examine, through textual analyses of several paradigmatic 
liberal thinkers,1 the philosophical framework within which nationalism first appeared 
and within which it perpetually reappears. The vast majority of academic works on 
nationalism focused on different aspects (cultural, historical, sociological, 
psychological, etc.) of nationalism as an already-existing socio-political phenomenon, 
while almost never attempting to address the issue of its conceptual origins as a 
political and philosophical doctrine, located in the sphere of ideas. The most 
significant exception to this rule is Elie Kedourie’s Nationalism2, which examines 
nationalism strictly as a doctrine, within the frame of the history of ideas. While not 
entirely disputing Kedourie’s theory of nationalism’s intellectual origins, a theory in 
which Kant’s theory of self-determination is attributed the central role, my thesis is 
written directly in response to Kedourie’s most famous claim that nationalism is a 
doctrine invented in Germany, by a handful of post-Kantian idealists and romanticists 
(most significantly, by Fichte and Herder) at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
For Kedourie, 
 
Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It 
pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a 
government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the 
right organization of a society of states. Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally 
divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be 
ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.3 
 
Kedourie presents nationalism as a doctrine, which was invented within a particular 
time-space framework and therefore would be expected to be of limited relevance and 
scope of application. However, he concedes that “not the least triumph of this 
doctrine is that such propositions have become accepted and are thought to be self-
evident, that the very word nation has been endowed by nationalism with a meaning 
                                                 
1
 Each of them stands as a paradigm for one century of liberalism’s history and is granted one chapter. 
They are: Algernon Sidney (the 17th century), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (the 18th century), John Stuart 
Mill (the 19th century), John Rawls (the 20th century). Sidney, Rousseau and Rawls also stand as 
paradigms of the contractarian branch of liberalism, while Mill represents the utilitarian branch. Their 
theories, respectively, also offer answers to the key-questions concerning the relationship between 
liberalism and nationalism, which will be briefly explained in the second part of this Introduction. The 
last chapter is devoted to Lord Acton, the only liberal thinker who explicitly and radically rejected both 
nationalism and ‘the nation-state’. 
2
 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960. Fourth edition, 1993). 
3
 Ibid., p. 1. 
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and a resonance which until the end of the eighteenth century it was far from 
having”.4 Thus the paradox of a universal spread of such a seemingly particularist 
doctrine immediately opens the question of agents who were capable of its invention, 
its application to particular European societies and its further transmission into other 
parts of the globe.  
 As for the doctrine’s inventors, Kedourie claims that they were to be found among 
German post-Enlightenment philosophers, namely Fichte, Schleiermacher and 
Herder. It was these thinkers who adapted the Kantian principle of individual self-
determination so as to produce a new collectivist principle of national self-
determination. Thus, according to Kedourie, “nationalism as a doctrine was 
articulated in German-speaking lands”, around 1800s. This claim itself might be 
regarded as arbitrary, given the historical fact that the first nations (with their 
respective nationalisms?) had emerged well before the 19th century and well outside 
the German-speaking context (England, Holland, USA, France). Yet, such an 
argument goes even further, so that Kedourie claims that “Great Britain and the 
United States are precisely those areas where nationalism is unknown”.5         
 What is nationalism, then, when its principles are so widely spread and accepted as 
self-evident and, yet, it has somehow remained unknown precisely in those nation-
states whose respective and joint impact on the shape of the contemporary world has 
been immeasurable? Perhaps it would be plausible to argue that nationalism emerged 
as a reaction, and was generated in opposition, to the attempts by precisely these two 
nation-states to shape international order so as to impose their own hegemony?6 Or, 
perhaps it would be plausible to argue that these two nation-states were actually 
shaping international order by imposing the hegemony of the doctrinaire nationalist 
agenda onto those parts of the world they attempted to dominate, thus remaining free 
from its influence? Yet, these two assumptions would go far beyond – probably even 
be directly opposed to – what Kedourie meant by defining nationalism as a German-
invented doctrine. This raises the question, not so much what nationalism is, but what 
nationalism is, then, for Kedourie.  
                                                 
4
 Ibid., p. 1. 
5
 Ibid., p. 143. 
6
 This argument might be derived from the theory of international society, as proposed by James 
Mayall. See James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
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 Kedourie’s claim that nationalism pretends to “supply a criterion for the 
determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its 
own” suggests that the author regarded nationalism as some form of ‘false 
consciousness’. In other words, nationalism is a form of ‘ideological politics’. As 
such, it attempts to impose certain ideas onto the world, so as to re-create it on its 
own image. Nationalism is, as Kedourie defines it, “politics in a new style”.7 As such, 
it is fundamentally opposed to what Kedourie labels as ‘constitutional politics’, which 
takes its lead from the world as it is. It is this distinction that makes it logically 
sustainable for Kedourie to claim that ‘constitutional politics’ – having first emerged 
in Great Britain and the USA – prevented ‘ideological politics’ of nationalism from 
coming into existence in these parts of the world.  
 However, the basic problem for Kedourie’s theory arises when it is confronted with 
the fact that the first historical nations emerged in the Anglo-Saxon political context 
(England and the U.S.), decisively shaped by the doctrine of liberalism. This fact 
generates several questions without any attempted answers on Kedourie’s part. First, 
how is it possible for the supposedly invented doctrine of nationalism to be 
completely unrelated to the supposedly spontaneous emergence of the first nations, 
taking into account Gellner’s modernist axiom that nationalism invents nations where 
they do not exist? Second, if these first nations were decisively shaped by the doctrine 
of liberalism (liberalism is a doctrine to which Kedourie prefers to refer exclusively 
as ‘constitutional politics’, in order to semantically separate it from nationalism as 
ideological politics) rather than by nationalism, should nationalism be regarded as 
separate and independent from liberalism, when they both (whether respectively or 
jointly) promoted the concepts of self-determination, self-government, popular 
sovereignty, liberty, equality, fraternity and social unity, using the common concept of 
‘the nation’? Is nationalism, which promotes (and, according to Gellner, produces) 
‘nations’ as the only legitimate political units, rather to be seen as a part, or perhaps a 
by-product, of the coherent, self-contained umbrella-discourse of liberalism, which 
promotes (or produces?) ‘nations’ in the very same manner? Or, is the doctrine of 
self-determination an umbrella under which both nationalism and liberalism co-exist 
as mutually pervasive, nation-creating discourses? A convincing response to these 
                                                 
7
 Kedourie, p. 1. 
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questions, raised by the logical problems in Kedourie’s theory, is the primary goal of 
this thesis.   
   
II 
 
In my view, nationalism’s proven ability to perpetually assert itself with unchallenged 
political strength, in quite different historical, social, and political environments and 
within the scope of three centuries, indicates that nationalism as a doctrine appears 
under the guise of a wider, living and omnipresent umbrella-discourse, under which 
and through which it is being constantly perpetuated. This thesis attempts to prove 
that this wider umbrella-discourse is liberalism, whose principles, norms and values – 
such as secularism, democracy, popular sovereignty, citizenship, political and 
economic liberty, political equality, social homogeneity, human rights, etc. – are 
deeply built-in into the modern political system and the modern state, so as to serve as 
an umbrella under which and through which nationalism is being perpetuated, 
unchallenged by other, individualist or cosmopolitan, aspects of liberalism (which 
thus regularly appear side by side with nationalism, rather than in opposition to it).    
As the main theoretical and conceptual framework for understanding nationalism, I 
adopt the complementary theories of nationalism by Rogers Brubaker and Mark 
Beissinger. According to Brubaker’s theory, “nationalism is a way of seeing the 
world, a way of identifying interests, or more precisely, a way of specifying interest-
bearing units, of identifying the relevant units in terms of which interests are 
conceived. (...) Thus it inherently links identity and interest – by identifying how we 
are to calculate our interests.”8 Nationalism manifests itself in what Brubaker labels 
as ‘nationness’. These manifestations of nationalism –  which neither develop nor 
permanently exist but rather happen as contingent events – should be decoupled from 
‘nationhood’ as a cognitive and socio-political framework. ‘Nationhood’ is “the 
nationalization of narrative and interpretative frames, of perception and evaluation, of 
thinking and feeling”. As such, it logically tends to produce marginalisation of 
alternative, non-nationalist discourses and the consequent nullification of complex 
                                                 
8
 Rogers Brubaker, ‘Myths and misconceptions in the study of nationalism’. In John A. Hall (ed.), The 
State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 291-2. 
 10 
identities by the categorical simplicity of ascribed nationality.9 According to Mark 
Beissinger’s theory of substantiation of nations, nationalism in its concrete 
manifestations is not an isolated contingent event, but rather a chain of connected 
contingent events: “It is not because people ‘think the nation’ (B. Anderson) that we 
believe that nations exist, but rather because people ‘behave the nation’. They engage 
in collective behaviours and actions which signal to us that the nation is a category of 
substance.”10 Nationalism is thus “not simply about imagined communities; it is much 
more fundamentally a struggle for control over defining communities – and 
particularly a struggle for control over the imagination about community”. For, ‘the 
nation’ is usually embraced by the majority of population as a natural institutional 
arrangement precisely because it is promoted by the nationalist elite as the only 
conceivable.11 This permanent nationalization of narrative and interpretative frames, 
of perception and evaluation, of thinking and feeling, promoted in modern political 
discourse as the only conceivable cognitive frame, is what enables nationalism to 
perpetually reassert itself, with unchallenged political strength, in the contingent 
manifestations of Brubaker’s ‘nationness’, through which ‘nations’ are actually being 
substantiated. However, in my view, this omnipresent nationalization (Brubaker’s 
‘nationhood’) is an inherent property of the umbrella-discourse of liberalism, rather 
than of the nationalism-proper, whose sporadic manifestations happen as contingent 
events (Brubaker’s ‘nationness’). For, it is the permanent omnipresence of the 
umbrella-discourse of liberalism in modern society (rather than the sporadic presence 
of the nationalism-proper) that makes this nationalization omnipresent.   
  By postulating liberalism as nationalism’s chief historical and conceptual source, I 
basically rely on Bertrand Russell’s assumption that historical liberalism, as a 
political movement, practically dissolved in nationalism: “The decay of Liberalism 
has many causes, both technical and psychological. They are to be found in the 
technique of war, in the technique of production, in the increased facilities for 
                                                 
9
 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 18-21.  
10
 It should be noted that both Brubaker and Beissinger take Gellner's postulate that nationalism 
invents nations where they don't exist as their starting point, from which they develop their respective 
theories. However, concerning their interpretations of 'the nation' as an existing category, it may be 
said that Brubaker and Beissinger introduce Einsteinian relativity in Gellner's Newtonian certainty. In 
their view, which I fully adopt in this thesis, nationalism has to permanently perpetuate itself on the 
societal level to make nations exist.  
11
 Mark Beissinger, ‘Nationalisms that bark and nationalisms that bite. Ernest Gellner and the 
substantiation of nations’. In John A. Hall, op. cit., pp. 173-176.  
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propaganda, and in nationalism, which is itself an outcome of Liberal doctrines.”12 
Also: “The Western world, from the Reformation until 1848, was undergoing a 
continuous upheaval which may be called the Rights-of-Man Revolution. In 1848, 
this movement began to transform itself into nationalism east of the Rhine. In France, 
the association had existed since 1792, and in England from the beginning; in 
America, it had existed since 1776. The nationalist aspect of the movement has 
gradually overpowered the Rights-of-Man aspect, but this latter was at first the more 
important.”13 To Russell’s assumption, my thesis adds the claims that liberalism – due 
to the fact that its principles, norms and values remain built-in into the foundations of 
the modern political system and the modern, liberal-democratic state – is to be 
regarded as a living and omnipresent umbrella-discourse rather than a short-lived 
historical movement, that it has always shared the common conceptual core with the 
nationalism-proper, and that the former eventually, perpetually and non-accidentally, 
dissolves in the latter. 
 There is no comprehensive theory that would provide a clear-cut definition of 
liberalism and I do not pretend to supply one in this thesis, not even through a 
discussion with numerous theories which aspire to comprehensiveness. Still, I believe 
that liberalism, understood as a living, ominpresent umbrella-discourse rather than a 
short-lived historical movement or a strict political-philosophical or economic 
doctrine, may be rather comprehensively approached as a discourse centred around 
the very word 'liberty' (be it applied to the areas of philosophy, politics or economics, 
respectively or jointly), with this word's meaning remaining essentially arbitrary and 
adaptable to particular circumstances. Still, 'liberty' is in this thesis interpreted in 
accordance with its earliest modern political usage14, as a license (or power) to 
independently legislate, that is, to make one's own laws. Such 'liberty' is necessarily 
understood as a property of a collective entity (group, body, country, state), which by 
acquiring it (or by credibly aspiring to it) rises to the status of 'the nation'. In the logic 
of liberalism presented in this thesis through the works of the paradigmatic liberal 
thinkers, man may be free only through membership in, and identification with, such 
a self-legislating collective entity, thereby acquiring the twin-status of 'the 
autonomous individual' and 'the citizen'. In the same sense, nationalism, as a 
                                                 
12
 Bertrand Russell, Power (London: Routledge Classics, 2004), p. 93. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
14
 See the first chapter below, on Algernon Sidney's concept of 'liberty'. 
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discourse derived from liberalism, is centred around the pursuit of such 'liberty' for 
such a collecitve entity. The pursuit of (or a credible aspiration to) the power (or 
license) to independently legislate is, within the self-referential logic of liberalism, 
automatically self-legitimised by referring to such a collective entity as 'the nation', as 
well as by referring to the very power (or license) to legislate as 'liberty'.           
 As a theory of political legitimacy, liberalism from its earliest beginnings to the 
present day has promoted homogenous ‘nations’ as the proper units through which its 
concept of ‘liberty’ was to be articulated, so as to inseparably link the attempts to 
promote ‘liberty’ and build a liberal-democratic state with the nationalist efforts to 
create such ‘nations’.  Thus on the historical level, from the late 17th-century England 
to the late 20th-century Eastern Europe, liberalism has been affirming the cause of 
‘liberty’ mainly through the self-legitimising acts of ‘national liberation’ 
(revolutionary and non-revolutionary) and ‘nation-building’, thereby practically 
generating nationalism as its historical by-product.”15     
On the conceptual level, I hope to prove through the analyses of the aforementioned 
paradigmatic authors that nationalist principles are deeply built-in into the very core 
of the liberal mainstream, so that practical-political efforts to introduce on the societal 
level the latter’s principles, norms and values (and thereby create a liberal-democratic 
                                                 
15
 John Gray also claims that ‘the sovereign nation-state’ from the nationalism-proper and even ‘the 
autonomous individual’ from the liberalism-proper are historical and conceptual constructs and by-
products of the wider umbrella-discourse of liberalism: “From Benjamin Constant and John Stuart Mill 
to John Rawls, the sovereign nation-state is the great unexamined assumption of liberal thought. (…) 
Even where liberal thinkers have not explicitly defended the sovereign nation-state, it is presupposed 
by much of what they argue for. The institution of the nation-state is tacitly assumed by liberal ideals 
of citizenship.  It underpins the assumption of an overlapping consensus on liberal values, and it is 
presupposed by the notion of social justice as an ideal pattern of distribution. (…) For the past two 
hundred years the liberal project has been pursued in most countries through an enterprise of nation-
building. Nineteenth-century liberals used the powers of the modern state to weaken or destroy local 
communities and regional loyalties. By doing so they helped to create the autonomous individual. (…) 
Being an autonomous agent is not, as Kant and his latter-day disciples seem to suppose, the timeless 
quintessence of humanity. (…) Autonomous individuals are artefacts, made possible by the power of 
the modern state. Autonomous individuals came into the world as products of the national cultures 
created by modern European nation-states. Modern European states did not inherit cohesive national 
cultures. Using their powers of military conscription, taxation and schooling, they constructed them. 
By constructing nations, modern states made possible the autonomous individuals of liberal thought 
and practice”. See John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 123. To 
develop Gray’s idea further and be more precise, in liberal-democratic society from liberal thought, 
practically constructed in the form of ‘the sovereign nation-state’, man is ideally put into a double 
position: that of ‘the citizen’, and that of ‘the autonomous individual’. As a ‘citizen’, man is put into 
the position of a member of ‘the nation’ (as a human aggregation), while in his relation with the 
modern state man is put (towards the state as a mechanism of coercion) into the position of ‘the 
autonomous individual’. At the same time, inversely and paradoxically, man’s ‘autonomy’ from the 
state is being realised through his membership in ‘the nation’, while he is formally being positioned as 
the state’s ‘citizen’ (since the state is defined as ‘the sovereign nation-state’).     
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state) logically and regularly produce the homogenising, illiberal manifestations of 
the nationalism-proper. Due to this deeply built-in ‘error’, attempts to renovate or 
innovate the liberalism-proper, when projected on the societal level, necessarily end 
up in practical renewals and reappearances of the nationalism-proper, with all its 
illiberal manifestations. Of course, this claim can not be empirically proven within the 
scope of a theoretical analysis. This remains a task for some other, rather empirical 
works, which would take this claim as their starting point. However, what my thesis 
attempts to do is to demonstrate the logic of the process on the purely conceptual 
level, pointing to liberalism's built-in logical 'error', one which prescribes 'the nation-
state' as the only legitmate unit of governance, and one which regularly and 
inevitably generates nationalism as a means to produce such a prescribed unit. 
The chapter on Lord Acton, on the other hand, attempts to demonstrate that an 
explicitly anti-nationalist liberalism, advocating various anti-homogenising concepts 
and strategies, logically ends up in the totally anti-liberal and anti-democratic 
concepts and practices of racial and social segregation. While nationalist 
homogenisation and the homogenous ‘nation-state’ regularly lead to illiberal 
practices, Acton’s theory demonstrates that a liberalism that completely rejects the 
former does not even remain true to its basic principles and values. The paradoxical 
but logical conclusion, which I hope to support with hard textual evidence in the 
chapters to come, is that nationalism, with all its illiberal practices and excesses, is 
the inevitable price that has to be paid for introducing liberal-democratic principles, 




The dissertation is divided into five chapters, each of them dealing with one 
paradigmatic liberal thinker. The first three chapters of this thesis, through analysis of 
three paradigmatic contractarian liberals (Algernon Sidney, Jean Jacques Rousseau, 
John Rawls), address three nationalism’s key-questions: 1. what ‘nations’ and 
‘liberty’ mean in the liberal discourse, and how that specific interpretation has 
actually established the nationalist doctrine (1st chapter), 2. how individuals ‘liberate’ 
themselves by perpetually identifying themselves with their ‘nation’, whereby the 
former’s mass-identifications with the latter substantiate the latter as a really existing 
social phenomenon (2nd chapter), and 3. how ‘the nation’ is being perpetually 
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substantiated and homogenised on the person-to-person level, through the uniform 
ritual procedures of members’ mutual recognition as ‘free and equal’ (3rd chapter). 
The 4th chapter, focused on one paradigmatic utilitarian liberal (John Stuart Mill), 
addresses the question whether the concept of ‘liberty’ in liberalism is inevitably 
conditioned by the existence of the homogenous ‘nation-state’ and its institutions. 
The 5th, final chapter (on Lord Acton’s theory of liberty), addresses the question 
whether a liberalism that rejects nationalism and ‘the nation-state’ can remain faithful 




The first chapter is devoted to Algernon Sidney, the paradigmatic 17th-century liberal, 
the first well-known author who explicitly proposed that ‘nations’ had the intrinsic 
right to legislate for themselves, so that they had the intrinsic right to establish their 
own states with legislative institutions.  
“What is a nation?” asked Abbe Sieyes, one of the prophets of the French 
Revolution and one of the undisputed founders of the nationalist doctrine. The answer 
was simple: “A body of associates living under one common law and represented by 
the same legislature.”16 What makes that body ‘the nation’, regardless of its size, and 
what makes it sovereign, is the possession of its own legislative institutions. Creating 
legislative institutions within a group, therefore, would be enough for a group to 
become ‘the nation’. Thus, the possession of these institutions legitimises a group as 
‘the nation’. However, such a postulate concerning ‘the nation’s’ essence and role had 
already been proposed by Sidney, in the 1680s, one century before Sieyes.   
Sidney was Locke’s contemporary, and they both wrote their main theoretical 
works, Discourses Concerning Government and Two Treatises of Government, in 
response to Sir Robert Filmer’s book Patriarcha.17 Eventually, Locke has become a 
symbol of liberalism and Sidney has been marginalised, but Sidney’s influence with 
the founders of the United States (especially with Jefferson), one century later, was 
known as even greater than Locke’s. This is hardly a surprise, because Sidney’s 
                                                 
16
 Cited in Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 7. 
17
 Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha: A Defence of the Natural Power of Kings against the Unnatural 
Liberty of the People, first published in 1680. In his book Filmer claimed that contemporary monarchs 
inherited their thrones in the direct lineage from the Biblical Adam. In their respective responses, 
Sidney and Locke postulated the theory of popular sovereignty. 
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explicitness and clarity about the right of ‘nations’ to found their own states once they 
acquire the ability to legislate were matching the political needs of the founders much 
better than Locke’s rhetorical ambiguity on the same issue (in Locke’s terms, the 
right to govern themselves was reserved for ‘freemen’, which may well have served 
to legitimise the claims to statehood internally, within the community, but was not so 
useful to legitimise these claims in external, state-to-state relations).18   
In my view, Sidney’s postulate practically established nationalism as a doctrine, 
much before Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation, as proposed by Kedourie. 
Sidney promoted ‘nations’ as the sole source of political legitimacy, without ever 
defining what ‘nations’ were supposed to mean, and thus introduced nationalism’s 
basic tenet, that of acquiring political legitimacy by arbitrarily applying the term ‘the 
nation’ to legitimise a group’s aspirations to legislative power, with the latter being 
labelled as ‘liberty’. Both for Sidney and for the present-day nationalists, the mere 
title of ‘the nation’ legitimises claims to legislative power and therefore to statehood 
(that is, to ‘liberty’); in both cases, the sociological content of the term ‘the nation’ is 
understood as a variable, subject to arbitrary adaptations, depending on political 
circumstances. The constant is the very term ‘the nation’, which legitimises claims to 
legislative power by those groups or parts of society which establish their monopoly 
on the use of the term to brand themselves, whatever their own sociological profile. 
For Sidney, as much as for the nationalists-proper, constituting ‘the nation’, and 
legitimising one’s claims to power by referring to oneself as ‘the nation’, is about 
monopolising legislative power and about overpowering (by eliminating or 
absorbing) other claimants to that power. In this process, the very title ‘the nation’ 
always remains the sole source of political legitimacy. Thus the sociological content 
of the term ‘the nation’ becomes the most contentious for the definition of who can 
actually legitimise aspirations to legislative power and statehood. Eventually, the key-
question becomes what is it, sociologically, that gives one the right to use the title of 
‘the nation’ to categorise oneself and thereby legitimise claims to legislative power, 
depicting these claims as claims to ‘liberty’. The struggle over the monopoly on this 
type of legitimacy within one limited political space is what constitutes nationalism as 
an actual political process and as an actual social phenomenon. What makes the 
aspiration to the monopoly on the title of ‘the nation’ defensible is one’s actual ability 
                                                 
18
 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).  
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to defend it when confronted with competing aspirations. As implied in Sidney’s 
theory, the actual ability of one group to claim legislative power for itself under the 
name of ‘liberty’, then to legitimise its pretensions to legislate for itself by 
proclaiming itself ‘the nation’, and then to monopolise within a limited political 
space the use of the title ‘the nation’ for itself, is what constitutes that group as ‘the 
nation’. The actual power to monopolise the title of ‘the nation’ thus becomes the 
source of the ‘right’ to legislate within that political space (that is, the source of 
‘liberty’, which is by Sidney’s definition contained in ‘nations’ as their ‘natural 
right’). Therefore, it is might that makes right and thus retrospectively legitimises 
claims to legislative power as ‘natural’. Thus Sidney practically established 
nationalism’s main principle of transforming one’s actual power to monopolise the 
title of ‘the nation’ into one’s ‘natural right’ to legislate, under the name of ‘liberty’ 
and on behalf of ‘the nation’. The word ‘liberty’ has thus become the code-word for 
the power to legislate, which one can actually seize by military or political means and 
then retrospectively legitimise by monopolising the title of ‘the nation’ for oneself.   
For Sidney and the English revolutionaries, and later for the French and American 
revolutionaries, the right to the title of ‘the nation’ was thus reserved for those 
sections of society with the actual military or political power to seize the legislative 
power and thereby retrospectively gain political legitimacy. To the present day, those 
who call themselves ‘liberals’ and strive for ‘liberty’ in terms of legislative power 
usually rely on their power of political or military pressure, and legitimise their 
actions by monopolising for themselves the title of ‘the nation’. They all rely on one 
comprehensive theory of political legitimacy which was first promulgated in the 17th-
century England by Algernon Sidney (and supported by Locke), and which has since 
become the norm in the modern political system. Sidney was probably the first author 
who explicitly proclaimed ‘the nation’ the sole source of political legitimacy, without 
ever defining its semantic or sociological content. He thus announced the rise of the 
doctrine of nationalism, whose main postulate is that political legitimacy can be 
acquired by an arbitrary, forceful monopolising of the term ‘the nation’ by whatever 
arbitrary claimants to legislative power, provided that they demonstrate their ability to 
actually seize it, provided that their claims are presented under the name of ‘the 
struggle for liberty’, and provided that they successfully monopolise the title of ‘the 
nation’ only for themselves. This is why the first chapter of this thesis is focused on 
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The second chapter deals with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory, as the paradigm of 
both the 18th-century liberalism and contractarian liberalism in general.  Rousseau, 
who was praised by Kant as the one who first established the valid principle of liberty 
and vilified by most 20th-century liberals as the one who established the principles of 
the 20th-century totalitarianisms, developed a most comprehensive theory of liberty, 
in which freedom is defined – paradoxically by common standards – as the ability to 
reconcile man’s individual will with ‘the general will’ of society, in the form of the 
former’s obedience to the latter. Although Rousseau never explicitly defines the 
means for practical articulation of ‘the general will’19, it is not logical to assume that 
Rousseau, as a disciple of Montesquieu, ever conceived of ‘the general will’ in some 
mystical terms, as a given, pre-societal unit or unity which needs no articulation on 
the societal level (or, to which man has to return), as most of his critics did assume 
(some also say that he used the term ‘the nation’ in the same, pre-societal and 
mystical sense20); what is logical to assume (and I follow this assumption) is that ‘the 
general will’ of society was meant to be practically articulated and expressed 
primarily through society’s legislative acts, by which society would establish itself as 
‘the nation’, by political means and in the political process. Rousseau’s ‘general will’ 
is the expression of the general interest as an eminently political category, and is 
always achieved in the political process through direct participation and public 
deliberation.   
Although Rousseau comes quite close to Sidney’s theory of liberty as ‘national self-
determination’ by means of autonomous legislation, his theory of liberty remains 
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 This is the most elaborate definition of ‘the general will’ that Rousseau offers: “There is often a 
great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the 
common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of 
particular wills: but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, 
and the general will remains as the sum of the differences.”  (The Social Contract, Book II, Ch. 3) 
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 See the second chapter. For Montesquieu, ‘the general will’ was the ‘spirit’ which was necessary for 
the establishment of the laws, and was to be equated with the ‘spirit of a nation’ (Montesquieu, The 
Spirit of the Laws, Book XIX, Ch. 4). Developing the line established by Sidney, in which ‘the nation’ 
was assumed to be a proto-political category seeking to find its proper political expression in the form 
of the sovereign state, Montesquieu postulated that ‘the spirit of the nation’ was in fact the spirit which 
inspires the laws of the country, thus making it ‘the nation-state’.    
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primarily concerned with reconciling man’s individual will with ‘the general will’ of 
society, the latter being articulated through its own laws.21 Thus for Rousseau liberty 
is not merely about society’s possessing its own legislative institutions; it is rather 
about reconciling man’s individual will with these institutions’ legislative acts, as the 
primary source of society’s ‘general will’. Given his tacit assumption that the 
possession of independent legislative institutions is what actually transforms society 
into ‘the nation’ (which is the tacit assumption he shares with Sidney), and that the 
possession of these institutions actually brings about what he calls ‘the general will’, 
his principle of liberty as the reconciling of man’s individual will with society’s 
‘general will’ is what makes it possible for man as an individual to practically identify 
his will with that of ‘the nation’ and to perceive that identification as his own 
liberation. According to Rousseau’s logic, which is rather implicit than explicit in 
Rousseau’s writings but which has been embraced and brought to its logical 
conclusion by all latter-day nationalists, striving for ‘the nation’s’ ‘self-
determination’ and ‘liberation’ in the form of its own state, with its own legislative 
institutions, is what logically leads to man’s own liberation and self-determination. 
Inversely, when society can not articulate its own ‘general will’ in the form of its own 
legislation, not possessing its own legislative institutions and its own state, man can 
not be free. For, man’s freedom depends on the existence of ‘the general will’, and 
the existence of ‘the general will’ depends on the existence of independent legislative 
institutions, which ‘the nation’ can fully acquire only by establishing its own state.22                   
Following the logic of Rousseau’s theory of liberty, nationalism perpetually 
articulates itself on the societal level through the process of the perpetual establishing 
of identity between man’s individual will and the presumed will of society, eventually 
bringing the social phenomenon called ‘the nation’ into existence: through repeated 
nationalist mass-mobilisations and mass-identifications in the name of ‘liberty’ and 
along the lines of ‘national unity’, the abstract concept is perpetually being 
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 For Rousseau, the central political and philosophical problem is: “The problem is to find a form of 
association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each 
associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain 
as free as before.” (The Social Contract, Book I, Ch. 6)  
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 Unlike 19th- and 20th-century nationalists, Rousseau never treats ‘the nation’ as a pre-political 
fantasy. Remaining true to his theory of ‘social contract’, he postulates that ‘the nation’ always comes 
into existence by an act of public deliberation, as the only conceivable founding act of society, which 
is by itself political.  Like Sidney before him, he uses the term ‘the nation’ referring to a group with 
half-developed, proto-political institutions, not to a pre-political association; for him, association can 
only be politically established and developed.  
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transformed into a really existing social phenomenon. The doctrine of nationalism 
regards these oscillatory mass-identifications of individual citizens with their ‘nation’, 
that is, mass-manifestations of ‘national unity’, as the only conceivable manifestations 
of man’s freedom. Rousseau’s theory of liberty has provided a socio-psychological 
mechanism through which these mass-mobilisations and mass-identifications actually 
function, providing them also with a universal philosophical rationale of struggle for 





The third chapter analyses John Rawls’s ‘theory of justice’, as the most elaborated 
philosophical framework and socio-psychological micro-mechanism through which 
the manifestations of ‘national unity’ are being perpetuated and through which ‘the 
nation’ is being substantiated and homogenised. Rawls’s aim was to return to 
liberalism’s contractarian roots, which were in the 19th- and 20th-century Anglo-
American liberalism totally neglected due to the overwhelming influence of different 
forms of utilitarianism,23  and “to present a conception of justice which generalizes 
and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract” 
of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Unlike these three authors, for whom the object of the 
original contract was to enter a given society or adopt a given form of government, 
Rawls sought to adopt the principles of justice for ‘the basic structure of society’ and 
to ascertain which principles it would be rational to adopt given the initial contractual 
situation. Being aware of classical liberalism’s affinity for the nationalist principles 
and ‘the nation-state’, Rawls attempts not to rely “on an undefined concept of 
community”, and not to “suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its 
own distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one 
                                                 
23
 Rawls’s main objection to utilitarianism is that it does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons when it postulates the principle of ‘the greatest sum of happiness for the greatest number’ of 
persons. In this collectivistic construction many persons are fused into one; but, “there is no reason to 
suppose that the principles which should regulate an association of men is simply an extension of the 
principle of choice for one man”. The principle of utility is incompatible with Rawls’s principle of 
social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage, which is based on the idea of reciprocity. In 
Rawls’s ‘well-ordered’, ‘just’ society, the principle of ‘justice as fairness’ (that is, as reciprocity) 
“denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others”. John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 
24-25. 
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another”.24 Instead, he assumes that society consists of, and is formed by, its 
members’ reciprocal relations with one another. From this conception, individualistic 
in its essence, he attempts to eventually prove the value of community. In my analysis 
of Rawls’s theory, I attempt to prove that Rawls’s community, labelled as ‘well-
ordered society’, is nothing else but the well-known homogenous ‘nation-state’, and 
that these reciprocal relations between the community’s members perpetually 
strengthen the nationalist principles of homogeneity, of inclusion and exclusion, of 
equality among members and inequality with non-members, and of the self-isolation 
of the homogenous ‘national’ community from other such communities. The 
presumed purely procedural nature of Rawls’s concept of fairness as reciprocity 
suggests that ‘the basic structure of society’ can be established as a network of purely 
procedural, contentless relations between individuals. However, in the third chapter 
of my thesis I attempt to demonstrate that individuals’ perpetual reciprocal 
recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ is the exact content of these relations, 
and that this very procedure of perpetual mutual recognition is actually the exact 
content of nationalism, as a social phenomenon with very concrete implications and 
consequences, far away from any abstract ‘procedural justice’ to which Rawls 
aspired.  
In Rawls’s ‘well-ordered society’, as well as in any democratic society derived from 
classical liberalism, members never enter any conflicts over their (possibly diverse 
and divergent) ‘comprehensive doctrines’; actually, they never touch upon their 
diverse conceptions of the good, despite the claims to the contrary: they only 
procedurally, ritually endorse their common good, that of being ‘free’ and ‘equal to 
one another’. On this, they reach a permanent consensus, permanently and 
procedurally recognising one another as ‘equal’. Thus this permanent consensus is 
made up of citizens themselves, not of their respective ‘comprehensive doctrines’. 
This is liberalism’s greatest invention, elaborated in detail and perfected by Rawls: no 
genuine conflicts over ‘comprehensive doctrines’ and ideologies (which are expelled 
into the strictly private sphere), only genuine conflicts over membership, over 
inclusion in, and exclusion from, the perpetual ritual display of reciprocal 
recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’. In permanently recognising one 
another as ‘free and equal’, members live out this permanent, procedural, ritual 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., p. 234. 
 21 
display of mutual recognition as a permanent political consensus, thereby 
permanently affirming this very consensus as ‘the basic structure of society’. This 
‘basic structure’, which functions as the consensus they permanently endorse (by 
procedurally endorsing themselves and each other as ‘free and equal’), is ‘the nation’ 
itself. ‘The nation’ is thus being substantiated and homogenised by the procedures of 
citizens’ permanent, ritual, reciprocal recognising of one another as ‘free and equal’, 
that is, by their permanent ritual recognising of one another as its members. Thus ‘the 
nation’ (this is also the logic derived from Rousseau’s theory of liberty) is being 
permanently and ritually endorsed as the only conceivable framework within which 
its members can be recognised as ‘free and equal’, and this permanent and ritual 
endorsement is actually nationalism’s only content. Nationalism operates on the 
societal level through such endorsing and self-endorsing manifestations (based on the 
well-established procedures of members’ mutual recognition), so that – primarily due 
to the existence of these well-established, ‘nationalising’ procedures – ‘the nation’ is 
being perpetually substantiated and perpetually homogenised. 
  In Rawls’s main works, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism,25 ‘the basic 
structure of society’ is conceived as a closed, self-contained society, having no 
relations with other societies. Self-isolation is for Rawls a precondition for a society 
to build its ‘basic structure’ on the shared conception of justice as a ‘fair distribution’ 
of rights, duties, benefits and burdens between members as ‘equals’. ‘The original 
position’ from which that ‘basic structure’ is to be built is defined as an initial status 
quo in which any agreements reached are fair, unanimity is possible and the 
deliberations of any one person are typical of all. The same is also supposed to 
develop in the ‘well-ordered society’, in which every person is supposed to have the 
identical sense of ‘justice’ as reciprocity, so that, in this moral consensus, the ‘well-
ordered society’ is homogenous. Moreover, the consequence is that, by perpetually 
displaying the identical sense of reciprocity in their mutual relations, members of the 
‘well-ordered society’ perpetually strengthen these relations and homogenise 
themselves as this society’s members, and perpetually display their own homogeneity 
in opposition to all non-members, aiming at the latter’s absolute exclusion. 
Eventually, Rawls’s self-isolated and self-contained society becomes a totally 
involuntary and exclusionary scheme of social cooperation, which the individual 
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 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2003), John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
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“enters only by birth and exits only by death”, and which is just like the self-
contained, self-perpetuating, and perpetually self-homogenising ‘nation’ from 
nationalists’ wildest dreams, in which only birth gives the right to membership, and 
death only deprives of that right.    
While living in the ‘well-ordered society’ which is self-isolated and self-contained, 
the members also perpetually homogenise the society itself on the basis of that 
society’s values and norms (including internal reciprocity, equality, fraternity, etc.), 
as opposed to other societies which homogenise themselves on their own values and 
norms, whatever these are. Even if all societies adopt the same set of values and 
norms, based on ‘justice as reciprocity’, they cannot share these values and merge 
with one another: as demonstrated in Rawls’s The Law of Peoples,26 they all have to 
remain distinct, self-contained and self-isolated (they are even labelled as ‘peoples’, 
which are assumed to be inherently and unchangeably distinct from one another). 
Thus the ‘well-ordered society’ is designed to become ever-more homogenous, by 
perpetually homogenising itself internally by strengthening the reciprocal relations 
between its individual members, which is necessary for it to establish and maintain 
reciprocal relations of equality with other self-homogenising, ‘well-ordered’ 
societies. This, in fact, is the basic mechanism through which the existing ‘nation-
state system’ already operates, in which only self-homogenising ‘nation-states’ 
subsist and within which non-homogenous and non-‘national’ states have serious 
problems in terms of their mere survival. Rawls’s theory of ‘reciprocity’ in inter-
societal relations, when applied, thus practically leads to reciprocity in checking and 
recognising one another’s self-homogenising assertiveness, that is, one another’s 
nationalism. Rawls’s theory of ‘reciprocity’ in intra-societal relations, when applied, 
practically leads to the ever-increasing strengthening of fraternal bonds between 
society’s members; and, as a consequence, it inevitably leads to their permanent, 
ever-increasing nationalistic homogenisation against all non-members, that is, against 
members of all other societies. In both cases, Rawls’ theory of ‘justice as fairness’ 
provides a comprehensive scheme for permanent homogenisation of all societies 
which endorse ‘procedural reciprocity’ in their members’ relations. In this sense, 
Rawls’s theory brings the doctrine of nationalism to its full self-consciousness, 
providing it with the most elaborated mechanism by which it can operate on the 
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micro-level, in the person-to-person communication. The third chapter of this thesis 




The fourth chapter is devoted to John Stuart Mill, as the paradigm of both 
utilitarianism and the 19th-century liberalism, and it ultimately demonstrates that 
‘national’ homogeneity, ‘national self-determination’ and the homogenous ‘nation-
state’ are within the logic of utilitarian liberalism regarded as the conditio sine qua 
non of man’s freedom. In his essay Considerations on the Representative 
Government, John Stuart Mill advances the postulate that “free institutions are next to 
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities”,27 so that, “it is in general 
a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should 
coincide in the main with those of nationalities.”28 Mill here practically equates ‘free 
institutions’ with ‘national’ institutions. The homogenous ‘nation-state’ thus arises as 
a ‘necessary condition of free institutions’; therefore, only ‘national’ institutions are 
to be regarded as free institutions, and only those individuals who live in the 
homogenous ‘nation-state’ can exercise ‘liberty’ institutionally.    
For Mill, “liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to 
the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal 
discussion.”29 According to the inherent logic of liberalism in general (which reaches 
a full circle in Mill’s theory of liberty), ‘free and equal discussion’ between 
‘autonomous individuals’ is a necessary precondition of ‘liberty’, if ‘liberty’ is taken 
as the ability to legislate institutionally. For, there can be no institutional legislation 
without ‘free and equal discussion’ between ‘autonomous individuals’ (branded also 
as ‘citizens’), and this ability to be ‘free’ through independent institutional legislation 
is what actually constitutes ‘nations’, as much as such ‘nations’, according to John 
Gray, construct ‘autonomous individuals’ by putting them – in Rawls’s terms – into 
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the position to reciprocally recognise one another as ‘free and equal’.30 This 
institutional exercise of ‘liberty’, through independent legislative institutions, is thus 
paradoxically but necessarily linked to both homogenisation and individualisation: 
homogenised public opinion, according to Mill, is – as much as ‘free and equal 
discussion’ between ‘autonomous individuals’ – a paradoxical but necessary 
condition for functioning of ‘free institutions’.31 On the other hand, common 
legislation exercised through such ‘free institutions’ homogenises the political space 
it covers:32 ‘national’ homogeneity is a condition of ‘free’ legislation, the ability to 
‘freely’ legislate is what constitutes ‘nations’, and ‘national’, ‘free’ legislation 
conditions (i.e. homogenises) in terms of ‘nationalising’.   
In Mill’s terms, a ‘division of human race’ can be ‘ripe for free institutions’ and 
therefore ready to be ‘free’ only when it is extricated from mingling under the same 
government with other ‘divisions of human race’, by which (that is, by acquiring its 
own, ‘free institutions’ for legislation) it is elevated to the status of ‘nationality’, that 
is, to the status of a ‘civilized group’. For Mill, “the social state is at once so natural, 
so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or 
by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a 
member of a body; and this association is riveted more and more, as mankind are 
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 See John Gray’s quotation above. In Gray’s opinion, ‘national’ homogenisation through ‘national’ 
legislative institutions (which Mill labels as ‘free institutions’) has produced, paradoxically, both the 
homogenous ‘nation-state’ (‘free state’) and ‘the autonomous individual’ (‘free individual’). In this 
thesis, I fully adopt Gray’s view that this paradox is the fundamental principle of the modern, liberal-
democratic society, which is thus – as the ultimate paradox – both nationalistic and individualistic.    
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further removed from the state of savage independence.”33 Since Mill assumes that 
we, as human beings, ‘desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures’34, we have to be 
granted (or, if we happen to lack in this ‘desire’, even imposed35) freedom to be ‘in 
unity’ with our ‘fellow creatures’, thereby fully realising our human ‘nature’. The 
fullest realisation of the human ‘natural desire to be in unity with our fellow 
creatures’ is thus to be regarded as the fullest practical realisation of the principle of 
utility, that is, of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. The realisation of 
the ‘natural desire’ to be ‘in unity’ and to be ‘free to unite’ (within the prescribed 
framework of ‘the sentiment of nationality’) thus at the same time promotes the 
principle of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ and the principle of 
‘advancement in civilization’ (since it ‘further removes’ mankind ‘from the state of 
savage independence’). Thus, by being a ‘member of a body’ and therefore realising 
his ‘natural desire to be in unity’, ‘the autonomous individual’ becomes both 
‘civilised’, ‘free’, and fully ‘human’. From the utilitarian point of view, his 
‘membership in a body’ through the full assertion of ‘the sentiment of nationality’ 
(through the establishment of its own ‘nation-state’) thus arises as the central 
category of the entire Mill’s theory, one that simultaneously promotes both ‘liberty’ 
and ‘civilization’, while fully realising ‘human nature’ and ‘the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number’.   
Since the establishment of ‘the nation-state’, while simultaneously promoting 
‘improvement in civilization’ and ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’, is 
to be seen as the necessary condition of ‘free institutions’, and the existence of ‘free 
institutions’ is regarded as essential for the promotion of individual freedom, the 
ultimate conclusion that arises from Mill’ theory is that ‘the individual’ from the 
liberal doctrine can be free only in ‘the nation-state’, so that his individual freedom 
can only be acquired only through the collectivist process of ‘nation-building’ 
(which, if necessary, may be forced or imposed from without). According to 
Brubaker’s and Beissinger’s theories adopted in this thesis, that process is just 
another name for nationalism as a social phenomenon: ‘nations’ can only be 
perpetually built through perpetual assertions of the nationalist discourse (Brubaker’s 
‘nationhood’) and of nationalistic behaviours and practices (Brubaker’s ‘nationness’) 
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 “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their 
improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.” (‘On Liberty’, op. cit., pp. 14-15) 
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in society as a whole. Therefore, as the fourth chapter of this thesis concludes, ‘the 
individual’ in the liberal doctrine can only be ‘free’ by perpetually building ‘the 
nation’, that is, by permanently exercising nationalism through the perpetual 
manifestations of absolute alienation of his own will to the ‘general will’ of ‘the 
nation’, that is, through the perpetual assertions of his absolute identification with 
‘the nation’ (i.e. with his ‘co-nationals’ who, through perpetual recognition of one 
another as ‘free and equal’, constitute both ‘the nation’ and themselves as 




The fifth, final chapter turns to Lord Acton, a 19th-century liberal thinker, who is 
paradigmatic as the only classical liberal who openly rejected both nationalism and 
‘the nation-state’, denouncing them as the embodiment of illiberal, arbitrary power 
and of the essentially absolutist character of the modern democratic theory and 
practice. In his criticism of modern society’s mechanical character, Acton resembles 
Rousseau. Modern society abolished corporations and classes, and replaced persons 
with moral duties towards their respective corporations and classes with mere units, 
with ‘equal’ and isolated ‘individuals’, loyal only to the state. In modern society all 
classes were either abolished – if higher – or absorbed – if lower – by the middle 
class, which presented itself as a quasi-organism called ‘the nation’. This quasi-
organism proclaimed its nominal sovereignty in relation to other such presumed 
quasi-organisms through the actual seizure of the state sovereignty. At the same time, 
paradoxically, the middle class also modelled itself as a mechanical collection of 
‘sovereign individuals’, thereby proclaiming their absolute freedom from any 
commitment to classes, corporations and religious communities, with their exclusive 
allegiance to ‘the nation’ (as some sort of a ‘greater middle class’ and a bridge 
between ‘individuals’ and the state). Thus the middle class legitimised its practical 
seizure of the state sovereignty, by nominally elevating itself onto the level of ‘the 
nation’, and by depicting the latter as the sole source of legitimacy and sovereignty. 
As a quasi-community of ‘sovereign individuals’, designed to legitimise the seizure 
of the state sovereignty and be worshipped itself as ‘sovereign’, ‘the nation’ was also 
designed to bridge the gap between ‘sovereign individuals’ and the sovereign state, 
thus ultimately projecting the object of their worship into the state itself. In Acton’s 
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view, all that could only strengthen absolutistic tendencies within the modern state, 
and ultimately led to its becoming absolutistic. And absolute power was regarded, not 
only by Acton, as the exact opposite of ‘liberty’.     
In Acton’s ideal society, both institutions and corporations would organically grow 
(including a delicate balance between the Church and the state), through a process of 
“weighing instead of counting”, so that classes and corporate interests, rather than 
single individuals, would be represented in the state institutions. His ideal was thus to 
be found in the Middle Ages rather than in modern times, so he proclaimed 
aristocracy and monarchy the most compatible with ‘liberty’, and not even monarchy 
alone, but monarchy by divine right: ‘liberty’ was inaccessible to arbitrary change 
only when there was a recognised “divine, objective right, anterior to every human 
law, superior to every human will”.36   
However, given the absence of traditional corporations and classes in modern 
society, Acton discovered their possible equivalent in the state consisting of a 
multitude of ‘nationalities’, so that he prescribed the ‘multi-national’ state as the only 
possible framework for what he regarded as ‘liberty’. This brought him into the direct 
opposition to his contemporary, John Stuart Mill, who claimed that the state 
consisting of only one ‘nationality’ was the only possible framework for the 
promotion of ‘liberty’. Referring to Mill’s claim that “one hardly knows what any 
division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the 
various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves,” 
Acton clearly saw that “it is by this act that a nation constitutes itself”; for, “to have a 
collective will, unity is necessary, and independence is requisite in order to assert 
it.”37 Unlike Mill (and rather like Rousseau), Acton did not imagine ‘the nation’ as a 
given, a-historical, pre-political category, whose ‘general will’ could only be 
articulated in its own, independent state. For Acton, ‘the nation’ could only be 
constituted historically and politically, by a voluntary act of contractual association 
and a seizure of state sovereignty.38 On the contrary, the ‘theory of nationality’, to 
which Mill subscribed and which Acton denounced as arbitrary, assumed that ‘unity’ 
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was a precondition of the existence of ‘the general will’, and that both ‘unity’ and ‘the 
general will’ were already contained in any demand for political independence. 
According to that theory, any demand for political independence automatically 
signalled the existence of both ‘unity’ and ‘the general will’; i.e. signalled the 
existence of ‘the nation’. Thus any group within a society might claim its own will to 
power to be ‘the general will’, asserting itself as ‘the nation’ by demanding 
independence, and the legitimacy of its claim would be contained in this very 
demand. The arbitrary will to power, legitimised as ‘the general will’ of the hitherto 
unknown entity called ‘the nation’, thus might well bring such a fictional entity into 
being, while retrospectively depicting it as a natural ‘division of the human race’.   
However, ‘nations’, as a cognitive frame and a practical-political category, remain 
uncontested in Acton’s vision, too. In contrast to Mill, Acton only questions whether 
‘the nation’ should produce a state of its own, which would remain internally 
unchecked and unbalanced and therefore inherently absolutist. Such a ‘nation-state’ 
would be only externally checked and balanced by other such states (which, then, 
could only strengthen its inherent absolutist tendencies). The alternative, proposed by 
Acton, is that ‘nations’ check potential absolutism of, and balance one another within, 
a ‘multi-national’ state. A ‘multi-national’ empire (such as the British and Austro-
Hungarian ones) thus becomes Acton’s ideal form of government. In these modern 
empires, unlike in the traditional ones, ‘subjects’ do not merge into a numberless 
mass: ‘nations’ within the modern empire remain internally homogenous, in order to 
be able to act as corporate bodies and thus check and balance one another. For Acton, 
“the combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of 
civilised life as the combination of men in society”.39 For, “where political and 
national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a 
condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow-
men”.40 In these lines Acton’s critique of nationalism reaches its moral peak: 
nationalism is dismissed as an ideology that leads into the opposite direction from 
that of civilisation. However, trying to identify any leverage that would undermine 
nationalism’s mechanism for simultaneous isolation of both ‘nations’ and 
‘individuals’, Acton was prepared to advocate some ideas and strategies that would 
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nowadays be treated as morally unacceptable and uncivilised.41 In  Acton’s theory, 
‘liberty’ could only be based on the system of checks and balances, and it was by 
definition present in all societies with fixed classes and corporate bodies, which 
would balance one another and thus check the absolute forms of power. Since slavery 
was a system that was designed to fix the classes of slave-owners and slaves, even 
slavery was to be regarded as a legitimate form of protection from absolutist 
tendencies in society and thereby a means to ‘liberty’. For Acton, slavery was a 
‘check’ on the ruthless capitalist exploitation that would inevitably follow from the 
presumed ‘inequality’ between races, and was, therefore, serving the cause of 
‘liberty’. This brought his theory of ‘liberty’ based on checks and balances to its 
ultimate, anti-liberal conclusion. The fifth chapter of this thesis demonstrates that the 
only liberal theory which explicitly rejected nationalism and the homogenous ‘nation-
state’ necessarily adopted the logic of rigid social stratification and advocated totally 
anti-liberal concepts of social and racial segregation; in other words, it finally 
demonstrates that liberalism, in order to remain true to its own principles, cannot shy 




The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate through textual analyses that the 
liberalism-proper and the nationalism-proper, as two nominally separate ideologies, 
regularly converge and overlap in the works of paradigmatic liberal thinkers, ever 
since these two ideologies first appeared. Each of the dissertation’s five chapters is a 
monographic analysis of one of the five paradigmatic liberal authors, and each 
provides an answer to one of the key-questions concerning the nationalist doctrine 
and its relationship with liberalism. As stated above, these questions are: 
 
1. What do ‘nations’ and ‘liberty’ mean in the liberal discourse and how has that 
specific interpretation established the nationalist doctrine? (1st chapter)  
2. How do individuals ‘liberate’ themselves by perpetually identifying themselves 
with ‘their nations’ as abstract concepts, and how do these individuals’ mass-
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identifications with ‘their nations’ substantiate these ‘nations’ as really existing social 
phenomena? (2nd chapter) 
3. How is ‘the nation’ being perpetually substantiated and homogenised on the 
person-to-person level, through uniform ritual procedures of members’ reciprocal 
recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’? (3rd chapter) 
4. Is liberalism’s concept of ‘liberty’ inevitably conditioned by the existence of the 
homogenous ‘nation-state’ and its institutions? (4th chapter)  
5. Is it possible for a liberalism that rejects nationalism and ‘the nation-state’ to 
remain faithful to liberalism’s true nature? (5th chapter) 
 
Given the complementary nature of these questions, the five monographic analyses of 
the five paradigmatic authors (which attempt to answer these questions) provide five 
complementary rather than five comparable answers. Therefore, methodologically, 
the whole dissertation is not structured in the form of a comparative analysis of five 
comparable authors, but rather in the form of five complementary analyses that 
provide five complementary answers, which jointly make up a comprehensive picture 
of nationalism’s relationship with liberalism.  
This dissertation is focused on the textual analyses of the primary sources (books 
and works of the five selected authors), and deliberately attempts to use secondary 
literature economically. However, secondary literature is presented in a usual amount 
and manner in those parts of the dissertation (the chapters on Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
and John Stuart Mill) where secondary literature was relevant for stimulating a 
productive academic discussion, so as to improve the analyses of the primary sources. 
In other parts of the thesis (the chapters on Algernon Sidney and Lord Acton), 
secondary sources are used sparingly, mainly due to the objective scarcity of 
secondary sources on these authors. The corpus of secondary literature on John 
Rawls, although huge in amount and scope, is absolutely non-convergent with, and 
therefore totally irrelevant for, my argument presented in the chapter on Rawls. 
Therefore I have found it reasonable to avoid any discussion with it, saving the 
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Chapter One: Algernon Sidney 
 
 
Algernon Sidney, together with John Locke, was co-founder of the Anglo-Saxon 
branch of contractarian liberalism. Both Locke and Sidney wrote their major works 
(Two Treatises on Government and Discourses Concerning Government) in response 
to Sir Robert Filmer’s book Patriarcha,42 which advocated absolute monarchy and 
the divine right of kings, unrestrained by any earthly laws and supposedly transmitted 
through the direct lineage of paternal right from Adam (to whom God supposedly 
gave sovereign power over the world) to contemporary monarchs.43 However, while 
Locke has subsequently become widely recognised and publicly celebrated as the 
founder of the philosophic doctrine of the social contract and of political ideology of 
liberalism, Sidney’s name is known today mostly to scholars studying the very 
foundations of these two. Since 1805 (up to 1996) only one major reprint of Sidney’s 
Discourses appeared in public.44  
Although Sidney’s and Locke’s arguments in favour of people’s sovereignty today 
represent common knowledge, while Filmer’s advocacy of the divine right of kings 
has sunk into obscurity and may even look bizarre when brought to contemporary 
light, in the days preceding the 1688 Glorious Revolution most of Protestant England, 
a century and a half after Henry VIII declared his religious independence from Rome, 
still believed that unquestioning obedience to the king was “the only means, which 
could preserve the civil, from being swallowed by the ecclesiastical powers”.45 
Eventually, Sidney found himself in absolute minority on this question and his 
plotting against the English Monarchy, in the name of liberty and popular 
government, led to his trial and execution in 1683. To the last moment devoted to the 
cause of liberty, in the Apology in the Day of His Death Sidney wrote:  
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I had from my youth endeavoured to uphold the common rights of mankind, the laws of this 
land, and the true Protestant religion, against corrupt principles, arbitrary power, and Popery, 
and I do now willingly lay down my life for the same.46 
 
A hundred years after Sidney’s death he was still celebrated as a martyr for free 
government and his Discourses were still widely read in the English colonies in 
America and served as a source of inspiration for the founders of the United States, 
not least because they too endorsed the same principles for which Sidney had laid his 
head. Thomas Jefferson regarded John Locke and Algernon Sidney as the two leading 
sources of the American understanding of political liberty.47 Sidney’s motto, written 
in the visitor’s book during his visit to the University of Copenhagen, Manus haec 
inimica tyrannis, Einse petit placidam cum liberate quietam (This hand, enemy to 
tyrants, By the sword seeks calm peacefulness with liberty) to this day remains the 
official motto of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.48 However, Sidney fell out of 
fashion during the nineteenth century, when people began to favour persons like 
Cromwell and Napoleon,49 who, unlike Sidney who advocated liberty as self-
restraint,50 favoured the exercise of unrestrained power for grand state projects.    
It is not difficult to identify why the Discourses were so attractive to the 18th-
century founders of the United States, who were attempting to secede from the 
English monarchy and establish self-rule. The goal of the Discourses, Sidney 
explains, is to demonstrate that “nations have a right to make their own laws, 
constitute their own magistrates; and that such as are so constituted owe an account of 
their actions to those by whom, and for whom they are appointed”.51 For, his deepest 
conviction is that the liberties of ‘nations’ as pre-political categories are from God 
and Nature:52  
 
If any man ask how nations come to have the power of doing these things, I answer, that 
liberty being only an exemption from the dominion of another, the question ought not to be, 
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how a nation can come to be free, but how a man comes to have a dominion over it; for till 
the right of dominion be proved and justified, liberty subsists as arising from the nature and 
being of a man.53  
 
Since man is God’s creature, Sidney points out, that creature has nothing and is 
nothing but what the Creator made him; therefore he must owe all to the Creator, and 
nothing to anyone from whom he has received nothing. Man therefore must be 
naturally free, concludes Sidney, unless he be created by another power than we have 
yet heard of.54 Analogous to that of the Creator is paternal right, so that “the 
obedience due to parents arises from hence, in that they are those from whom under 
God we have received all. When they die we are their heirs, we enjoy the same rights, 
and devolve the same to our posterity”. 55 Thus man’s liberty is being transmitted 
from one generation to another, and this liberty therefore must continue, till it be 
either forfeited or willingly resigned:  
 
The forfeiture is hardly comprehensible in a multitude that is not entered into any society; 
(…) because where there is no society, one man is not bound by the actions of another. All 
cannot join in the same act, because they are joined in none; or if they should, no man could 
recover, much less transmit the forfeiture; and not being transmitted, it perishes as if it had 
never been, and no man can claim anything from it. (…)  Men could not resign their liberty, 
unless they naturally had it in themselves. Resignation is a publick declaration of their assent 
to be governed by the person to whom they resign; that is, they do by that act constitute him 
to be their governor. This necessarily puts us upon the inquiry, why they do resign, how they 
will be governed, and proves the governor to be their creature; and the right of disposing the 
government must be in them, or they who receive it can have none.56 
 
Denying Filmer’s basic assumption that Adam had been the first king on Earth, 
whose paternal right devolved to the first monarchs and then has been transmitted by 
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royal bloodline to all contemporary monarchs, Sidney argues that Adam’s paternal 
right devolves to, and is inherited by, the entire human race. For, “the pretended 
paternal right is divisible or indivisible: if divisible, ‘tis extinguished; if indivisible, 
universal,”57 and “every man that hath children, hath the right of a father, and is 
capable of preferment in a society composed of many”.58 On the other hand, no man 
comes to command many, unless by consent or by force.59 Giving the government of 
the world to one man without consent of all inevitably produces a state of slavery for 
all, because “to depend upon the will of a man is slavery”60. Therefore, “God having 
given the government of the world to no one man, nor declared how it should be 
divided, left it to the will of man”.61 Sidney thus concludes that God leaves to man the 
choice of forms in government; and those who constitute one form, may abrogate it.62  
That is why “all just magistratical power is from the people”,63 and “'tis natural for 
nations to govern, or to chuse governors; and… virtue only gives a natural preference 
of one man above another, or reason why one should be chosen rather than 
another”:64  
 
We have heard of nations that admitted a man to reign over them (that is, made him king) but 
of no man that made a people. (…) and all the world agrees, that qui dat esse, dat modum 
esse; he that makes him to be, makes him to be what he is: and nothing can be more absurd 
than to say, that he who has nothing but what is given, can have more than is given to him. If 
Saul and Romulus had no other title to be kings, than what the people conferred upon them, 
they could be no otherwise kings than as pleased the people: They therefore did not admit the 
people to be partakers of the government; but the people who had all in themselves, and could 
not have made a king if they had not had it, bestow'd upon him what they thought fit, and 
retained the rest in themselves.65 
 
That is why the ancients chose those to be kings, who excelled in the virtues that are 
most beneficial to civil societies.66 For, ‘freemen’ join together and frame greater or 
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lesser societies, and give such forms to them as best please themselves.67 Therefore, 
government is not instituted for the good of the governor, but of the governed,68 and 
“they who have a right of chusing a king, have the right of making a king”.69 
Societies are thus established by ‘freemen’ who join together and make a mutual 
contract and then expand the contract so as to appoint the magistrate to govern them, 
with restraint. Thus the right and power of a magistrate depends upon his institution, 
not upon his name:70  
 
No man can have a power over a nation otherwise than de jure, or de facto. He who pretends 
to have a power de jure, must prove that it is originally inherent in him or his predecessor 
from whom he inherits; or that it was justly acquired by him. (…) If the power were 
conferred on him or his predecessors, 'tis what we ask; for the collation can be of no value, 
unless it be made by those who had a right to do it; and the original right by descent failing, 
no one can have any over a free people but themselves, or those to whom they have given it. 
(…) If acquisition be pretended, 'tis the same thing; for there can be no right to that which is 
acquired, unless the right of invading be proved; and that being done, nothing can be acquired 
except what belonged to the person that was invaded, and that only by him who had the right 
of invading. (…) Whatsoever therefore proceeds not from the consent of the people, must be 
de facto only, that is, void of all right; and 'tis impossible there should not be a right of 
destroying that which is grounded upon none; and by the same rule that one man enjoys what 
he gained by violence, another may take it from him.71 
 
In order to restrain a magistrate’s power, the contract between him and the people 
consisted in the institution of the laws. The laws were therefore made to direct and 
instruct magistrates, and, if they will not be directed, to restrain them.72 In this 
essential sense, the laws are not made by kings, because ‘nations’ are to be governed 
by rule, and not arbitrarily,73 and because a presumption that kings will govern well, 
is not a sufficient security to the people.74 Therefore, kings (not being fathers of their 
people, nor excelling all others in virtue) can have no other just power than what the 
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laws give.75 For, it cannot be for the good of the people that the magistrate have a 
power above the law; and “he is not a magistrate who has not his power by law”.76 To 
sum up, the laws of every ‘nation’ are the measure of magistratical power.77  
Once established, our own laws confirm to us the enjoyment of our native rights, 
rights to liberty.78 For, the ability to make the laws, that is, the power to legislate, is 
what Sidney actually means by ‘liberty’. Thus ‘liberty’ in this early liberal discourse 
may practically be defined as ‘the power to legislate for oneself’. Those groups with 
the actual power to legislate for themselves are within this discourse granted the 
status of ‘nations’; inversely, those with the status of ‘nations’ are by definition 
recognised the ‘right’ to legislate for themselves. This means that within this 
discourse ‘nations’ are by definition recognised as free, that is, as the very source of 
‘liberty’ as the ‘right’ to legislative power. Within such a conceptual framework, the 
laws are by their very existence a confirmation of one’s ‘liberty’ (that is, of one’s 
legislative power), and obedience to the laws is therefore to be regarded as the 
practical exercise of one’s ‘liberty’. Thus Sidney, together with Locke and 
Montesquieu, laid the foundations for the future liberal concept of ‘liberty’ as the 
obedience to the moral (Kant) or societal (Rousseau) law.  79   
According to Sidney, the laws are thus always to be regarded as just and are to be 
obeyed:  “That which is not just, is not law; and that which is not law, ought not to be 
obeyed”,80 so that unjust commands are not to be obeyed; and no man is obliged to 
suffer for not obeying commands which are against law.81 Hence, “no people can be 
obliged to suffer from their kings what they have not a right to do”.82 On the contrary, 
“the mischiefs suffered from wicked kings are such as render it both reasonable and 
just for all nations that have virtue and power to exert both in repelling them”.83 The 
people for whom and by whom the magistrate is created, can only judge whether he 
rightly perform his office or not.84 Therefore, kings cannot be the interpreters of the 
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oaths they take.85 In this sense, “the general revolt of a nation cannot be called a 
rebellion”, because it is only a confirmation of ‘liberty’ as the essence of that 
‘nation’s’ existence:  
 
But tho every private man singly taken be subject to the commands of the magistrate, the 
whole body of the people is not so; for he is by and for the people, and the people is neither 
by nor for him. The obedience due to him from private men is grounded upon, and measured 
by the general law; and that law regarding the welfare of the people, cannot set up the interest 
of one or a few men against the publick. The whole body therefore of a nation cannot be tied 
to any other obedience than is consistent with the common good, according to their own 
judgment: (…) and having never been subdued or brought to terms of peace with their 
magistrates, they cannot be said to revolt or rebel against them to whom they owe no more 
than seems good to themselves, and who are nothing of or by themselves, more than other 
men.86 
 
Sidney clearly advocated not only the right to, but the benefit of, revolt against 
desolate conditions created by misrule: “‘Tis ill that men should kill one another in 
seditions, tumults and wars; but ‘tis worse to bring nations to such misery, weakness 
and baseness, as to have neither strength nor courage to contend for anything; to have 
nothing left worth defending, and to give the name of peace to desolation.”87 For 
Sidney, “it would be madness to think, that any nation can be obliged to bear 
whatsoever their own magistrates think fit to do against them”:88  
 
Allegiance signifies no more (as the words, ad legem declare) than such an obedience as the 
law requires. But as the law can require nothing from the whole people, who are masters of it, 
allegiance can only relate to particulars, and not to the whole. No oath can bind any other 
than those who take it, and that only in the true sense and meaning of it; but single men only 
take this oath, and therefore single men are only obliged to keep it; the body of a people 
neither does, nor can perform any such act.89  
 
In this essential sense, the body of people is sovereign in its ‘liberty’ to legislate and 
subject to no obligation external to its own free will. This sovereign body of people is 
what Sidney variously labels as ‘the nation’, ‘the people’ or ‘commonwealth’.90 For 
Sidney, this notion refers to a society formed by ‘freemen’ (that is, men who inherited 
their natural ‘liberty’ to legislate) who freely join together into a mutual law-making 
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contract and establish a sovereign law-making parliamentary assembly. It was then of 
the utmost importance for him to demonstrate that such “nations have power of 
meeting together, and of conferring, limiting, and directing the sovereignty; or all 
must be grounded upon most manifest injustice and usurpation”.91, in other words, 
that sovereignty is not a property of kings, but of ‘nations’ (“It was not by law nor by 
right, but by usurpation, fraud and perjury that some kings took upon them to pick 
what they pleased out of the publick acts.”92): 
 
I say that nations being naturally free may meet, when and where they please; may dispose of 
the sovereignty, and may direct or limit the exercise of it, unless by their own act they have 
deprived themselves of that right: and there could never have been a lawful assembly of any 
people in the world, if they had not had that power in themselves. It was proved in the 
preceding section, that all our kings having no title, were no more than what the nobility and 
people made them to be; that they could have no power but what was given to them, and 
could confer none except what they had received. If they can therefore call parliaments, the 
power of calling them must have been given to them, and could not be given by any who had 
it not in themselves.93  
 
As Sidney demonstrates in various historical examples, the people who meet and give 
the sovereign power also direct and limit its exercise. The laws of each people show 
in what manner and measure it is everywhere done and this shows that there is no 
such thing as a legislative power placed in kings by the laws of God and nature, but 
that ‘nations’ have it in themselves.94   
The word ‘nations’ in Sidney’s Discourses thus refers to groups with assembled 
law-making bodies, although it sometimes refers to groups whose tribal structure did 
not allow for any parliaments proper to be assembled. While Sidney points out that 
ancient North European tribes always had some form of law-making councils, which 
then may explain the use of the word ‘the nation’ in their case, he nevertheless refers 
to ‘the English nation’ as if this ‘nation’ preceded, in a purely ethnic or racial sense, 
the establishment of a law-making body:       
 
Magna Charta was not the original, but a declaration of the English liberties. The king's 
power is not restrained, but created by that and other laws; and the nation that made them can 
only correct the defects of them. (…) Magna Charta was not made to restrain the absolute 
authority; for no such thing was in being or pretended (the folly of such visions seeming to 
have been reserved to complete the misfortunes and ignominy of our age) but it was to assert 
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the native and original liberties of our nation by the confession of the king then being, that 
neither he nor his successors should any way encroach upon them: and it cannot be said that 
the power of kings is diminished by that or any other law; for as they are kings only by law, 
the law may confer power upon one in particular, or upon him and his successors, but can 
take nothing from them, because they have nothing except what is given to them.95 
 
Sidney puts a lot of effort in demonstrating that “the English nation has always been 
governed by itself or its representatives”96 and that “the people of England have never 
acknowledged any other human law than their own”97. However, unlike present-day 
nationalists, he admits that “in matters of the greatest importance, wise and good men 
do not so much inquire what has been, as what is good and ought to be; for that which 
of itself is evil, by continuance is made worse, and upon the first opportunity is justly 
to be abolished”. For, says Sidney, time cannot make anything lawful or just, that is 
not lawful or just of itself; and what is so, is of much force the first day as ever.98 
What matters to him, then, in an inquiry of the historical kind is to prove that “the 
nations whose rights we inherit, have ever enjoy’d the liberties we claim, and always 
exercised them in governing themselves popularly, or by such representatives as have 
been instituted by themselves, from the time they were first known in the world”.99   
Thus Sidney’s original intention was to demonstrate that popular government, rather 
than absolute monarchy, had always been the norm in England. Yet, he nevertheless 
established a type of argument which starts from the assumption that ‘nations’ have 
always enjoyed their ‘liberty’ (to legislate) and exercised them in governing 
themselves popularly, that they have never acknowledged any human law other than 
their own, and that such a state of affairs has reigned from the time they were first 
known in the world. Nationalists’ claims are commonly based precisely on this set of 
assumptions, and once this set is well-established, their struggle is mainly focused on 
the monopoly on defining the content of the term ‘the nation’; practically, on the 
monopoly on defining which group can and which one cannot legitimise its claims to 
legislative power (that is, to ‘liberty’) by using the term ‘the nation’ to categorise 
itself. By establishing such a set of assumptions, Sidney laid the foundations for 
nationalist ideology in England, which was the first such ideology to emerge on the 
historical scene.    
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 In an unconscious proto-nationalist manner, Sidney also used the word ‘nations’ to 
label the ancient historical ancestors of the contemporary Englishmen – Angles or 
Saxons, and Britains. Referring to Caesar’s writings, he ascribes to the latter a 
mythical aura of “a free people”, “zealous for liberty, and so obstinately valiant in the 
defence of it” that “their country could no otherwise be subdued, than by the 
slaughter of all the inhabitants that were able to bear arms”100, which has later 
become a central part of the British nationalist mythology.    
It is visible throughout the Discourses that Sidney applies the term ‘nations’ to 
groups with established forms of parliamentary councils, such as Saxons, no matter 
whether they were still tribally organised, nomadic or settled. This attaches a rather 
political (or proto-political, to be more precise) meaning to the term ‘the nation’, 
although it would be very difficult to perceive those tribal councils as comparable to 
modern parliaments. On the other hand, the idea of assembly or council as a crucial 
point in defining ‘the nation’ as distinct from other forms of social organisation may 
shed a new light on the primarily proto-political nature of those pre-modern 
‘nations’, which in contemporary social science mostly appear under the name of 
‘ethnic groups’. Of course, modern social science avoids using the term ‘the nation’ 
to describe pre-modern forms of social organisation, which are ignorant of the idea of 
the modern state (including its monopoly on the use of means of violence) and its 
administrative and economic instruments (including centralised fiscal, monetary and 
customs policy, fixed territory and monitored borders). Instead, it tends to employ the 
notion of ‘ethnic groups’, although it commonly reduces the concept of ethnicity to 
linguistic, cultural or genetic categories and rarely takes political institutions as 
relevant (even Barth’s ‘boundary theory’, which defines ethnic ‘boundaries’ as 
symbolic rather than substantial, does not take political institutions as relevant for 
ethnicity).101 In this context, it is significant to note that Sidney’s pre-modern 
‘nations’ – which may be with certainty identified with what is nowadays commonly 
labelled as ‘ethnic groups’ – are neither genetically nor linguistically nor culturally, 
but rather politically defined, as groups possessing their own proto-political 
institutions in the form of councils or assemblies. These institutions, unlike those of 
the modern state, did not have a unified reach over a clearly demarcated territory, but 
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nevertheless performed their crucial, law-making function. In this sense, it would be 
possible to establish a distinction between Sidney’s pre-modern ‘nations’, possessing 
their own proto-political law-making institutions without necessarily having their 
own state with a unified reach over a clearly demarcated territory, and modern 
‘nations’, employing the institutions of the modern state to exercise control over the 
demarcated territory and population. Thus – following Sidney – it would still be 
possible to apply the term ‘nations’ to pre-modern societies and groups with proto-
political institutions, without necessarily falling into the trap of primordialist 
arbitrariness or nationalist mythomania, which both tend to claim the link between 
modern ‘nations’ and ancient cultural or linguistic groups and regularly put the label 
of ‘nations’ on the latter. Yet, without employing the notion of ethnicity (whether 
supposedly based on culture, language, genetic code, religion or on Barth’s symbolic 
boundaries) it would be very difficult to distinguish between ancient ‘nations’ with 
their own proto-political, law-making institutions, such as Saxons, and ancient states, 
such as Sparta or Athens, which also possessed their own parliaments and were even 
the founders of the concept of citizenship (in the subsequent political theory 
necessarily related to the concept of nationality). And then the only available 
distinction applicable to the pre-modern times (Sidney himself does make a 
distinction between ancient and modern ‘nations’102), which would then be similar to 
the view later employed by nationalist mythology, would be one that defines pre-
modern ‘nations’ as ethnic groups with their own proto-political, law-making 
institutions. In this way, Sidney’s understanding of the term ‘the nation’, no matter 
how political in its appearance, inevitably ends up as ethnic rather than political in its 
essence. Thus Sidney approaches the position of ethnonationalists, who see ethnic 
groups (whose claims to ‘nationhood’ and statehood the former promote and 
legitimise by labelling the latter as ‘nations’) as the only legitimate (indeed, as the 
only possible) bases for the establishment of ‘nation-states’. However, in the 
comparison he makes between England and the Netherlands or Switzerland there is 
still a room for a view of England as a ‘nation’ based on civic rather than ethnic 
prinicples:  
 
The powers of every county, city and borough of England, are regulated by the general law to 
which they have all consented, and by which they are all made members of one political 
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body. This obliges them to proceed with their delegates in a manner different from that which 
is used in the United Netherlands, or in Switzerland. Amongst these every province, city or 
canton making a distinct body independent from any other, and exercising the sovereign 
power within itself, looks upon the rest as allies, to whom they are bound only by such acts as 
they themselves have made; and when any new thing not comprehended in them happens to 
arise, they oblige their delegates to give them an account of it, and retain the power of 
determining those matters in themselves. ‘Tis not so amongst us: Every county does not make 
a distinct body, having in itself a sovereign power, but is a member of that great body which 
comprehends the whole nation. ‘Tis not therefore for Kent or Sussex, Lewis or Maidstone, 
but for the whole nation, that the members chosen in those places are sent to serve in 
parliament: and tho it be fit for them as friends and neighbours (so far as may be) to hearken 
to the opinions of the electors for the information of their judgments, and to the end that what 
they shall say may be of more weight, when everyone is known not to speak his own thoughts 
only, but those of a great number of men; yet they are not strictly and properly obliged to give 
account of their actions to any, unless the whole body of the nation for which they serve, and 
who are equally concerned in their resolutions, could be assembled.103 
 
Here the principle that unites England as a ‘nation’ is clearly one of sovereignty under 
one law-making body. Still, it is not clear whether the Netherlands or Switzerland are 
to be regarded as ‘nations’ or simply as confederations; whether their provinces and 
cantons are to be regarded as ‘nations’, given their sovereign status; and whether the 
term ‘ the nation’ actually applies to England as a country or to the Englishmen as a 
body of people. In this respect, the ambiguity with which Sidney uses the term ‘the 
nation’ is eminently modern, in the sense that the semantic content of the word 
permanently shifts, from one signifying the body of people united by common law-
making institutions (or, in addition, by common culture, language, religion), to that 
referring to the state as a political institution, or to that referring to country as a 
geographic rather than political category. For, the property of the term ‘the nation’ to 
change its semantic content – already present in Sidney’s Discourses – has in the 
modern times become the potential source of its greatest political power, the power to 
unite by putting under one label 1) a group of people into one body, 2) a body of 
people with a territory appropriated as their own, 3) a body of people with the state 
that unites the territory into one entity. Also, the shifts between civic and ethnic 
interpretations of the term’s content increase its potential for further semantic and 
political expansion. These shifts can stimulate existing ethnic communities to match 
the semantic content of the term ‘the nation’ and legitimise their political claims to 
establish their own sovereign ‘nation-states’, as much as they can stimulate existing 
sovereign political communities to match the semantic content of the term and 
homogenise their populations by creating common ‘national’ culture. As already 
                                                 
103
 Discourses, Ch. Three, Sec. 44. 
 44 
noted in Liah Greenfeld’s comparative study Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, 
nationalism practically emerged when in the 17th century England the term ‘the 
nation’ acquired its modern, broad and imprecise meaning of ‘the sovereign 
people’104 and thereby the potential for all these semantic shifts with political 
implications. In Sidney’s Discourses Concerning Government the implications of the 
term ‘the nation’ as the term signifying ‘the sovereign people’ were elaborated for the 
first time, and – if we follow the line of Greenfeld’s argument – Algernon Sidney is 
certainly to be recognised as a founder of nationalism, no less than as a founder of 
liberalism.                                 
 Having in mind all the semantic ambiguities with which Sidney fills the term ‘the 
nation’, which have for several centuries been exploited by nationalists of all sorts 
who followed the practice established by Sidney and his English contemporaries, it 
seems particularly important to identify the precise sociological content hidden 
behind these ambiguities. In Sidney’s days, not quite unlike today, English society 
was composed of nobility, commons and clergy, and Sidney discusses the content of 
the notion of ‘nobility’ in order to prove that Filmer’s understanding of nobility as a 
narrow circle of king’s entourage – often with their titles bought for money – was not 
correct, that nobility included all ‘freemen’ under arms and obligation to defend their 
country and that all three social groups were actually parts of what he calls ‘the 
English nation’.   
Starting from the assumption that the best government is that which best provides 
for war105,  Sidney claims that in “all the legal kingdoms of the North, the strength of 
the government has always been placed in the nobility; and no better defence has 
been found against the encroachments of ill kings, than by setting up an order of men, 
who by holding large territories, and having great numbers of tenants and dependents, 
might be able to restrain the exorbitances, that either the kings or the commons might 
run into”106. Unlike in the ‘Eastern tyrannies’, where there was no nobility and 
common people could only be raised above others by prince’s favour,   
 
The Northern nations, who were perpetually in arms, put a high esteem upon military valour; 
sought by conquest to acquire better countries than their own; valu'd themselves according to 
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the numbers of men they could bring into the field; and to distinguish them from villains, 
called those noblemen, who nobly defended and enlarged their dominions by war; and for a 
reward of their services, in the division of lands gained by conquest, they distributed to them 
freeholds, under the obligation of continuing the same service to their country. This appears 
by the name of knight's service, a knight being no more than a soldier, and a knight's fee no 
more than was sufficient to maintain one.107 
 
In the medieval times about which Sidney writes, the titles of offices were “conferred 
upon those, who did and could best conduct the people in time of war, give counsel to 
the king, administer justice, and perform other publick duties; but were never made 
hereditary except by abuse; much less were they sold for money, or given as 
recompences of the vilest services”:108. Thus, says Sidney, the ancient councils of ‘the 
English nation’ did not consist of such which are now called ‘noblemen’:109  
 
By giving the name of noblemen (which anciently belonged to such as had the greatest 
interests in nations, and were the supporters of their liberty) to court-creatures, who often 
have none, and either acquire their honours by money, or are preferr’d for servile and 
sometimes impure services render’d to the person that reigns, or else for mischiefs done to 
their country, the constitution has been wholly inverted, and the trust reposed in the kings 
(who in some measure had the disposal of offices and honours) misemploy’d. This is farther 
aggravated by appropriating the name of noblemen solely to them; whereas the nation having 
been anciently divided only into freemen or noblemen (who were the same) and villains; the 
first were, … exempted from burdens and contributions, and reserved like arms for the uses 
of war, whilst the others were little better than slaves, appointed to cultivate the lands, or to 
other servile offices. And I leave any reasonable man to judge, whether the latter condition be 
that of those we now call commoners. (…) But if the commons are as free as the nobles, 
many of them in birth equal to the patentees, in estate superior to most of them; and that it is 
not only expected they should assist him in wars with their persons and purses, but 
acknowledged by all, that the strength and virtue of the nation is in them, it must be 
confess’d, that they are true noblemen of England, and that all the privileges anciently 
enjoy’d by such, must necessarily belong to them, since they perform the offices to which 
they were annexed.110 
 
Since armed service was by far the most important public service, it was common in 
those times for the clergy to join nobility and take arms in defence of the country, and    
“this succeeded so well (in relation to the defence of the publick rights) that… the 
bishops, abbots, &c. were no less zealous or bold in defending the publick liberty, 
than the best and greatest of the lords”. The same applied to commons, since kings 
had clear interest in including all those who were capable of bearing arms into 
country’s armed service. In such a way commons – together with nobility and clergy 
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– got their share in power, so that, Sidney claims, “those whom we now call 
commons, have always had a part in the government, and their place in the councils 
that managed it”.111 In fact, every knight had a right to the noble status, and “even to 
this day the name of gentleman comprehends all that is raised above the common 
people”.112 In such a way the estate with the right to participate in power-sharing 
increased so much that “one place was hardly able to contain them; and the 
inconveniences of calling them all together appeared to be so great, that they in time 
chose rather to meet by representatives, than every one in his own person.”113 In this 
difficulty Sidney sees the origin of aristocracy as a method of the indirect execution 
of power (not as a distinct social class or estate), as opposed to the first phase, when 
‘freemen’ or ‘gentlemen’ were able to participate in councils in person, so that the 
method of execution of power was rather direct or democratic. However, in both 
phases, power essentially remained in the ‘freemen’ as the main estate (as opposed to 
the estate of villains, who were despised by ‘freemen’ and only allowed to cultivate 
land). In other words, it was the ‘freemen’ who constituted ‘the nation’, regardless of 
whether these ‘freemen’ had a formal status of nobility, clergy or arms-bearing 
‘commons’, “and whether they did immediately, or some ages after that distinction, 
cease to come to their great assemblies, and rather chuse to send their deputies, or, 
whether such deputies were chosen by counties, cities and boroughs, as in our days, 
or in any other manner”.  In those Saxon times, “the power of the nation, when it was 
divided into seven kingdoms, or united under one, did reside in the micklegemotes or 
witenagemotes”, and these consisted of the nobility and commons, who were 
sometimes so numerous that no one place could well contain them, so that the 
preference was given to the chief among them, on account of the offices they 
executed. No matter, Sidney concludes, whether they were called ‘earls’, ‘dukes’, 
‘aldermen’, ‘herotoghs’ or ‘thanes’, it is certain that the titular nobility has no 
resemblance to this ancient nobility of England.114   
In any case, it is possible to understand from the Discourses that ‘the nation’ of the 
Saxons, the way Sidney describes it – whether divided into several kingdoms or being 
united into one, whether consisting of the nobility and the people or consisting of the 
nobility only, whether they were both representing themselves in the councils or were 
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represented only by their chosen deputies – was made of ethnic Saxons, these having 
presumably been culturally, linguistically and genetically distinct from other 
contemporary ethnic groups. However, it seems implied in the text that these ethnic 
Saxons could not be licensed to wear the title of ‘the nation’ without having made a 
contract between themselves to constitute their own law-making councils in the 
territories they conquered and occupied. Thus the way Sidney interprets the content 
of the term ‘the nation’ which he uses to label the ancient predecessors of the 
contemporary Englishmen remains inherently ambiguous, subject to both ethnic, 
territorial and political interpretations and stretched so as to cover all these three 
potential aspects.         
 Since the presence or absence of councils or parliaments in a group’s history 
presumably decides whether it has the necessary prerogatives of ‘the nation’ or not, 
Sidney devotes a lot of effort to prove that the whole power of calling and dissolving 
the parliament is not placed in the king but in ‘the nation’, which thus qualifies for 
that title by demonstrating the ability to establish its own parliamentary institutions. 
This effort is built upon the supposition that “that the king can have no such power, 
unless it be given to him, for every man is originally free; and the same power that 
makes him king, gives him all that belongs to his being king”. King’s power is not 
therefore an inherent, but a delegated power; and whoever receives it, is accountable 
to those that gave it.115 The only reason why parliaments of ‘nations’ meet is to 
provide for the public good, and they by law ought to meet for that end, and ought not 
therefore to be dissolved till it be accomplished; therefore, they ought not to be called 
or dissolved by the king’s arbitrary will but by the arbitrary will of ‘the nation’.116 
Members of parliaments – knights, citizens and burgesses – have a power only 
because they serve the people who sent them, who have all the power in themselves – 
“the legislative power therefore that is exercised by the parliament, cannot be 
conferred by the writ of summons, but must be essentially and radically in the people, 
from whom their delegates and representatives have all that they have”.117 This 
legislative power of the people “is always arbitrary, and not to be trusted in the hands 
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of any who are not bound to obey the laws they make”;118 indeed, the establishment 
of government is an arbitrary act, wholly depending upon the will of men, and so are 
“the particular forms and constitutions, the whole series of the magistracy, together 
with the measure of power given to everyone, and the rules by which they are to 
exercise their charge”.119 Therefore, Sidney finally concludes, not only can there be 
no such thing as a legislative power placed in kings by the laws of God and nature, 
but there can only be that ‘nations’ have it in themselves.120 And this legislative 
power is what he understands under the name of ‘liberty’, as the essential property of 
‘nations’. 
 Sidney was thus the first modern author to explicitly propose that ‘nations’ have 
legislative power in themselves, based on man’s having by nature ‘liberty’ in himself, 
and his view has since become the norm. This caused that the issue of the exact 
sociological content of the terms ‘the nation’ and ‘liberty’ has ever since become the 
most contentious for the definition of who can actually aspire to this legislative 
power, and has permanently entwined these two terms as self- and mutually 
legitimising. This issue boils down to the question of what is it that grants the right to 
a group or to a part of a country’s population to use the title of ‘the nation’ to 
categorise itself and thereby legitimise its claims to legislative power (these also 
being legitimised by labelling the latter as ‘liberty’); in other words, what is it that 
makes it ‘the nation’, by nature ‘free’. The struggle over the monopoly on this type of 
legitimacy within one limited political space is what constitutes the core of 
nationalism as a political process. Nationalist elites thus may claim the title of ‘the 
nation’ for themselves, or for any group or any part of a country’s population, in the 
name of ‘liberty’; what makes their claims politically defensible is their ability to 
actually defend them when confronted with competing claims. The actual ability of 
one group first to claim legislative power for itself under the name of ‘liberty’, then to 
legitimise its pretensions to legislate for itself by proclaiming itself ‘the nation’, and 
then to monopolise the use of the title ‘the nation’ for itself, is what constitutes that 
group as ‘the nation’. The actual imposition of its monopoly on legislation within one 
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limited political space is what constitutes that space as ‘the nation-state’, by 
definition ‘free’.    
Therefore, only a group or a part of the population with the ability to actually 
impose its own claims to ‘liberty’ and thereby to legislative power in one political 
space (and on other groups with competing claims within that political space) has the 
‘right’ to legitimise these claims by calling itself ‘the nation’. Inversely, by 
proclaiming itself ‘the nation’, it demonstrates pretensions to acquire this ‘right’ to 
legislate for itself and to impose its monopoly on legislative power within one limited 
political space, and then to impose this monopoly (under the name of ‘inherited 
liberty’, ‘given by nature’) onto other groups with competing claims within that 
space. Thus the power to impose one’s own claims to the title of ‘the nation’ becomes 
the source of the ‘right’ to legislate for the entire political space in question (that is, 
the source of ‘liberty’, which is by definition contained in ‘the nation’), that is, of the 
‘right’ to legislate on behalf of ‘the nation’, including the ‘right’ to legislate on behalf 
of those groups that previously attempted to impose their own, competing claims to 
the title of ‘the nation’ and to legislative power implied in that title. In other words, it 
is might that makes right and thus retrospectively legitimises claims to ‘legitimacy 
given by nature’.   
The principle of transforming one’s power to monopolise the title of ‘the nation’ 
into one’s ‘right’ to legislate under the name of ‘liberty’ and on behalf of ‘the nation’ 
sheds some light on those elite groups or wider parts of the population which 
historically possessed the ability to use military power and thereby the ability to 
impose their own claims as legitimate and monopolistic. In this respect Sidney’s 
book, as the first work that established a theoretical framework for legitimising 
‘nations’ as bearers of the legislative power under the name of ‘liberty’, is very 
instructive. It demonstrates that for Sidney and his English contemporaries the right 
to the title of ‘the nation’ was reserved for those sections of society with the ability to 
use and monopolise military power and thereby acquire political legitimacy. Thus for 
Sidney the right to the title of ‘the nation’ and hence the right to legislate was not to 
be reserved only for ‘nobility’, as a presumed military caste, but also for those 
‘commons’ practising military skills and possessing military (and financial) power, 
while ‘villeins’, as the part of ‘commons’ without military status, were to be 
explicitly excluded (“the despised commons under the name of villeins”). Both of the 
former groups were named and treated as ‘freemen’ (that is, the bearers of ‘liberty’), 
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with the ‘right’ to legislate and call themselves ‘the nation’, while the latter were to 
be understood as unfree and therefore by definition excluded from legislation. Thus 
the body of ‘freemen’ practically equals ‘the nation’ (as also practically claimed by 
Locke121). This establishes an instructive relationship between ‘liberty’ and 




As financial power was increasingly replacing military power as a key to political 
power and hence to political legitimacy, so was the title of ‘the nation’ increasingly 
becoming attached to the financially rising middle class, and the beginning of this 
process is already visible in Sidney’s Discourses, where ‘commons’ who were able to 
contribute to defence with their ‘purse’ were equated with those who contributed with 
their military skills. Eventually, in the French Revolution, the so-called Third Estate 
(that is, the middle class, then already capable of bearing the main burden of 
financing the military and war) became synonymous with ‘the nation’ and 
monopolised all legislative power for itself under the name of ‘liberty’. In the English 
Revolution, however, the title of ‘the nation’ and hence monopoly on political 
legitimacy and legislation had to be shared between ‘nobility’ and ‘commons’ (minus 
“the despised commons under the name of villeins”), exactly as Sidney had envisaged 
several years before. In both cases, it was the title of ‘the nation’ that legitimised 
claims to legislative power (that is, to ‘liberty’) by those elite parts of society 
(contained under the joint name of ‘freemen’) which practically demonstrated the 
ability to impose their claims onto the rest by proclaiming themselves ‘the nation’. In 
turn, these two cases demonstrated that the sociological content of the term ‘the 
nation’ was in those times (and still is) treated as a variable, subject to arbitrary 
adaptations that always depend on particular political circumstances. The constant has 
remained the very term ‘the nation’, as the framework that universally legitimises 
claims to legislative power by those who can practically manage to impose their 
monopoly on the use of the term to brand themselves, whatever their constituting 
principles and sociological profile. They (whoever they are – politically, 
sociologically, ethnically, or religiously) constitute themselves as ‘the nation’ (and 
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legitimise themselves accordingly) by monopolising legislative power for themselves 
and by overpowering (that is, by eliminating or absorbing) other claimants to that 
power; but the very title ‘the nation’ always remains the sole source of their 
legitimacy. Algernon Sidney was the first well-known author who promoted ‘nations’ 
as the sole source of political legitimacy, without ever defining what ‘nations’ 
actually were or were meant to be. In this respect, his contribution to the emergence 
of the doctrine of nationalism, which promotes the same principle of gaining political 
legitimacy by arbitrarily applying the term ‘the nation’ to whoever’s claims to 































Although there were individuals (such as Immanuel Kant) who celebrated his great 
achievements in philosophy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau had to take the blame for almost 
all of the 18th-, 19th-, and 20th-century excesses in politics, coming from both the left 
and the right. Denounced after his death as the founding father of both the Jacobins 
and the Nazis,122 of liberal individualism and totalitarian collectivism, of the 
revolution and ‘the nation’, Rousseau sought to create ultimate answers to eternal 
questions, as most of philosophers have done. And yet, being denounced for 
simultaneously advocating so many mutually contradicting theories, principles and 
values, he was the one and only among them who escaped any classificatory schemes 
by remaining consistent beyond any classification. Thus his fate remains full of 
multiple paradoxes, as much as was his work.     
The series of paradoxical accusations begins with Burke, who takes Rousseau as the 
embodiment of the philosophy of the revolution, which begins as a revolt of the 
individual against society, as an outburst of selfish ambition, aiming to replace the 
existing authorities by himself.123 For the early socialists, Rousseau was a hard-core 
individualist, and yet according to some modern critics Rousseau’s 2nd Discourse is to 
be regarded as one of the principal sources of the socialist movement, of Marxism, 
and still more of anarchism.124 Rousseau’s name is often associated with the German 
Idealists and he is often credited with being the real originator of their political 
system.125 Kant admitted that Rousseau contributed to his development of the 
principle of the autonomy of the will, by which he reconciled law with freedom.126   
His 20th-century critics could also agree on very few things. Ernst Cassirer wrote 
that Kant was the only man in the eighteenth century to understand the inner cohesion 
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of Rousseau’s thought.127 For Jacob Talmon, Rousseau was to be simply dismissed as 
a ‘tormented paranoiac’, with a ‘totalitarian Messianic temperament’, whose envious 
dream was to become a ‘disciplinarian’.128 C.E. Vaughan thought that Rousseau’s 
work was without much inner cohesion, influenced by different authors in different 
phases, so that it had to be divided into three, mutually contradicting parts: in the first 
one, in 2nd Discourse and the first chapters of The Social Contract, he was an extreme 
individualist and a follower of Locke, in the core part of The Social Contract he was a 
disciple of Plato, while in The Government of Poland he fell under the influence of 
Montesquieu.129 In Alfred Cobban’s view, Rousseau, as the greatest of the disciples 
of Montesquieu, was as clear an upholder of the rule of law and of individualism as 
Locke himself,130 and yet Cobban sees Rousseau as one of the originators of the 
eminently collectivist doctrine of nationalism. In Anne Cohler’s interpretation, 
Rousseau’s late work The Government of Poland is to be regarded as the founding act 
of nationalism.131  
 
Rousseau and Nationalism 
 
Rousseau was one of the most zealous advocates of freedom, and this fact leads even 
many of his opponents to classify him as a liberal. In this sense, his book The 
Government of Poland, proclaimed by Cohler as the manifest of nationalism, also 
abounds with references to freedom and may well be classified as liberal. But, as 
noted in the Introduction to the book written by Willmoore Kendall, “The ‘freedom’ 
of The Government of Poland is, quite simply, the freedom of the Polish people from 
foreign domination, that is, in the jargon of our own contemporary politics, ‘self-
determination’; and even that is put forward not as a ‘cause’, a principle applicable to 
all peoples everywhere and always; it is, specifically, the Poles’ freedom, from, 
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specifically, Russian domination.”132 Of course, it would be very difficult for a book 
on, specifically, the Poles’ freedom from, specifically, Russian domination to serve as 
a general manifest of nationalism that aims to lay down a general principle applicable 
to all peoples everywhere and always. However, this book, while treating the freedom 
of the Poles as freedom in general, established the practice of conflating all kinds of 
freedom (including the conflation between individual and collective freedom), which 
has ever since characterised both liberalism-proper and nationalism. The Government 
of Poland thus followed and further developed the logic of Sidney’s Discourses 
Concerning Government in establishing the theory of national self-determination as 
part of the more general liberal theory.133           
  Rousseau wrote The Government of Poland on request of the Polish noble, Count 
Wielhorski, playing with his favourite concept of the legislator, a position often 
celebrated throughout his main works, and a position which enabled him to apply on 
one concrete polity the basic principles of his Social Contract.134 Starting from his 
favourite conclusion that the contemporary Europeans, due to the ill-devised 
institutions which inculcated into their hearts nothing but the prejudices, the base 
philosophy, the passions of narrow self-interest and indifference to the welfare of 
others, had nothing in common with the ancient Romans and Greeks,135 Rousseau 
saw in Poland’s incomplete (compared with modern European states) state-structure a 
great opportunity for a wise legislator to re-model the existing polity after the ancient 
examples (rather than, as Cohler says, to push the existing polity further towards 
‘barbarism’). However, being aware of the key-problem put before the legislator, of 
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putting law over men, that is, of making laws rather than men governing, and 
comparing it with the problem of squaring the circle in geometry,136 Rousseau put 
into the centre of his enterprise the idea of reflexivity between laws and men, using 
the country’s constitution to re-constitute the Poles, their habits, customs and 
values137 so as to make them embrace both their country and its laws:       
 
A good and sound constitution is one under which the law holds sway over the hearts of the 
citizens; for, short of the moment when the power of legislation shall have accomplished 
precisely that, the laws will continue to be evaded. But how to reach men’s hearts? Our 
present-day lawgivers, thinking exclusively in terms of coercion and punishment, pay almost 
no attention to that problem – for which, perhaps, material rewards are no better solution. 
And justice, even the purest justice, is not a solution either. For justice, like good health, is a 
blessing that people enjoy without being aware of it, that inspires no enthusiasm, and that 
men learn to value only after they have lost it. By what means, then, are we to move men’s 
hearts and bring them to love their fatherland and its laws? Dare I say? Through the games 
they play as children, through institutions that, though a superficial man would deem them 
pointless, develop habits that abide and attachments that nothing can dissolve.138 
 
In devising institutions that would make Poles ever more attached to their country, to 
one another, and to these very institutions themselves, Rousseau was explicitly 
following the ancient legislators, who sought ties that would bind the citizens to the 
fatherland and to one another, and who “found what they were looking for in 
distinctive usages, in religious ceremonies that invariably were in essence exclusive 
and national, in games that brought the citizens together frequently, in exercises that 
caused them to grow in vigor and strength and developed their pride and self esteem; 
and in public spectacles that, by keeping them reminded of their forefathers’ deeds 
and hardships and virtues and triumphs, stirred their hearts, set them on fire with the 
spirit of emulation, and tied them tightly to the fatherland – that fatherland on whose 
behalf they were kept constantly busy”.139 In particular, Rousseau did not hesitate to 
show that in The Government of Poland Moses was a hero to be followed, in 
particular in terms of making his people permanently distinct from all the others:  
  
Moses made bold to transform this herd of servile emigrants into a political society, a free 
people; at a moment when it was still wandering about in the wilderness and had not so much 
as a stone to pillow its head on, he bestowed upon it the enduring legislation – proof against 
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time, fortune, and conquest – that five thousand years have not sufficed to destroy or even 
weaken. Even today, when that nation no longer exists as a body, its legislation endures and 
is as strong as ever. Determined that his people should never be absorbed by other peoples, 
Moses devised for them customs and practices that could not be blended into those of other 
nations and weighted them down with rites and peculiar ceremonies. He put countless 
prohibitions upon them, all calculated to keep them constantly on their toes, and to make 
them, with respect to the rest of mankind, outsiders forever.140 
 
In the case of the then Poland, which was weak from anarchy, constantly divided 
within, constantly threatened from without, underpopulated, with few troops and 
surrounded by larger states with strong militaries and despotic governments, the 
example of Jews was particularly instructive.141 Rousseau’s love of paradox sought to 
create a Polish replica of Moses’ Jewish state in Jewish hearts, thereby reintroducing 
this very paradigm as a potential inspiration for future nationalist entrepreneurs.142 
Rousseau thus saw only one means of giving Poland stability it lacked: that of 
establishing the republic in the Poles’ own hearts, so as to live on in them despite 
anything that its oppressors may do. Those hearts, thought Rousseau, are the 
republic’s only place of refuge: there force could neither destroy it nor even reach 
it.143 Not being able to keep Russians from swallowing them, Poles at least could see 
to it that Russian would never be able to digest them.144 As in Rousseau’s message to 
the Polish dignitaries: “See to it that every Pole is incapable of becoming a Russian, 
and I answer for it that Russia will never subjugate Poland.”145  
 In this book Rousseau was quite explicit in repeating that Poland needed ‘national’ 
institutions, which were supposed to give form to the genius, the character, the tastes, 
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and the customs of ‘the people’, which would then be impossible to uproot.146 These 
pre-political categories, although meant to serve as the basis for the formation of 
‘national’ institutions, were nevertheless only potentially taken as ‘national’; that is, 
they were taken as proto-‘national’: the label ‘national’ was applied only to the 
political institutions which the Poles had yet to build. Rousseau thus claimed that the 
Poles were the only ones in Europe who had a chance to be formed ‘nationally’, by 
distinctive legislation, by developing political institutions as ‘national’ ones (instead 
of developing the same tastes, passions, customs, as was already the case with the rest 
of Europeans):147 “Give a different bent to the passions of the Poles; in doing so, you 
will shape their minds and hearts in a national pattern that will set them apart from 
other peoples, that will keep them from being absorbed by other peoples, or finding 
contentment among them, or allying themselves with them.”148 In order to do so, the 
Polish elite had to preserve or revive ancient Polish customs, and introduce “suitable 
new ones that will also be purely Polish”, so as “endear Poland to its citizens and 
develop in them an instinctive distaste for mingling with the peoples of other 
countries”.149 For, “He who would try his hand at founding a nation must learn to 
dominate men’s opinions, and through them to govern their passions.”150 This is to be 
done primarily through education, whose task is to “shape the souls of the citizens in 
a national pattern and so to direct their opinions, their likes, and dislikes that they 
shall be patriotic by inclination, passionately, of necessity”:151 
  
When the Pole reaches the age of twenty, he must be a Pole, not some other kind of man. I 
should wish him to learn to read by reading literature written in his own country. I should 
wish him, at ten, to be familiar with everything Poland has produced; at twelve, to know all 
its provinces, all its roads, all its towns; at fifteen, to have mastered his country’s entire 
history, and at sixteen, all its laws; let his mind and heart be full of every noble deed, every 
illustrious man, that ever was in Poland, so that he can tell you about them at a moment’s 
notice.152  
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In The Government of Poland Rousseau thus gave a precise instruction for building 
social and political homogeneity, and that homogeneity is there explicitly called 
‘national’. However, rather than affirming ‘the Polish nation’ as a pre-political 
category for the sake of affirming ‘nations’ as pre-political categories through the 
process of state-building (as Cohler claims153), he explicitly stated that his aim was to 
reform the government of Poland as an existing political entity, so as to give “to the 
constitution of a large kingdom the stability and vigor of that of a tiny republic”;154 
hence, homogeneity as the ultimate means to that particular end. Rather than 
affirming ‘nations’ as pre-political categories, The Government of Poland, no less 
than other Rousseau’s works, affirms small states (which were the most suitable 
political framework for building and developing ‘national’ institutions as eminently 
political ones),155 in order to affirm his favourite concept of direct democracy:  
 
One of the greatest drawbacks of large states, that which more than any other makes the 
preservation of liberty most difficult for them, is that the legislative power in such a state 
cannot make itself seen and can act only by deputation. This, to be sure, has its advantages as 
well as its disadvantages; but, the latter outweigh the former. The legislator as a body is 
impossible to corrupt but easy to put upon. Its representatives are difficult to put upon but 
easy to corrupt; and it rarely happens that they are not corrupted. You have merely to look at 
the English parliament as one example, and at your own nation, because of the liberum veto, 
as another. Now: one can enlighten the man who is mistaken, but how restrain the man who 
can be bought?156 
 
Consistent with the idea of direct democracy for small states, and Rousseau in Poland 
advocates them as well, are the concepts of social equality157, citizens’ army,158 social 
mobility and meritocracy.159 Yet, paradoxically, despite the fact that Rousseau 
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advocated small states with direct democracy rather than large ‘nation-states’ with 
representative government, Rousseau’s idea of establishing a direct proportion 
between social mobility and the display of patriotism (by giving an opportunity for 
every citizen to compete for grades in public service and rise on social scale by 
demonstrating patriotic zeal) served as probably the most efficient approach to social 
and ‘national’ homogenisation, one that has later been appropriated by most of 
leaders of large ‘nation-states’ in their endeavours of ‘nation-building’.    
However, in Poland Rousseau, as observed by Kendall, does argue for “giving up 
the large nation state for another form of polity”.160 This form of polity is a parochial, 
anti-modern petty-state, and its profile is designed in contradistinction to the modern 
‘nation-state’, already well-established in Rousseau’s own time.161 Yet, paradoxically, 
again, if the large states of his time were to be regarded as ‘nation-states’, then 
‘nationalism’ which Rousseau allegedly proposed as solution to Poland’s problems 
would go directly against ‘the nation-state’ as such. In that sense, would nationalism, 
provided that nationalism is what Rousseau really advocated, be inherently opposed 
to the existing ‘nation-state’? And, if Rousseau’s ‘nationalism’ really emerged in 
opposition to the already existing ‘nation-state’, what kind of ‘nation-state’ his 
alleged ‘nationalism’ sought to create? And, if the already-existing ‘nation-state’ had 
been created by some other doctrine or ideology, what kind of doctrine, other than 
nationalism, it could have been, taking that state as created for a particular ‘nation’? 
Or, if the already existing ‘nation-state’ could not be detached from some form of 
nationalism (that is, if modern ‘nation-states’ could not be created without their 
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respective nationalisms), would it still be plausible to claim Rousseau to be 
nationalism’s founder?162 Or, if there had been nationalisms which had contributed to 
the creation of the first ‘nation-states’, who could have been their founders? Such 
questions inevitably multiply if one insists on the claim of Rousseau’s being the 
founder of the doctrine of nationalism, and there are no logical answers to them once 
it is adopted that Rousseau’s was ‘nationalism’ against (or without) the already 
existing ‘nation-state’, or that there had been large ‘nation-states’ without (or prior to) 
their respective nationalisms: it is only logically sustainable to maintain that these 
‘nation-states’ had come into existence together with their nationalisms, which had 
had their founders other than Rousseau, and that Rousseau’s was a peculiar form of 
anti-modern parochialism, advocating a petty-state with a society homogenised for 
direct democracy, which would be structurally opposed to the (already existing) large 
‘nation-state’, which sought to homogenise its society for its further expansion.   
 
‘The nation’ as a pre-political fact? 
 
A widespread assumption, which Cohler articulated in the most extensive manner but 
which is by no means her intellectual property, is that Rousseau was the first political 
philosopher who took ‘the nation’ as a given, pre-political fact to which politics must 
adjust, rather than as a product of politics, which legislators can remake. This 
assumption always goes so far as to claim that, since modern nationalism is in 
essence this same fashioning of politics on the basis of ‘the nation’ as a presumed 
pre-political fact, nationalism therefore owes its intellectual origin to Rousseau.163   
As the chapter on Sidney demonstrates, it was Sidney who was probably the first 
political philosopher who sought to adjust politics to ‘nations’ as proto-political, if 
not pre-political, facts. On the other hand, the claim that Rousseau regarded ‘the 
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Polish nation’ as a given, pre-political fact is seriously challenged by the fact that he 
attempted to build for this ‘nation’, that is, to build its national institutions, which 
means that this ‘nation’ was not taken as given, or complete, at the least: its 
institutions had to be built ‘nationally’ in order for this potential ‘nation’ to assert 
itself as a real one. Also, as modernists would argue, nationalism is in essence 
fashioning politics on the basis of the prescribed political unit, ‘the nation’; in this 
sense, Rousseau indeed took Poland as a prescribed unit for which he was building, 
naming it ‘the nation’. However, Poland with its long political history, to which 
Rousseau refers repeatedly, is far from a pre-political (or even proto-political) fact at 
the time of Rousseau’s writing, regardless of the fact that the very term ‘the nation’ 
(at least among nationalists) subsequently acquired the meaning of a pre-political 
rather than political unit: for Rousseau, such a ‘nation’ was a political fact which he – 
according to his introductory claim – studied thoroughly, rather than a pre-political 
fantasy, which he sought to impose onto political reality. It is clear that in his 
favourite role of the legislator Rousseau was building on the basis of an existing, 
albeit imperfect, political structure. The fact that he named it ‘the nation’ corresponds 
well with Sidney’s earlier use of this term, which refers to groups with half-
developed, proto-political institutions; however, this fact by no means proves that he 
took a pre-political unit as prescribed or presumed and then sought to impose it on 
political reality.164 It is evident in a paragraph from The Social Contract that 
Rousseau himself clearly objected to those theories which postulate or imply the 
existence of such prescribed or presumed pre-political units, such as one by Grotius: 
 
A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. Then, according to Grotius, a people is a 
people before it gives itself. The gift is itself a civil act, and implies public deliberation. It 
would be better, before examining the act by which a people gives itself to a king, to examine 
that by which it has become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the 
true foundation of society.165 
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For Rousseau, neither ‘the people’ nor ‘the nation’ can be treated as pre-political 
facts, whatever meaning these terms may have later acquired; for, they can not be said 
to have come into existence without an act of public deliberation as the only 
conceivable founding act of society, which by itself is eminently political. This 
passage thus illustrates that Rousseau never entertained the ideas common to the 19th-
century nationalists, of ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ as pre-political fantasies. On the 
contrary, criticising Grotius, he anticipated a necessity to criticise all subsequent 
interpretations of the pre-political origins of society. Nothing, then, is more absurd 
than to claim (as Cohler does) that Rousseau saw ‘nations’ as pre-political and pre-
societal units to which men should return in order to become free again.    
In The Social Contract, Rousseau is clear that the ‘body politic’, as a public person 
formed by the union of all other individual persons, is a political unit. Establishing 
within the ‘body politic’ a distinction between the State and ‘the Sovereign’, he also 
postulates that they are both coextensive political units:  
  
This public person, so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of 
city, and now takes that of Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when 
passive. Sovereign when active, and Power when compared with others like itself. Those who 
are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as 
sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State.166 
 
The public person in its active form, formed by the union of all individual persons, is 
what Rousseau labels as ‘the Sovereign’. Those associated in the public person take 
collectively the name of ‘the people’ when active (and the name of ‘the subjects’ 
when passive). Without further impact on Rousseau’s part, the term ‘the Sovereign’, 
referring to the public person itself, and the term ‘the people’, referring to individual 
persons associated in this public person, both in active form, have eventually merged 
into the single term ‘the nation’, meaning ‘the sovereign people’.167 Thus ‘the nation’ 
comes to comprise the public person and the individual persons it consists of, both in 
active form, while retaining its distinction from ‘the state’ as the public person in its 
passive form. And this public person, as derived from Rousseau’s distinction, whether 
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in active or in passive form, can only be a political creation: both ‘the nation’ and ‘the 
state’, being two sides of the same phenomenon called ‘the nation-state’, can only 




Focussing on Rousseau’s concept of ‘the general will’, Frederick Watkins links 
Rousseau to the concept of ‘integral nationalism’, denouncing him for totalitarian 
tendencies, based on Rousseau’s alleged Calvinist inspiration. Watkins observes that 
the ideal society in the Calvinist vision was a community of saints, austerely and 
tirelessly devoted to the task of ensuring that God’s will be done on earth as it is in 
heaven,168 so that intense moral activism, totalitarian in its insistence on social 
discipline, was its ultimate political consequence.169 Accordingly, for Rousseau no 
government, however efficient, was morally justified unless it rested on active 
participation of all its citizens. Political life, in his view, was an unremitting struggle 
to subdue selfish impulses in the interest of the common good.170 The primary 
purpose of society is thus to provide its members with an occasion for voluntary 
social action, and the task of society is to provide an opportunity for the moral self-
development of men.171 However, the main problem of Rousseau’s theory, according 
to Watkins, is that even participation of all citizens does not necessarily bring about 
‘the general will’ which makes government legitimate.172 More generally, the 
problem is that there is no positive definition of ‘the general will’.173     
Rousseau, of course, was not the first who introduced the concept of ‘the general 
will’, closely linked and overlapping with the concepts of ‘the body politic’ and 
‘sovereignty’.174 The history of ‘the general will’ begins with Jean Bodin, who had 
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introduced the concept of ‘sovereignty’, as a power belonging to ‘the body politic’ 
which is distinctive from the actual power of the governing body. For Grotius, the 
people was an ‘artificial body’ composed of lesser corporations, which was supreme 
over all its members and, therefore, sovereign. Grotius defined sovereignty as a ‘spirit 
or constitution in the people’, but delegated this sovereignty to the person of 
monarch. Hobbes introduced the Leviathan, a ‘body politic’ with powers and mind 
above that of the individual, with characteristics of a greater person. The political 
society was thus promoted into a ‘civil person’, analogous to the corporations already 
recognised by law as ‘persons’. Pufendorff  adopted Hobbes’s conception of the state 
as a ‘public person’ constituted by the wills of natural persons. But the fact that the 
state, as a ‘civil person’, was constituted by individual wills of all its members gave 
the state the status of a ‘moral person’, giving it the power of all constituted by the 
will of all. This ‘moral person’, made by the union of the will of all, necessarily had a 
will of its own, directed towards the general good of all. This will, concentrating in 
itself the power of all, was named by Pufendorff ‘the general will’.175 For 
Montesquieu, ‘the general will’ was the ‘spirit’ which was necessary for the 
establishment of the laws, and it was to be equated with ‘the spirit of the nation’.176 
Developing the line established by Sidney, in which ‘the nation’ was assumed to be a 
proto-political category seeking to find its proper political expression in the form of 
the sovereign state, Montesquieu postulated that ‘the spirit of the nation’ was in fact 
the spirit which inspires the laws of the country, thus making it ‘the nation-state’.    
Developing Pufendorff’s definition of ‘the sovereign’ as a moral person endowed 
with will, Rousseau goes beyond Pufendorff’s conception of ‘the general will’ by 
defining man’s freedom as obedience to ‘the general will’ and thereby defining man’s 
obedience to it as, essentially, obedience to himself as a moral person. In this way, he 
assumes the existence of a feedback between man’s own self and the self of society, 
and postulates the conception of man as an essentially social(ised) being.   
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As a disciple of Montesquieu, Rousseau also implicitly incorporated the assumption 
that man’s freedom could be achieved by obedience to the laws established by ‘the 
general will’, which itself could be regarded as an expression of the ‘national’ spirit 
(in the sense of ‘national’ meaning ‘pre-political’). However, this assumption remains 
only implicit in Rousseau’s conception of ‘the general will’. In his conception, ‘the 
general will’ is, first and foremost, the measure of government’s legitimacy.177 And 
this by itself does not mean that only a ‘nationally spirited’ government (in the sense 
of a government inspired by pre-political values) expresses ‘the general will’ and 
thereby possesses the required degree of legitimacy. For Rousseau, ‘the general will’ 
is the expression of the general interest as an eminently political category and is 
never assumed as a preconceived pre-political category, but always achieved in the 
political process through direct participation and public deliberation.178 However, the 
fact that ‘the general will’ is to be achieved in the political process does not preclude 
its being the expression of the ‘national’ spirit, if ‘national’ is taken as a political 
category, reached through the process of public deliberation. In this sense, ‘the 
general will’ can even be regarded as the active expression of ‘the nation’ itself, in its 
civic, that is, political meaning.    
Another problem for Rousseau’s theory, according to Watkins, is that the idea of 
contract is actually incompatible with the moral implications of ‘the general will’: the 
difficulty is that a contract, if it is to have any significance at all, must be capable of 
obliging men to act against their will.179 However, it seems that this represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Rousseau’s ‘social contract’. For, it is 
not a contract between society and government, it is a contract by which both come 
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into existence, and society has the contract built-in in its foundations.180 Society’s 
freedom with regard to government is, therefore, part of the contract itself, which 
binds everyone in society to follow ‘the general will’ that is constituted by the 
contract. Thus following ‘the general will’ may also imply changing the government, 
if necessary, and such are the terms of the contract by which it comes into existence. 
On the other hand, ‘the general will’ is the continuing moral consensus of individuals 
in society; as such, it is constituted by the contract itself, and the rights and duties of 
the individual are determined by it. No contract is being made by the parties to it with 
the intention of its breaching, but with the intention of its observance. As such, the 
contract binds morally rather than legally. Especially in the case of ‘the social 
contract’, which is a hypothetical idea rather than a historical fact, it is difficult to 
imagine how the contract which precedes the making of the laws can bind legally. It 
binds morally, in the same sense as does ‘the general will’. 
 While rightfully assuming that for Rousseau society is a necessary condition for the 
exercise of human freedom, from which follows that socially disruptive behaviour 
must be repressed in the interest of freedom itself, Watkins nevertheless joins a 
widely-held opinion that the ultimate implication of Rousseau’s theory is that men, as 
private individuals, must be ‘forced to be free’.181 However, what Rousseau’s critics 
regularly overlook is the fact that Rousseau’s ‘general will’ in its entirety refers to the 
sphere of public legislation and to the observance of the laws created in the process of 
public legislation, and not to norms of private behaviour and to their imposition on 
the will of the individual. As for the objection that Rousseau does not allow the 
distinction between the private will of the individual and his adherence to ‘the general 
will’, it is sufficient to remember that Rousseau in The Social Contract insists on the 
distinction between the private individual and the citizen as a public individual, as 
much as he insists on the basic distinction between ‘the Sovereign’ and the State. Of 
course, there is no doubt that Rousseau holds that the private individual ought to be 
publicly-spirited; but, that is not sufficient to claim that his private will has to be 
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coercively subjected to that public spirit. As far as the citizen is concerned, he is to be 
‘forced to be free’ insofar as he is bound by society’s laws, that is, as he is bound to 
act as a citizen. If he chooses not to do so, and thus refuses to be ‘forced’ by the rule 
of law ‘to be free’ as a member of society, he is no longer entitled to enjoy any legal 
protection by society, and ceases to be its legal member.182 This can hardly point to 
anything resembling totalitarianism or ‘integral nationalism’. 
 Watkins claims that Rousseau’s principal claim to fame rests “on his skill in 
discovering most of the basic principles and practices of what later came to be known 
as integral nationalism”. These principles and practices concern the “minimisation of 
private interests and activities”, and “the complete absorption of the individual in the 
collective life of the state”. According to Watkins, the task of Rousseau’s legislator 
was to create conditions for these practices,183 since Rousseau believed that ignorant 
men were helpless without the aid of a scientifically competent elite.184 Yet, it is 
difficult to support this claim about Rousseau’s pessimism regarding human 
capacities, given Rousseau’s permanent and consistent insistence on the individual’s 
moral responsibility. Actually, the fact that Rousseau holds that there has to be an 
individual genius to create social and political institutions only points to his 
fundamental disbelief in the actual abilities of ‘the collective genius’. Otherwise, if 
there were no need for the individual legislator, it would logically follow that ‘the 
national character’ or ‘national spirit’ would be sufficient to create workable 
‘national’ institutions. The fact that Rousseau insists on the individual legislator 
perhaps makes his concept of the legislator authoritarian, but it practically removes 
all implications of ‘integral nationalism’.  
 
Shaping the individual and building ‘the nation’: towards truly socialised man  
 
A decisive argument demonstrating that Rousseau clearly endorsed the concept of 
‘nation-building’ rather than some alleged ‘integral’ or ‘primordialist’ nationalism 
can be found in this passage from his Confessions:  
 
                                                 
182
 Such was also the position of Montesquieu and, apart from Rousseau’s favourite rhetorical 
paradoxes, it is difficult to find significant differences between the two authors on this matter.  
183
 Watkins, p. xxxi. 
184
 Watkins, p. xxviii. 
 68 
I had realized that everything was basically related to politics, and that, no matter how one 
approached it, no people would ever be anything but what the nature of its government made 
it. Therefore that great question of the best possible government seemed to me reduce itself to 
this: which is the form of government fitted to shape the most virtuous, the most enlightened, 
the wisest, and, in short, the ‘best’ people, taking that word in its noblest meaning?185  
 
Shaping the ‘best’ people through a proper form of government thus becomes the 
central issue of politics for Rousseau. In addition, he claims that everything is 
basically related to politics, so that the issue of shaping the ‘best’ people through the 
process that is nowadays labelled as ‘nation-building’ becomes for Rousseau the 
central issue of philosophy, because only in the society thus shaped can man return to 
his true nature.186 Unlike in Rousseau’s theory of ‘the social contract’, the question of 
return to man’s true nature is not implied in other contractarian theories that start 
from the notion of ‘the state of nature’. Speaking about man in ‘the state of nature’, 
says Rousseau, means speaking “of a state which no longer exists, which may have 
never existed, and which probably never will exist”. However, “it is a state of which 
we must, nevertheless, have an adequate idea in order to judge correctly our present 
condition.”187 ‘The state of nature’, as a hypothetical early condition of mankind, is 
therefore important primarily as a source of the idea of what ‘natural man’ may have 
been like, as he may have once existed.    
However, the problem with most contractarian theories and their image of ‘the state 
of nature’ is that they present a historically and sociologically incorrect picture. While 
the contract refers to the establishment of a political society (embodied in the state) 
without acknowledging a prior existence of any from of society (while assuming the 
existence of the self-interested individual instead of it), the recorded historical 
development of society along the lines of extended family clearly precedes – in all 
known historical examples – the establishment of a political society-proper. Thus 
agents who are presumed to have entered the social contract as individuals are, 
actually, a priori socialised and communalised; therefore, they do not act as self-
interested individuals and do not enter the contract as self-interested individuals. As 
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A.D. Lindsay put it, “Society cannot be looked upon as an aggregate of individuals, 
as though individuals existed first with all their nature complete and then by coming 
together and cooperating in various ways made the State and other communities.”188 
Even self-interested individuals, as we know them today, are hardly more than a 
product of socialisation in a society dominated by the ideal of self-interest. Rousseau 
was the only contractarian theorist who was at least  intuitively correct about this 
aspect of prior socialisation, which makes his agents adaptive to further socialisation, 
and which makes their individual wills tuned with that of society in general, rather 
than merely self-interested. Actually, it is only with the break-up of traditional 
communities and societies that the Hobbesian self-interested individual and his 
‘arbitrary will’ come into existence; and, they are both socialised by the society which 
projects the ideals of individuality, self-interest and arbitrary will.   
The opposite idea, commonly associated with Rousseau and Kant, that the 
individual becomes free (that is, becomes ‘the free individual’) when he obeys the 
non-arbitrary, inward law contained in his ‘self’ is also problematic, although for 
different reasons. For, it is far from self-evident what, actually, ‘the self’ is, to whose 
inward law the individual is supposed to obey in order to become ‘the free 
individual’. Like in Ivor Jennings’s remark about ‘national self-determination’189, ‘the 
self’ cannot decide until someone decides who ‘the self’ is and what it actually 
consists of. For, ‘the self’ as such is, as contemporary psychological theories show, 
constructed, perhaps no less than ‘the people’. The concept of obedience to ‘the self’ 
is therefore highly problematic, not only because ‘the self’ cannot be easily identified 
(regardless of its ostensibly identifiable physical boundaries), but because, as a 
consequence, the ‘self-ness’ of ‘the self’ is contestable, at the least. To what extent 
the ‘free will’ of ‘the self’ is actually free from influences and concepts absorbed in 
the process of socialisation (or de-socialisation), and to what extent ‘the self’ is a self-
construct rather than other-construct, is something that theory can hardly decide upon. 
And then, it becomes less plausible to claim that the obedience to oneself is 
necessarily contrasted to obedience to some other ‘self’ and that, as such, it founds 
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‘the free individual’. Still, Rousseau’s conception of ‘the self’ at least implicitly takes 
these aspects into account, unlike the conceptions of Locke and Hobbes. The 
similarity between Hobbes and Locke, and their difference from Rousseau, was 
precisely caught by Chapman: 
 
It would appear that no two theories of man could be more different from one another than 
those held by Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes regards man as an irrational, prideful and social 
creature. Locke sees him fundamentally rational and social, although self-interested and 
biased. These differences, however, conceal an even more profound similarity. Neither 
Hobbes nor Locke envisages men undergoing transformation of their nature in society as does 
Rousseau. They agree on the nature of the functional relationship between man’s 
psychological processes and his environment. This acts on him only according to the 
principle of association. It is this agreement between their theories of human nature which 
above all distinguishes them from Rousseau’s conception of man. Against Hobbes, Rousseau 
contends that man is not innately selfish and vain; against Locke, he contends that man is not 
innately sociable and moral. Neither theory deals with necessary expressions of human 
tendencies in society. Man may be, according to Rousseau, either prideful or social and moral 
depending on the nature of his education and environment. In other words, Hobbes and Locke 
regard as necessary what Rousseau thinks are contingent expressions of man’s nature.190 
 
Rousseau’ ‘self’ is assumed to be open to socialisation; that is, open to the absorption 
of the values and concepts of society after the establishment of ‘the social contract’; 
but, also, open to all external influences which may have preceded the contract itself. 
Contrary to the claims of C. Fred Alford,191 ‘natural independence’ to which 
Rousseau refers is not an absolute independence, insofar as it is referred to as 
‘natural’, which means, as formed under natural rather than societal conditions (it 
may be said that nature itself knows only one Absolute; other things in nature are 
simply natural and therefore cannot be absolute). From a sociological point of view, 
these ‘natural’ conditions, preceding the establishment of the society-proper, still 
include various degrees of socialisation (family, clan, tribe). In general, socialisation 
plays the central role in Rousseau’s theory: it is to be found under various names, 
such as ‘education’, ‘virtue’192 or ‘nation-building’, but each time these concepts 
stand for the broader concept of socialisation. ‘The self’ is thus construed by 
Rousseau as a dynamic concept, an entity with flexible and permeable boundaries, 
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which permit various degrees of socialisation to shape its internal structure, as much 
as they permit ‘the self’ to shape the structure of its social environment. And, while 
socialisation in the stages prior to ‘the social contract’ may shape this entity’s 
structure in various ways, depending on pre-societal and sub-societal institutions 
through which ‘the self’ interacts with the world (and which it sometimes may 
perceive as the world itself), the institutions in charge of socialisation of ‘the self’ in 
the society established by the social contract are fixed by the contract, and so is the 
process of socialisation itself. Socialisation in the society-proper is necessarily the 
task of this society’s common institutions, that is, of the state; therefore, this 
socialisation takes the form of organised, state-controlled and sponsored activity, 
which appears under various names, from ‘culture’ and ‘education’ to ‘nation-
building’. It seems that it is primarily through this activity that the individual is being 
‘forced to be free’,193 without the need for these institutions to exercise any degree of 
actual coercion.194 This activity, if properly applied, suffices for socialising ‘the self’, 
which thus obeys only its own, socialised ‘self’ and therefore makes itself ‘free’, 
while abandoning its ‘natural independence’. Thus the freedom-proper exists only in 
the society-proper, while in ‘the state of nature’ it takes the form of relative, ‘natural 
independence’ (which can never be absolute and is only relative to the dependence in 
society). Free will, then, does not exist prior to the establishment of at least some 
form of society; for, a ‘naturally independent’ being, if construed as existing without 
at least some degree of prior socialisation, becomes an absolutely independent being 
and is therefore incapable of willing, since there is no external referential framework 
(apart from nature, which is not subject to human will) for it to depend, and therefore 
to will, upon. ‘The self’ is, then, incapable of being itself, having no active external 
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framework (since nature simply leaves it independent) to shape its internal structure. 
For, ‘naturally independent’ man, if he can exist as such in the proper i.e. absolute 
sense, is a creature that is both selfless and shapeless. As such, it is as incapable of 
structuring the world, as it is incapable of being structured by the world. For, only a 
being capable of being structured is capable of structuring, that is, of being an agent. 
And, being an agent, or having a ‘self’, is a property of socialised man. Thus the 
process of socialisation necessarily strengthens the ability of man to be an agent, that 
is, of his ‘self’ to be itself. And the state of being oneself, and obeying oneself, is 
what Rousseau regards as the state of freedom. For Rousseau, this state not only 
presupposes interaction with one’s social environment; indeed, this state is the 
process of interaction, the process of mutual structuring and restructuring, through 
which the willing and the acting agent comes into existence, making himself free by 
being an active, constitutive part of society and by being treated by society as its 
constitutive part. Within this logic, a degree of socialisation thus necessarily becomes 
a degree of self-liberation, that is, a degree of one’s being oneself.    
Yet, the problem in modern society, as Rousseau perceives it, is that socialisation 
actually fails to produce a socialised being; instead, it produces a self-interested and 
quasi-self-sufficient unit, incapable of being a true agent, that is, incapable of 
properly interacting with society and therefore incapable of being free.195 That is why 
Rousseau turns to ‘natural man’, as opposed to the failed, quasi-socialised, quasi-
individualistic creature of modern society,196 in order to apply to him a proper way of 
socialisation (such as Emile’s ‘education’) and thus make him capable of freedom. 
Thus, Rousseau’s ‘natural man’ is not an end in itself, as is too often mistakenly 
assumed; it is rather a means to the end of a truly socialised man.    
Rousseau certainly saw politics as a form of applied ethics. Man’s moral needs are 
the foundation of man’s sociability; inversely, man’s sociability is the foundation of 
man’s morality, and this morality is always doubly related to man’s existence in 
society: on one hand, morality is always formed under the impact of society; on the 
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other hand, society is the only proper stage for the display of morality.197 And, while 
it is clear that politics, given its eminently social nature, can hardly be a medium for 
any un-affected individualism, it should also be obvious that ethics as such is 
impossible as the individualist disregard for the community; indeed, it may be said 
that ethics itself is impossible outside the community, and Rousseau was certainly 
aware of it, as much as a Calvinist would be, no matter how uncomfortable he felt in 
the society of his day.   
Rousseau’s individual is a thoroughly socialised being, and it is exactly his social 
and communal dimension that brings about his ethical and therefore political 
dimension. As Vaughan argued, it was Locke who, by making the individual morally 
sufficient unto himself, had divorced politics from ethics; Rousseau, by recognising 
the necessity of the community for the individual’s moral life, brought ethics and 
politics again into connection with one another.198 However, it rather seems that both 
ethics and politics are possible only in society; indeed, it is exactly their social 
essence that makes them so closely related; and, it is only the socialised individual 
who is capable of taking part in both. Even Locke’s individualistic ethics is possible 
only in the society of self-interested individuals, where the ethics of self-sufficiency 
is promoted by the individualistic society itself, as much as by its individual 
members, socialised in accordance with the individualistic ethical norm. Thus, even 
that highly individualistic ethics is necessarily promoted by political means, and 
politics necessarily becomes an application of the former. And then, it seems that 
Locke’s distinction between politics and ethics mainly serves the purpose of 
concealing that fact. In Rousseau’s understanding, in contrast, the more socialised the 
individual, the more capable he is of moral and political freedom. For, it is only in 
his capacity as a socialised being that the individual can both perform his moral and 
political duties and exercise his moral freedom and his political liberties. Indeed, 
only within the framework of permanent, ever-increasing socialisation can the 
individual perceive the very performance of his moral and political duties (including 
the sacrifice for the community) as the exercise of his moral and political freedom. 
But if, as Cobban says, Rousseau practically rejects any theory which sinks the 
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individual so completely in the mass as to rob him of his capacity for moral 
freedom,199 it is difficult to see him embracing nationalism in the proper sense, which 
by (Kedourie’s) definition attempts to sink the individual’s personality in the greater 
whole of ‘the nation’. Thus Cobban’s earlier argument about Rousseau’s alleged 
‘nationalism’ is bound to be inconsistent with the claim above.200    
The problem lies not in Rousseau’s inconsistency, as many would claim, but in a 
widely-spread misunderstanding of his essentially dialectical interpretation of the 
relation of reflexivity between the individual and the community. Thus, even if there 
was no doubt that Rousseau starts from the individual and not from the community, it 
should be noted that for him these two never function as two mutually independent 
concepts, let alone as two mutually independent social units. To paraphrase his 
statement, those who attempt to divide them will never understand anything of 
either;201 or, at least, they will not understand how deeply interrelated they are in 
Rousseau’s account. Cobban himself caught a great deal of Rousseau’s dialectics, 
advancing a seemingly paradoxical claim that “the very existence of the general will 
is equivalent to laying down a programme for the individual”. For, ‘the general will’ 
“necessitates that his judgement shall be rational, in the general interest, and 
unperverted by selfish prejudices or individual passions.” The intention of Rousseau’s 
Social Contract, says Cobban, is therefore “to expand and not to obliterate 
individuality in the corporate life of the state”. The object of Rousseau’s political 
philosophy is “to effect a reconciliation between the individual and the state, in which 
each may acquire a fuller meaning”. Only this can explain “the apparent contradiction 
by which the assertion of the rights of the individual is joined to the creation of the 
idea of a more closely integrated state.”202 Still, in the light of this interpretation, 
Cobban’s earlier claim that a “hard and insoluble core of individualism” in 
Rousseau’s thought “refuses to be dissolved away by the rising tide of communal 
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values” seems far too strong. It would be much more accurate to say that Rousseau’s 
radical individualism was, paradoxically, a desperate cry for the true communal 
values, as opposed to the quasi-individualistic, anti-communal values of modern 
society. Inversely, his radical communalism, as well as his radical anti-modernism, 
was a desperate cry for a return of the individual to his true moral values, intrinsic to 
his nature as a social being. For, paradoxically, Rousseau’s ‘natural man’ is only a 
truly and properly socialised man, relieved of both the quasi-individualistic and 
quasi-communalistic distortions brought about by modern society.203 His idea of 
‘natural man’ was necessary for revising the idea of modern man; however, it was a 
means to a re-socialised man, modelled after the ancient ideal.204   
It is precisely with this idea in sight that Rousseau established his famous 
distinction between ‘homme naturel’ and ‘homme artificiel’.205 He discovered that in 
order to distinguish between these two we need not go back to the epochs of the 
distant and dead past (labelled by other philosophers as ‘the state of nature’), since 
every man, regardless of his current artificial surface, carries the true, natural 
archetype within himself. It is this discovery, self-understandable as it may seem, that 
Rousseau proclaimed as his own greatest accomplishment.206 This very distinction 
allows for the possibility of man’s being non-artificial without literally going ‘back to 
nature’, outside society: man may well be natural in society, by discovering his true 
nature. However, paradoxically, Rousseau seems to imply that this true nature of man 
can only be revealed in a newly-constructed society. For, man’s true, non-artificial 
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sociability is necessarily revealed as part of man’s true nature only in a society shaped 
anew by political means, which – paradoxically again – itself ceases to be artificial by 
man’s discovering his natural, true sociability through shaping society in accordance 
with this sociability.207 It is by discovering his natural sociability that man abandons 
the artificial, conventional sociability which gave rise to modern, conventional 
society, as well as to the modern, isolated individual. Thus man, as a truly sociable 
being in all times and all places, is to be distinguished from the creature known as 
‘the individual’, as a product of modern society’s conventional and therefore 
essentially isolating sociability. At the same time, in the society built on his true 
sociability, man can return to his true, non-individualist nature. A need to find such a 
‘natural man’ was a pressing issue for Rousseau, and he returns to this motive ever 
and ever again in his works. This urgency is well-illustrated in the following 
paragraph: 
 
But where is he, this natural man who lives a truly human life; who, caring nothing for the 
opinion of others, acts only in accord with his impulses and reason, without regard for the 
praise or blame of society? In vain we seek him among us. Everywhere only a varnish of 
words; all men seek their happiness in appearance. No one cares for reality, everyone stakes 
his essence on illusion. Slaves and dupes of their self-love, men live not in order to live but to 
make others believe that they have lived!208 
 
The form of sociability which requires that men do not truly live but instead attempt 
to create an impression of their living or of their having lived is what is clearly 
unacceptable to Rousseau.209 Still, that by no means suggests his dismissal of either 
sociability or society itself. For, a society in which men would seek their happiness in 
their essence, in which they would care for reality and reject all their ‘amour propre’ 
                                                 
207In Cohler’s simplistic interpretation, this restored “sociability seems to be expressed in the mutual 
membership in a community. These men are sympathetic to and concerned with each other, perhaps 
because the only standard for their activity is their common membership in a community”. (Cohler, p. 
67) 
208
 Rousseau juge Jean-Jacques, Troiseme Dialogue (Hachette ed., IX), p. 288. Cited in Cassirer, p. 51.  
209
 Kendall probably caught the essence of Rousseau’s opposition to modern society and of his 
advocacy of civic activism: “It becomes more and more clear as one reads the Poland that Rousseau 
identifies the viciousness of the moderns with a certain randomness in the pattern of their lives. His 
notion of virtue, then, involves simply the replacement of “random man” with the kind of person 
whose life is ordered by some consistent purpose. This kind of person is the citizen of the completely 
public man; and it is the business of the state, or, more properly, it is the business of the founder of the 
state to see to it that the citizen passes every waking moment within the institutions that will insure his 
constant attention to public affairs. To put another way, for Rousseau the random life is slavery 
because it is constantly subject to the vicissitudes of the moment, whereas even under the most 
authoritarian regime the genuine citizen enjoys a superior freedom by virtue of his sense of purpose. 
Apart from being grounded in an intense piety toward the fatherland, Rousseau’s notion of virtue is 
almost without content.” (Kendall, Introduction to The Government of Poland, p. xxxii) 
 77 
which makes them real only insofar as it creates an illusion of their being real – such 
a society would certainly be more than desirable to Rousseau; indeed, it would be the 
only form of human existence in which men would be capable of realising their 
human essence. It is this society that The Social Contract seeks to bring forth, and the 
state is only a means (political, as it is) to this particular end. For, as Rousseau stated 
in his Confessions, “no people would ever be anything but what the nature of its 
government made it”: government, politics, education, civil religion – they all only 
serve the purpose of making a society in which men would be able to live without 
having to make others believe that they have lived, in which their very existence 
would be a reflection of their essence instead of their appearance. It is the superficial 
and artificial society in which man’s existence is reduced to his social appearance that 
Rousseau clearly rejects; a society in which man’s existence would come closer to his 
human essence is a society that Rousseau clearly seeks to establish. As Cassirer 
correctly put it, 
 
How can we build a genuine and truly human community without falling in the process into 
the evils and depravity of conventional society? This is the question to which the Contrat 
social addresses itself. The return to the simplicity and happiness of the state of nature is 
barred to us, but the path of freedom lies open, it can and must be taken.  To him freedom did 
not mean arbitrariness but the overcoming and elimination of all arbitrariness, the submission 
to a strict and inviolable law which the individual erects over himself. Not renunciation of 
and release from this law but free consent to it determines the genuine and true character of 
freedom. (…) Here lies the heart of the whole political and social problem. It is not a question 
of emancipating and liberating the individual in the sense of releasing him from the form and 
order of the community; it is, rather, a question of finding the kind of community that will 
protect every individual with the whole concerted power of the political organization, so that 
the individual in uniting himself with all others nevertheless obeys only himself in this act of 
union.210 
 
Freedom understood as arbitrariness, according to Platonic principles which Rousseau 
passionately embraced, would be a negation of man’s free will. For, surrender to 
arbitrariness is simply a surrender of man to his un-willing part, a form of slavery to 
his own weaknesses and passions.211 Free will is, therefore, possible only as a 
resistance to man’s own arbitrary weaknesses. Arbitrariness itself is, in a profoundly 
Platonic sense, a negation of freedom. On the other hand, man’s willing part, though 
source of man’s freedom, is not to be regarded, and Rousseau does not seem to regard 
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it as, fully autonomous by itself. For, man’s free will is never free from unconscious 
influences of man’s social environment and its values, nor from the influences of his 
own natural social inclinations (i.e. sociability). Indeed, these values and inclinations 
are so deeply embedded in the very foundations of man’s will that it makes it almost 
impossible for him to will anything which is not already given as a possibility within 
the set of values and inclinations he inherits and further embraces through the process 
of socialisation. Thus man’s willing part contains its own non-autonomous part, 
which makes man’s freedom conditional upon his conscious acceptance of the latter’s 
existence. However, this reconciliation between free will’s autonomous and non-
autonomous parts is, in Rousseau’s conception, outwardly rather than inwardly 
oriented. According to his conception, the reconciliation can only take place at the 
societal level, through identification of this will’s inward, autonomous part with the 
outward projection of its non-autonomous part. This outward projection of the non-
autonomous, socially conditioned and sociably inclined part of man’s free will is 
what Rousseau calls ‘the general will’. As such, ‘the general will’ is as constitutive of 
man’s own free will as his free will is constitutive of ‘the general will’. This outward 
projection of free will’s non-autonomous part is the essence of Rousseau’s 
Copernican revolution: the non-autonomous, socially conditioned and socially 
inclined part of man’s free will is thus brought back to its societal source, and society 
as a source of free will’s non-autonomous part is reconciled with the part of man’s 
will that craves for full autonomy. Through the acknowledgement of the existence of 
free will’s non-autonomous part, which is achieved by its outward projection back to 
the societal level, the quest for full autonomy of man’s free will is reconciled with the 
existence of society, as a very negation of that quest. It is only by recognising the 
non-autonomous, socially conditioned and socially inclined part of man’s free will 
that man can reconcile his free will with the will of society. Conversely, it is only by 
reconciling his free will with the will of society that his free will becomes identical 
with itself, indeed, becomes truly free while reconciling its autonomy-craving part 
with the non-autonomous one.              
In the introductory sentence of The Social Contract, Rousseau says “Man is born 
free; and yet everywhere he is in chains.”212 The usual, common-sense interpretation 
is that man was free only in ‘the state of nature’ and that he is in chains in any form of 
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society. Yet, if Rousseau really intended to say that, then the whole project of The 
Social Contract that follows from this opening sentence would simply contradict that 
intention. It would probably be too extravagant to assume that such exactly was the 
case, as indeed so many of his critics assumed. Rather, the true meaning of that 
phrase should be sought in affirmation, not in negation, of both society and 
sociability. What Rousseau actually meant by that sentence, provided that in The 
Social Contract he really wanted to affirm man’s genuine sociability, thus can be 
summarised as, “Man is born sociable; and yet everywhere he is in isolation”. This 
isolation of man, in the form of the self-contained individual, which Rousseau saw as 
the distinctive feature of modern society, was to be equated with physical chains; 
hence the sentence above as the opening of the project that celebrates both true 
society and man’s natural sociability as a way of overcoming man’s self-imposed 
isolation. Many of Rousseau’s liberal critics mistook this isolation of man for man’s 
free will and, consequently, practically projected their own views into Rousseau by 
claiming that for him every society was necessarily a negation of man’s free will. 
Still, this not so much Rousseau’s fault, though he was not always explicit at this 
point. A true society of natural men, as opposed to modern, false society of artificial 
individuals, is what he really sought to promote in order to liberate man from the 
chains of isolation. True society, in this sense, is for Rousseau a negation of man’s 
isolation, not of man’s free will. As such, true society is a negation of the isolated 
individual, and an affirmation of natural man. It is exactly this isolation of the 
individual that Rousseau was referring to while introducing the concept of ‘amour 
propre’ (usually translated as ‘vanity’ or ‘pride’), as opposed to ‘amour de soi’ (‘self-
love’), which is man’s natural inclination and which includes both his sociability and 
his sympathy for other men. Sympathy is thus for Rousseau an extension of ‘amour 
de soi’: we love others because we see them as being like ourselves. However, it does 
not mean that for Rousseau sympathy is, as C. Fred Alford claims, merely an 
extension of ourselves so as to embrace others by denying their otherness.213 Rather, 
it means that in ourselves we recognise others – and hence their otherness – while 
recognising our own self as socially constructed. It is only in an essentially infantile 
projection of the relations between society and the self that the former is seen as an 
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extension of the latter; in a more mature projection, one usually comes to recognise 
oneself as an extension of one’s own society and/or of the entire mankind. And, that 
is why sympathy for others can be at the same time the love of oneself (‘amour de 
soi’): we love others in ourselves as much as we love ourselves in others.  If we 
pursue only the strategy of loving ourselves in others, ‘amour de soi’ necessarily 
degenerates into ‘amour propre’. In this sense, ‘amour propre’ becomes a negation of 
man’s sociability and of man’s socially conditioned self; as such, it becomes a 
negation of man’s true nature and, eventually, a negation of his free will. For, in 
accordance with Rousseau’s Platonic conception, ‘amour propre’ itself is a form of 
slavery to man’s own un-willing weaknesses and passions. Inversely, man’s love of 
himself (‘amour de soi’) is to be seen as man’s true nature only insofar as his self is 
recognised as an extension of the entire society/mankind; that is, insofar as this love 
of the self embraces the entire society/mankind. That is why the struggle for natural 
man for Rousseau necessarily becomes a struggle for man’s re-socialisation. In this 
sense, the de-socialising education in Emile is merely the first phase of Rousseau’s 
bigger project of man’s re-socialisation. The second phase of this project takes the 
form of nation-building and is elaborated in The Social Contract, The Government of 
Poland, and The Constitutional Project for Corsica. In this second phase, the pivotal 
role in man’s re-socialisation is to be played by ‘civil religion’, by which Rousseau 
meant a perpetually generated attachment of man to his social environment, 
ultimately aiming at the creation of unity between the perpetually splitting parts of 
man’s will – the one craving for its full autonomy and the non-autonomous, 
instinctual, socially-conditioned and sociable one, the unity which is made possible 
by the outward projection of the latter part onto the societal level, the projection 
which Rousseau named ‘the general will’, and which was thus, by its very definition, 
meant to be identical with both parts of man’s will.  
Clearly, for Rousseau, selfish love (‘amour propre’) was not to be exclusively 
charged to society as such, but to its present form, in which man’s natural sociability 
had already degenerated into the selfish isolation from, and oppression of, other 
men.214 However, a society that would replace the present, coercive society would not 
be only an ethical community in which everyone obeys only ‘the general will’, in 
terms of this will’s being external to man; nor would this will only be internalised 
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through externally imposed ‘civil religion’. It would be a society in which man’s 
natural, inherent sociability would be preserved, so that man would remain faithful to 
his very nature – a being that desires closeness of his fellow beings, not a being 
striving for his own isolation while oppressing others. The latter, Hobbesian picture 
of man certainly does not resonate with Rousseau’s deep faith in the natural goodness 
of man; for, the degeneration of ‘amour de soi’ into ‘amour propre’, which takes 
place in modern society (so that man eventually comes to resemble the Hobbesian 
image of man), is for Rousseau contingent, not necessary. Otherwise, what would be 
the purpose of his proposing a new social contract, if that new contract, built on the 
foundations of man’s natural sociability and implying man’s thorough re-
socialisation, could not prevent this degeneration from happening? It seems that the 
only way that Rousseau envisaged of bringing us back to ourselves would be the way 
of our thorough re-socialisation, not only through identification of ourselves with 
others but, more importantly, through identification of others with ourselves. For, it is 
only in our recognition of others as part of ourselves – indeed, of others as being 
built-in into the very foundations of our own selves – that we can come back to 
ourselves without alienating ourselves both from others and from our own sociable 
nature. Such is the foundation of Rousseau’s ethics and of his faith in man. Man’s 
salvation is thus possible only as a revelation and recovery of his inherent sociability; 
and it is this revealed sociability that man simply acknowledges while identifying his 
own will with ‘the general will’ of society. For, it is only through this identification 
that man’s will unites with its own non-autonomous, sociable and socially constituted 
part: only through this identification with the will of society does his own will 
become one with itself, while incorporating its own non-autonomous, sociable and 
socially constituted, part. Thus, by postulating ‘the general will’, Rousseau sought to 
solve not only the problem of theodicy – he also sought to solve Plato’s problem of 
man’s perpetually splitting self and his desire to make it one. As Cassirer summarised 
it, 
 
The hour of salvation will strike when the present coercive form of society is destroyed and is 
replaced by the free form of political and ethical community – a community in which 
everyone obeys only the general will, rather than be subjected to the wilfulness of others. But 
it is futile to hope that this salvation will be accomplished through outside help. No God can 
grant it to us; man must become his own savior and, in the ethical sense, his own creator. In 
its present form society has inflicted the deepest wounds on humanity; but society alone can 
and should heal these wounds. (…) That is Rousseau’s solution for the problem of theodicy – 
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and with it he had indeed placed the problem on completely new ground. Ha had carried it 
beyond the realm of metaphysics and placed it in the center of ethics and politics. With this 
act he gave it a stimulus which continues to work unabated even today. All contemporary 
social struggles are still moved and driven by this original stimulus. They are rooted in that 
consciousness of the responsibility of society which Rousseau was the first to possess and 
which he implanted in all posterity.215  
 
Still, man’s inherent sociability is not to be seen as a mere instinct, deprived of ethical 
dimension.216 On the contrary, ethical dimension of man is derived from man’s 
sociability; indeed, ethics is, on this view, just a form of acknowledgement and proper 
application of man’s inherent sociability. What, then, makes such ethics truly ethical 
in terms of overcoming the givens of man’s nature is an effort to reconcile the 
instinctual craving for full autonomy of man’s will, which constitutes one of its two 
parts, with the other, non-autonomous, socially conditioned and socially inclined, and 
therefore instinctual part of this will. It is man’s inherent craving for full autonomy 
that has to be reconciled with man’s inherent sociability if man’s will is to be truly 
free: it is this reconciliation that constitutes the core of Rousseau’s ethics. By acting 
in accordance with this ethics, man’s will becomes free and one with itself, thus 
allowing man to be one with himself, that is, with his own nature. Only such a being 
is to be properly called ‘natural man’.      
Of course, ‘natural man’ is not an absolute category, abstracted from any social 
intercourse: ‘natural man’ is simply a man abstracted from the deviations brought 
about by the present form of society. As such, he has a potential for both sociability 
and Hobbesian egoism; despite the fact that in the present form of society man has 
already developed the latter potential, Rousseau was quite certain that in a society 
established by a new contract (as he himself proposed) man could as well develop the 
former one. Thus, the fact that man’s inborn capability of compassion is not to be 
considered strictly ‘ethical’ (in terms of taking active interest in others), it 
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nevertheless confirms man’s inborn sociability. The very act of compassion and 
sympathy, the act of entering into being and sentiments of others, is an act of man’s 
identification with others. This identification may not be called ‘ethical’; however, it 
is this identification that constitutes the foundations of all ethics. (The fact that man 
does not identify himself with animals but with other human beings is what, for 
example, makes his killing of human beings un-ethical, while making his killing of 
animals merely non-ethical.) It is exactly this ability of identification with human 
beings that constitutes man as a potentially ethical being. In this identification, man 
does not simply project himself into others, denying their otherness (as repeatedly 
suggested by C. F. Alford); more importantly, he projects others, their beings and 
sentiments, into himself, without denying his own self, either. He thus affirms himself 
as a part of others, as well as others as a part of himself and of his own nature.      
As Cassirer stresses, for Rousseau this relationship of reflexivity is grounded not in 
some instinctive inclination of sympathy but in man’s capacity for self-determination. 
Its real proof lies in the recognition of an ethical law to which the individual will 
surrenders voluntarily. Man’s goodness217 is mirrored in the degree to which his 
nature is not absorbed in sensual instincts but lifts itself spontaneously to the idea of 
freedom.218 However, man’s capacity for self-determination is not merely opposed to 
man’s un-willing, sensual half.219 This capacity for self-determination, in order to be 
realised, has to overcome a tension within itself, a tension between the potential for 
full autonomy of man’s will and the potential for man’s sociability, which is by 
definition constituted by man’s absorption of social values and is therefore essentially 
non-autonomous, while still being constitutive of man’s willing half. Man’s self-
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determination thus, in the first place, assumes the recognition of this tension within 
man’s willing half; by recognising this opposition, man’s willing half strengthens 
itself against the un-willing, sensual half. For, this recognition is, paradoxically, 
realised through an outward projection of the socially constituted part of man’s will 
into the will of society; and only thus can the relationship of reflexivity be established 
between man’s will and society’s will, thereby forging an alliance to overcome man’s 
un-willing half.220 This relationship of reflexivity, then, in its higher form, evolves 
into one of identity. According to Rousseau, it is the perpetual establishment of this 
identity, which can only be realised through the establishment of reflexivity between 
man’s will and society’s will by projecting the socially constituted, non-autonomous 
part of man’s will into the will of society, that equals man’s freedom. Freedom is thus 
to be achieved not merely in terms of overcoming the strivings of man’s un-willing, 
sensual part by the assertion of his willing part; it is to be achieved by overcoming the 
tension within the willing part itself, first by establishing a relationship of reflexivity 
and then a relationship of identity between man’s individual will and the will of 
society.221 Since the natural constitution of man is his sociability, ‘the general will’ as 




The process of the perpetual establishing of identity between man’s individual will 
and the presumed will of society, which was in Rousseau’s view the only path to 
man’s freedom, brings the social phenomenon called ‘the nation’ into existence. For, 
it is through repeated, perpetual manifestations of national unity, as perpetual mass-
mobilisations conceived as mass-displays of identity between individual wills and the 
presumed collective will of society, that ‘the nation’, as a presumed unity between 
these two, actually comes into existence at the societal level. These repeated mass-
mobilisations are the social expressions of nationalism, an ideology that presupposes 
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the essential identity between individual wills and the presumed collective will of 
society as the sole condition of man’s freedom. It is only through these perpetual 
mass-mobilisations in the name of ‘liberty’ and along the lines of ‘national unity’ that 
‘the nation’, as an abstract concept, is being embodied (albeit in an oscillatory 
manner) as a really existing social phenomenon. According to the doctrine of 
nationalism, these oscillatory mass-manifestations of ‘national unity’ are to be 
regarded as the only possible manifestations of man’s freedom. In this respect, 
Rousseau’s theory, depicting man’s freedom as a matter of identification of his 
individual will with the presumed will of the entire society, has certainly provided a 
solid philosophical foundation, as well as the most elaborate socio-psychological 
mechanism, for the subsequent emergence of the ideology of nationalism. Of course, 
Rousseau’s theory was by no means its only source: nationalism absorbed all 
previous and subsequent liberal-democratic and republican theories and through 
mass-mobilisations at the societal level eventually embraced the very mainstream of 
modern political practice. Still, Rousseau’s theory of freedom provided such 
mobilisations with an elaborated socio-psychological mechanism through which they 
actually function, as well as with a universal philosophical rationale of struggle for 
man’s freedom. The ultimate accomplishment along these lines has been achieved by 
Rawls’s theory of ‘justice as fairness’, which provided the most elaborated 
philosophical framework and socio-psychological mechanism through which the 
manifestations of national unity are being affirmed at the societal micro-level.  


















John Rawls, who was by many proclaimed the greatest liberal philosopher of the 20th 
century, had himself a more modest ambition: to be a re-establisher of the social 
contract tradition within liberalism itself.222 This effort is materialised primarily in 
his two most important works, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, as well 
as in The Law of Peoples.223 Rawls was dissatisfied by the fact that liberalism was for 
more than a century dominated by some form of utilitarianism (within which John 
Stuart Mill was perceived as an almost sacred figure; see the next chapter), and 
attempted to redirect it towards its own contractarian foundations.224 His aim was “to 
present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of 
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract” of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant; 
but, unlike for these three authors, for him the object of the original agreement was 
not to enter a given society or adopt a given form of government, but to adopt the 
principles of justice for the basic structure of society and to ascertain which principles 
it would be rational to adopt given the contractual situation.225 Eventually, he 
extended these principles from societal to international level, to what he labelled as 
‘Society of Peoples’.  
 
Justice as reciprocity  
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The idea of the theory of ‘justice as fairness’ is to “use the notion of pure procedural 
justice to handle the contingencies of particular situations”. In order to do so, “the 
social system is to be designed so that the resulting distribution is just however things 
turn out”.226 In postulating this theory, Rawls does not want to rely “on an undefined 
concept of community, or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its 
own distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations with one 
another”.227 Instead, he assumes that society consists of, and is formed by, its 
members’ reciprocal relations with one another. From this conception, however 
individualistic it might seem, he attempts to eventually explain the value of 
community. Otherwise, he says, the theory of justice cannot succeed.228 In this 
chapter, the value of one specific community – ‘the nation’, from both liberal-
democratic and nationalistic discourses – has been explained by the ostensibly 
individualistic terms of the theory of ‘justice as fairness’.  
Rawls puts justice at the centre of social and political theory and thereby 
simultaneously attempts to eliminate from there the utilitarian principle of ‘the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number’, which in his view has no respect for 
individuals’ interests.229 The contrast between ‘justice as fairness’ and classical 
utilitarianism implies a difference in their underlying conceptions of society: “In the 
one we think of a well-ordered society as a scheme of cooperation for reciprocal 
advantage regulated by principles which persons would choose in an initial situation 
that is fair, in the other as the efficient administration of social resources to maximize 
the satisfaction of the system of desire constructed by the impartial spectator from the 
many individual systems of desires accepted as given.”230 Rawls’s main objection to 
utilitarianism is that “it does not take seriously the distinction between persons”231 
when it postulates the principle of ‘the greatest sum of happiness for the greatest 
number’ of persons: “The striking feature of the utilitarian view of justice is that it 
does not matter, except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among 
individuals any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his 
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satisfactions over time.”232 He blames utilitarianism for the logical error of adopting 
for society as a whole the principle of rational choice for one man, the so-called 
impartial spectator, “who is conceived as carrying out the required organization of the 
desires of all persons into one coherent system of desire”. It is by this collectivistic 
construction that many persons are fused into one.233 But, “there is no reason to 
suppose that the principles which should regulate an association of men is simply an 
extension of the principle of choice for one man”.234 Besides seeing utilitarianism as a 
non-individualistic doctrine,235 one that does not attempt to make distinction between 
individual persons and their desires, Rawls sees the principle of utility as totally 
inconsistent with the principle of equality between individuals: 
 
It hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equals, entitled to press their 
claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may require lesser life prospects 
for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Since each 
desires to protect his interests, his capacity to advance his conception of the good, no one has 
a reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net 
balance of satisfaction.236  
 
The principle of utility is thus incompatible with the conception of social cooperation 
among equals for mutual advantage, which is based on the idea of reciprocity, 
implicit in the notion of a well-ordered, just society.237 In such a society, “justice 
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by 
others”, and “the reasoning which balances the gains and losses of different persons 
as if they were one person is excluded”:238 
 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a 
whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is 
made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed 
on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a 
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just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice 
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.239 
   
In contrast to the constructed principle of utility, Rawls claims that the principle of 
justice naturally occupies the central place in social theory, since “justice is the first 
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought”.240 Hence, all theories 
must be rejected if untrue, as laws and institutions have to be abolished or reformed if 
unjust.241 The centrality of justice is explained by the fact that a conflict of interests is 
built-in into the very foundations of society as a system of collaboration between 
individuals. For, “persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced 
by their collaboration are distributed”. This is why “a set of principles is required for 
choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of 
advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares”. 
These principles, which “provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic 
institutions of society” and “define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation”, are ‘the principles of social justice’.242 Rawls claims 
that these ‘principles of justice’ for society were the actual object of the original 
contract:243  
 
The main idea is that when a number of persons engage in a mutually advantageous 
cooperative venture according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty in ways necessary to 
yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to the restrictions have a right to a similar 
acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. We are not to 
gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share.244 
 
The other idea of ‘justice as fairness’ is that “men share in primary goods on the 
principle that some can have more if they are acquired in ways which improve the 
situation of those who have less” (this is what Rawls calls the second principle of 
‘justice as fairness’ or ‘the difference principle’, in addition to the first principle, that 
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of ‘equal liberty’).245 If that principle is not satisfied, society suffers from injustice, 
which can be simply interpreted as “inequalities that are not to the benefit of all”.246 
The first principle of ‘justice as fairness’, then, is that “each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar scheme of liberties for others”. The list of these basic liberties consists of  
“political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) and freedom of speech 
and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, 
which includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and 
dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of 
law,” and these liberties are to be equal by the first principle. Since these basic 
liberties may be limited when they clash with one another, “none of these liberties is 
absolute; but however they are adjusted to form one system, this system is to be the 
same for all”.247 The second principle is that “social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s 
advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all”. It applies to “the 
distribution of income and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of 
differences in authority and responsibility”; “while the distribution of wealth and 
income need not be equal, it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time, 
positions of authority and responsibility must be accessible to all”.248 Positions are to 
be not only open in a formal sense, but all should have a fair chance to attain them. 
Those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness 
to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place 
in the social system.249 When the two principles are satisfied, all are ‘equal’ 
citizens.250  ‘The difference principle’ thus explicitly expresses a conception of 
reciprocity. It is a principle of mutual benefit.251 Further, Rawls says that ‘the 
difference principle’ corresponds to a natural meaning of fraternity, and expresses its 
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fundamental meaning from the standpoint of social justice. It refers to the idea of not 
wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less 
well off, which is an idea usually put into practice only in the family: only members 
of a family commonly do not wish to gain unless they can do so in ways that further 
the interests of the rest. Acting on ‘the difference principle’ has precisely this 
consequence: those better circumstanced are willing to have their greater advantages 
only under a scheme in which this works out for the benefit of the less fortunate.252 
So “we can associate the traditional ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity with the 
democratic interpretation of the two principles of justice as follows: liberty 
corresponds to the first principle, equality to the idea of equality in the first principle 
together with equality of fair opportunity, and fraternity to the difference 
principle”.253   
A shared conception of justice established within society with the distributive role is 
thus not exhausted by it. What is equally important, by establishing ‘equal 
citizenship’, “among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared 
conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship”.254 These bonds, by 
consistent application of ‘the difference principle’, may evolve into the bonds of 
fraternity. Both of these bonds are based on perpetual expression of persons’ 
reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’: “By arranging inequalities 
for reciprocal advantage and by abstaining from the exploitation of the contingencies 
of nature and social circumstance within a framework of equal liberties, persons 
express their respect for one another in the very constitution of their society.”255 Thus, 
by arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage within a framework of ‘equal 
liberties’, individuals both express their respect for one another and constitute their 
society. In this way, Rawls practically says, the principles of individuals’ reciprocal 
recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ (in the classical interpretation, this is 
expressed by the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity) are built-in into the very 
constitution of a projected well-ordered society. The public understanding of justice 
as a reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ is also built-in into the 
system of state institutions, in charge of administering justice through laws and 
norms: 
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Similar cases are treated similarly, the relevant similarities and differences being those 
identified by the existing norms. The correct rule as defined by institutions is regularly 
adhered to and properly interpreted by the authorities. This impartial and consistent 
administration of laws and institutions, whatever their substantive principles, we may call 
formal justice. (…) Formal justice is adherence to principle, or as some have said, obedience 
to system.256  
 
Common obedience to the system perpetually strengthens ‘the bonds of civic 
friendship’ and thereby strengthens ‘the basic structure of society’. ‘The basic 
structure of society’ is Rawls’s term that refers to a scheme that provides the rules for 
a ‘fair system’ of social cooperation:  
 
First of all, I assume that the basic structure is regulated by a just constitution that secures the 
liberties of equal citizenship (…). Liberty of conscience and freedom of thought are taken for 
granted, and the fair value of political liberty is maintained. The political process is 
conducted, as far as circumstances permit, as a just procedure for choosing between 
governments and for enacting just legislation. I assume also that there is fair (as opposed to 
formal) equality of opportunity.257  
 
In A Theory of Justice, ‘the basic structure of society’ is “conceived for the time being 
as a closed system isolated from other societies”.258 In Political Liberalism, it is 
maintained that “the basic structure is that of a closed society: that is, we are to regard 
it as self-contained and as having no relations with other societies.”259 Isolation is 
thus regarded as a precondition for a society to build its ‘basic structure’ on the 
shared conception of justice as a fair distribution of rights, duties, benefits and 
burdens between equal individuals.  
 
Paradoxes of the original position 
 
The distribution of rights, duties, benefits and burdens is based on the principle of 
reciprocity and – in order for the distribution to remain purely reciprocal – must not 
be subject to any external, extra-societal influences.260 This is what Rawls calls ‘the 
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original position’, which provides absolute ‘fairness’ (i.e. absolute reciprocity) in the 
social distribution, due to the assumed ‘veil of ignorance’:  
 
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to 
will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. 
Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and 
tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order 
to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know 
how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to 
evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations. It is assumed, then, that the 
parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. First of all, no one knows his place in 
society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of 
natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone 
know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the 
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or 
pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances 
of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level 
of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position 
have no information as to which generation they belong. (…) As far as possible, then, the 
only particular facts which the parties know is that their society is subject to the 
circumstances of justice and whatever it implies. (…) In any case, the original position must 
be interpreted so that one can at any time adopt its perspective. It must make no difference 
when one takes up this viewpoint, or who does so: the restrictions must be such that the same 
principles are always chosen. The veil of ignorance is a key condition in meeting this 
requirement. It insures not only that the information available is relevant, but that it is at all 
times the same.261 
 
‘The original position’ of equality, says Rawls, corresponds to ‘the state of nature’ in 
the traditional theory of the social contract.262 ‘The original position’ is defined as an 
initial status quo in which any agreements reached are ‘fair’ and “the parties are 
equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary 
contingencies or the relative balance of social forces”. However, unlike in the 
traditional conception of the state of nature, ‘the original position’ is so characterised 
that unanimity is possible and the deliberations of any one person are typical of all. 
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The same applies to the judgement of the citizens of a well-ordered society regulated 
by the principles of justice: everyone has a similar sense of justice so that, in this 
moral consensus, a well-ordered society is homogenous.263 Although ‘justice as 
fairness’ uses the idea of ‘pure procedural justice’ from the very beginning,264 this 
idea from the very beginning implies the ideal, and leads to the outcome, of unanimity 
and homogeneity. The conceptions of ‘the original position’ and ‘pure procedural 
justice’ thus from the beginning suffer from serious paradoxes. Or, at least, this is 
what I intend to prove.   
Rawls assumes that the ‘veil of ignorance’, the key assumption that makes ‘the 
original position’ conceivable, covers all types of social knowledge. However, it may 
be said that in ‘the original position’ as conceived by Rawls persons are not ignorant 
of the fact that they are already classified and ordered as equal individuals, that is, as 
‘equal citizens’. They may not know their class position or their advantages, strengths 
and weaknesses; however, they know that they are supposed to see themselves, and to 
recognise one another, as ‘free and equal’ individuals, that is, as citizens. And that is 
what applies to a very particular type of society, civic society. Rawls takes this 
particular society as universal, and that is the first paradox he encounters. Rawls 
touches the problem of citizen-individuals and the relationship with civic society 
commenting on Bradley’s claim that “the individual is a bare abstraction”.265 Rawls 
says that Bradley probably meant that “a person’s obligations and duties presuppose a 
moral conception of institutions and therefore that the content of just institutions must 
be defined before the requirements for individuals can be set out”.266 In this way 
Rawls makes an inversion of the problem he faces himself, and defends the principle 
of postulating ‘the original position’ of equality as a precondition for the individual to 
come into being. Yet, although it may be historically true that the system of civic 
relations had to be first established in order for the individual to be formed, there is 
still a problem for his theory to presuppose the possibility of ‘the original position’ of 
equality between individuals without the prior existence of equal individuals as a 
product of the already established civic relations. This paradox is exposed in Rawls’s 
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claim that the first problem is to design a just procedure: to do this the liberties of 
‘equal citizenship’ must be first introduced and then incorporated into and protected 
by the constitution.267 A just procedure thus cannot be designed without the prior 
existence of the liberties of ‘equal citizenship’, that is, without the prior existence of 
‘free and equal’ citizens. Without ‘free and equal’ citizens’ prior knowledge of their 
status as ‘free and equal’ citizens, an assumed just procedure characterising ‘the 
original position’ cannot come into being. Rawls even worsens the paradox by 
introducing practical stages in realisation of the two principles of ‘justice as fairness’, 
replicating the difficulties from which ‘the original position’ suffers. Equal 
citizenship and its liberties are here established by a constitution as a codified just 
procedure designed to secure citizens’ ‘liberty and equality’,268 despite Rawls’s 
previous admission that in principle such a procedure can not be designed without the 
prior introduction of the liberties of ‘equal citizenship’, which can be only 
subsequently incorporated into the constitution. This is not a merely rhetorical 
question, or a problem of formal logic, since this paradox exposes the problem of 
Rawls’s inability to design the  procedures of justice without establishing and 
defining ‘equal citizens’ first; that is, without defining who is to participate in the 
procedures of justice as an ‘equal citizen’. In this way the principles of justice are 
essentially reduced to the principle of citizenship, and the principle of citizenship is 
taken as part of the principle of participation, despite Rawls’s claiming the 
opposite.269 This paradox also indirectly exposes the common practice of liberalism’s 
reduction of the proclaimed principles of liberty, equality and fraternity (in Rawls’s 
case, of the proclaimed principle of ‘justice as reciprocity’) to the practical issues of 
participation, citizenship and membership (in ‘the nation’), and then their further 
reduction to the question of constitutional, legal and state institutions in charge of 
administering these issues. Rawls explicitly makes this reduction in the case of 
liberty:          
 
The general description of a liberty, then, has the following form: this or that person (or 
persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to 
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do) so and so. Associations as well as natural persons may be free or not free, and constraints 
may range from duties and prohibitions defined by law to the coercive influences arising 
from public opinion and social pressure. For the most part I shall discuss liberty in connection 
with constitutional and legal restrictions. In these cases liberty is a certain structure of 
institutions, a certain system of public rules defining rights and duties.270 
  
It is this reduction that establishes the paradoxical and yet unbreakable bonds between 
the eminently individualistic and inclusivist concept of ‘liberty as participation’ and 
the eminently collectivistic and exclusivist concept of ‘the nation as membership’: 
only fixed members of ‘the nation’ are free to participate and, in Rawls’s terms, 
justice applies only to them. On the level of this practical-political reduction, the 
concepts of ‘liberty’ and ‘the nation’ are inseparable, and so are the historical 
ideologies derived from these concepts, liberalism and nationalism. The same applies 
to Rawls’s concept of justice as ‘fair’, reciprocal participation designed to include 
only ‘equal citizens’ and the concept of ‘the nation’ as exclusive membership for 
those (‘equal citizens’) to whom this justice applies. The problem, addressed in this 
chapter as well as in the rest of the thesis, is that the reduction of liberty and justice to 
participation is at the core of both classical and Rawls’s liberalism, which practically 
makes nationalism their common alter ego.      
Another paradox, linked to the issues of participation, citizenship and membership 
in ‘the nation’, is related to the question of the individual’s voluntary or involuntary 
entering into society as a scheme of cooperation. On one side, Rawls projects the 
ideal of society as a voluntary scheme of cooperation and claims that a society 
satisfying the principles of ‘justice as fairness’ comes as close to this ideal as a 
society can (since “it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent 
to under circumstances that are fair”; in this sense “members are autonomous and the 
obligations they recognize self-imposed”).271 On the other side, a self-contained, 
isolated society which he projects is a totally involuntary scheme of cooperation, one 
that the individual “enters only by birth and exits only by death”.272 The latter 
projection resembles the ideal of a self-contained and self-perpetuating ‘nation’, one 
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of which all nationalists dream, in which only birth gives the right to participate and 
death only deprives of that right. To this problem we shall return.     
Yet another paradox that craves for resolution lies in Rawls’ tacit assumption that 
we can define ‘justice as fairness’ without properly defining what is ‘fairness’. An 
explicit definition of ‘fairness as reciprocity’ is never actually reached, so that the 
reader has to assume that ‘fairness’ is somehow to be seen as a self-understandable 
and self-explanatory concept. Yet, even if one accepts to define ‘fairness’ as a purely 
mechanical procedure of applying mathematical reciprocity to relations between 
individuals, there is still a problem of the content of these relations, that is, to what 
kind of relations this reciprocity is to be applied. The presumed procedural nature of 
Rawls’s ‘fairness as reciprocity’ leaves this question unanswered, and poses a new 
question of how ‘the basic structure of society’ can be established as a network of 
purely procedural, contentless relations between individuals. This is not a rhetorical 
question, since an answer (or the lack of answer) to it defines the nature of these 
relations. In the next part of this chapter, I intend to demonstrate that the exact 
content of these relations is individuals’ perpetual recognition of one another as ‘free 
and equal’, based on the principle of reciprocity, and that this very content, when 
transplanted into practical-political framework, is at the same time the exact content 
of nationalism, as a phenomenon with very concrete non-procedural implications and 
consequences, far away from any abstract procedural justice to which Rawls claimed 
to have subscribed. 
 
Classical vs. political liberalism 
 
In Theory Rawls regarded the social contract tradition as part of moral philosophy 
and drew no distinction between moral and political philosophy.273 In Political 
Liberalism he discovered that the lack of such a distinction produced a serious 
problem for his theory of ‘justice as fairness’. In Theory, a ‘well-ordered society’ was 
conceived as inherently homogenising, one in which all citizens endorse the 
conception of ‘justice as fairness’ by accepting its two principles of justice. They 
endorse that conception on the basis of what in Political Liberalism Rawls calls a 
‘comprehensive philosophical doctrine’, in a manner resembling that of ‘the well-
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ordered society’ of the utilitarian kind, where citizens accept the principle of utility on 
the basis of a comprehensive philosophical doctrine of utilitarianism. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls attempts to return to the purely procedural, non-comprehensive 
tenets of his theory and turns to the problem of liberal society as a coexistence of 
various incompatible ‘comprehensive doctrines’. Thus the main question becomes, 
“how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and 
equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines”? For, as ‘political liberalism’ assumes, the most 
intractable struggles are for the sake of the highest things: for religion, for 
philosophical views of the world, and for different moral conceptions of the good.274 
Put another way, the question is, “how is it possible that deeply opposed though 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political 
conception of a constitutional regime”?275 In turning to this question while 
postulating ‘political liberalism’, Rawls actually turns to the origins and basic tenets 
of the liberal worldview: 
 
The historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) is the 
Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious toleration in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (…) As Hegel saw, pluralism made religious liberty 
possible, certainly not Luther’s and Calvin’s intention. Of course, other controversies are also 
of crucial importance, such as those over limiting the powers of absolute monarchs by 
appropriate principles of constitutional design protecting basic rights and liberties. Yet 
despite the significance of other controversies and of principles addressed to settling them, 
the fact of religious division remains. For this reason, political liberalism assumes the fact of 
reasonable pluralism as a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, including both religious and 
nonreligious doctrines. This pluralism is not seen as a disaster but rather as the natural 
outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions. To see reasonable 
pluralism as a disaster is to see the exercise of reason under the conditions of freedom itself 
as a disaster. Indeed, the success of liberal constitutionalism came as a discovery of a new 
social possibility: the possibility of a reasonably harmonious and stable pluralist society. 
Before the successful and peaceful practice of toleration in societies with liberal institutions 
there was no way of knowing of that possibility.276   
 
Following Constant’s famous distinction between ‘liberties of the ancients’ and 
‘liberties of the moderns’, Rawls suggests that that the problem of coexistence of 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines historically arose only with the rise of the 
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modern salvation religions within Christianity. Unlike in the ancient times, when 
religion was civic religion and philosophy was supposed to work out a doctrine of the 
good, for the moderns religion was the salvation religions of Christianity; in these 
religions, both Catholic and Protestant, the good was already pre-defined as the good 
of salvation, and they had no conflict over that; the conflict was only over their 
jurisdiction over this absolute good, so that their competing claims to administer the 
pursuit of the absolute good did not admit of compromise. Eventually, their mortal 
combat ended up in mutual exhaustion, due to which another principle of the good 
had to be introduced, the principle of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, 
entwined with the principles of toleration and of separation between Church and 
State.277 In such a way, mutually opposed comprehensive doctrines were put into the 
position of relative coexistence in a society run by non-salvationist, secular doctrines. 
Yet, this coexistence was only relatively stable, and all post-Reformation societies 
suffered from inherent instability.     
The Enlightenment, a part of which was classical liberalism, emerged as an attempt 
to solve this problem in post-Reformation societies, and Rawls in developing 
‘political liberalism’ points to its foundations in classical liberalism. Classical 
liberalism explicitly put the good of liberty of conscience in its centre, and introduced 
a relatively inclusive principle of secular citizenship (which evolved into a more 
exclusive principle of national membership), instead of the overtly exclusive and 
discriminating principle of membership in one of the competing Churches. Rawls’s 
‘political liberalism’ goes a step further than any of the historical forms of 
Enlightenment liberalism, which was, in Rawls’s words, a comprehensive liberal and 
often secular doctrine, founded on reason and viewed as suitable for the modern 
age.278 For, ‘political liberalism’ is not conceived as a comprehensive doctrine, in the 
sense that it is not designed to be concerned with general problems of moral 
philosophy and with its own search for the comprehensive moral good. It aspires to 
possess a particular political philosophy that has its own subject matter: how is a just 
and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect 
of resolution?279 Indeed, ‘political liberalism’ makes this ‘just and free society’ its 
own supreme good, and this good is consciously limited to the sphere of the political; 
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in other words, its basic assumption is that the common good can only be found on 
the level of the political.280 In making this step, ‘political liberalism’ claims to make a 
radical departure from both classical liberalism and Rawls’s own theory of justice, 
denouncing the latter as a comprehensive doctrine with the aim to homogenise all 
citizens on the basis of the same principles of justice: 
 
It is the fact of reasonable pluralism that leads – at least me – to the idea of a political 
conception of justice and so to the idea of political liberalism. For rather than confronting 
religious and nonliberal doctrines with a comprehensive liberal philosophical doctrine, the 
thought is to formulate a liberal political conception that those nonliberal doctrines might be 
able to endorse. To find this political conception we do not look at known comprehensive 
doctrines with the aim of striking a compromise with a sufficient number of those doctrines 
actually existing in society by tailoring the political conception to fit them. Doing that appeals 
to the wrong idea of consensus and makes the political conception political in the wrong way. 
Rather, we formulate a freestanding political conception having its own intrinsic (moral) 
political ideal expressed by the criterion of reciprocity. We hope in this way that reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines can endorse for the right reasons that political conception and hence 
be viewed as belonging to a reasonable overlapping consensus.281 
   
Rawls assumes that in ‘political liberalism’ “a plurality of reasonable yet 
incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human 
reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic 
regime”.282 In contrast to Theory, where justice and fairness are presented as 
necessarily related, Political Liberalism, rather than referring to the principles of its 
political conception of justice as ‘fair’, refers to them as ‘reasonable’, indicating that 
these principles and ideals are based on the principles of practical reason.283 The 
conception of ‘reasonable’ enters the equation to replace the twin-categories of ‘just’ 
and ‘fair’ (as well as the conception of truth):  
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For these terms to be fair terms, citizens offering them must reasonably think that those 
citizens to whom such terms are offered might also reasonably accept them. Note that 
“reasonably” occurs at both ends in this formulation: in offering fair terms we must 
reasonably think that citizens offered them might also reasonably accept them. And they must 
be able to do this as free and equal, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the 
pressure of an inferior political or social position. I refer to this as the criterion of 
reciprocity.284 
 
The criterion of reciprocity thus remains the central category in Rawls’s theory, albeit 
in its mutated form, proposed as the ultimate measure of ‘reasonableness’ rather than 
of ‘fairness’: “The reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a system of fair 
cooperation and that its fair terms be reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of 
reciprocity.”285  In Political Liberalism, ‘the principles of political justice’ are defined 
as “the result of a procedure of construction in which rational persons (or their 
representatives), subject to reasonable conditions, adopt the principles to regulate the 
basic structure of society”.286 In the same sense, ‘reasonable principles’ are defined as 
those “that issue from a suitable procedure of construction”, which itself “properly 
expresses the requisite principles and conceptions of practical reason”.287 ‘The 
principles of political justice’ are thus defined in a circulatory, self-referential 
manner, supported by a set of arbitrary categories, such as ‘reasonable’, ‘suitable’, 
and ‘properly’. This is no accident, since Rawls has a fundamental problem with 
postulating ‘the principles of political justice’ as ‘reasonable’, despite the fact that 
these are founded on reciprocity and that their ‘reasonableness’ is measured by a 
degree to which reciprocity governs social relations based on them. The problem lies 
in the fact that there can be no practical, political, legal or social authority that can 
legitimately decide what a ‘suitable procedure of construction’ is, and what is it that 
‘properly expresses the requisite principles and principles of practical reason’. For, 
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although ‘suitable’, ‘proper’ and ‘reasonable’ in social relations may be equated with 
whatever in these relations is based on reciprocity, and whatever is based on 
reciprocity in social relations may be regarded as ‘suitable’, ‘proper’ and 
‘reasonable’, the source of legitimacy in the society ordered by ‘political liberalism’ 
can hardly be a pure mathematical and procedural reciprocity, as Rawls attempts to 
postulate by introducing the term ‘reasonable’ as the ultimate measure of legitimacy. 
Reciprocity can hardly be a source or a measure of legitimacy since, as above, it can 
only produce a circle of self-referential concepts, which are supposed to reflexively 
legitimise themselves. However, such exactly is the problem with the concepts of 
‘liberty’ and ‘the nation’: they are both essentially reflexive, self-referential and self-
legitimising, and that is why so many thinkers have had difficulties in finding their 
definition or true content. Rawls’s great achievement is in bringing this mechanism of 
self-referential, self-legitimising circulatory logic close to the point of self-awareness. 
In Rawls’s theory, this mechanism is almost fully deconstructed; the rest is to be 
deconstructed in this effort to deconstruct Rawls’s procedures of reciprocity by 
revealing their only and true content, that of citizens’ perpetually recognising one 
another as free and equal. 288  
 
From ethnic to civic 
 
As indicated above, the comprehensive doctrine of ‘justice as fairness’ to which 
Rawls refers, one that all citizens endorse as the basis of their social existence, is in 
fact one of national homogeneity (although Rawls himself never uses this term). 
‘Justice as fairness’ is a comprehensive doctrine in terms of its aim to produce 
homogenisation of all citizens on the basis of their permanent endorsement of its 
principles. This permanent endorsement is in Theory presented as the sole basis of 
their social existence and of their social interaction within society ordered by this 
doctrine. In such a society, all citizens are supposed to act on the basis of this doctrine 
and be consequently homogenised into a single body, that is, a single ‘nation’. Acting 
on the basis of a homogenising, comprehensive, all-embracing doctrine is what 
transforms society’s members into ‘the nation’s’ citizens, that is, co-nationals. 
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However, their ‘nationality’, itself based on mutual recognition of one another’s 
membership and ‘equality’, is what has to be permanently subscribed to, in order to 
maintain the system of ‘justice as fairness’, itself based on their permanent mutual 
reciprocal recognition of ‘equality’ and membership.289 This process of permanent 
endorsement of ‘justice as fairness’ by a permanent exercise of mutual, reciprocal 
recognition of one another’s status as ‘free and equal’ citizens of ‘the nation’ – while, 
at the same time, permanently discriminating against all those who are recognised as 
non-members, and who may consequently be treated as unfree unequals – is a process 
of permanent ‘national’ homogenisation through which ‘the nation’ actually comes 
into existence (this is not to say that ‘the nation’, once homogenised, continue its 
existence as a substantial entity; rather, I here claim that ‘the nation’ has to be 
permanently homogenised in order to perpetually affirm its existence: in this sense, 
‘nations’ and ‘nationhood’ exist only through this perpetual affirmation of 
‘nationness’290). Permanent homogenisation around the concepts of ‘nationhood’ and 
citizenship through citizens’ perpetual recognising of one another as ‘free and equal’, 
this thesis claims, is what ‘nations’ and nationalism are all about and in this sense 
‘justice as fairness’ is as comprehensive, nationalistic and exclusivist as any ideology 
of ethnic nationalism. What Political Liberalism, in contrast to Theory, actually 
attempts is to transform this comprehensive form of permanent ‘national’ 
homogenisation into a form of civic nationalism, based on a purely political, though 
still permanent and ‘national’, homogenisation:  
 
In the transformation from the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness, the idea of the 
person as having moral personality with the full capacity of moral agency is transformed into 
that of the citizen. (…) Persons are viewed as being capable of exercising their moral rights 
and fulfilling their moral duties and as being subject to all the moral motivations appropriate 
to each moral virtue the doctrine specifies. In PL, by contrast, the person is seen rather as a 
free and equal citizen, the political person of a modern democracy with the political rights 
and duties of citizenship, and standing in a political relation with other citizens. The citizen 
is, of course, a moral agent, since a political conception of justice is, as we have seen, a moral 
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conception. But the kinds of rights and duties, and of the values considered, are more 
limited.291  
 
The ‘free and equal’ citizen who stands in a political relation with other citizens as 
political persons is, as already indicated, a member of a specific type of society 
claimed to consist of ‘free and equal’ citizens, and that type of society is to be 
recognised under the name ‘the nation’, albeit a civic one. Such citizens are regarded 
as moral agents with respect to the moral character of political conception of justice, 
in which the core is still their reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ 
citizens, that is, as members of ‘the nation’, that is, as co-nationals. In the same sense, 
non-citizens i.e. non-members of ‘the nation’ are still not to be regarded as moral 
agents nor as ‘free and equal’, and members of ‘the nation’ do not owe them 
recognition or reciprocity. Moreover, it is even not to be regarded – from the 
members’ point of view – unreasonable or unjust to treat non-members as 
unreasonable and incapable of being moral agents. The doctrine of nationalism, be 
that ethnic or civic one, is thus always adapted to fit a particular group’s moral 
outlook, in which morality itself, as well as ‘freedom and equality’, are reserved only 
for a group’s members and do not apply to non-members, who have to seek for these 
values within their particular ‘national’ groups. This is transparent in Rawls’s 
definition of the person, supposedly characterising only ‘political liberalism’ and 
civic ‘nations’: 
 
Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully 
cooperating member of society over a complete life. We add the phrase “over a complete 
life” because society is viewed not only as closed but as a more or less complete and self-
sufficient scheme of cooperation, making room within itself for all the necessities and 
activities of life, from birth until death. A society is also conceived as existing in perpetuity: 
it produces and reproduces itself and its institutions and culture over generations and there is 
not time at which it is expected to wind up its affairs.292 
 
The image of a self-sufficient and closed society that reproduces itself and its 
institutions and culture in perpetuity, which one enters only by birth and exits only by 
death is, no doubt, a typical image of ‘the nation’ in a typical ethnonationalist (rather 
than civic nationalist) discourse, and Rawls here appears to come quite close to such a 
view (let us not forget, ‘nation’ originates from the Latin ‘nasci’, which means “to be 
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born”). However, what is more striking than this underlying ethnonationalist tone is 
the conception of the person who qualifies as a person only by being a citizen, that is, 
by being a member of such a self-perpetuating and closed ‘nation’. If one does not 
happen to enter ‘the nation’ by birth – and otherwise, as all ethnonationalists would 
probably agree, ‘the nation’ is closed for entry – s/he is not to be regarded as a 
person. Being able to be a citizen, and thereby to be a person, is thus one’s birthright, 
not one’s ability to understand and responsibly participate in public life. Thus only 
some can be recognised as persons, and this recognition can come only from their 
fellow co-nationals. And only their fellow co-nationals are to be reciprocally 
recognised as persons, in the mutual display of fairness and justice, which embraces 
no one else. Indeed, fairness and justice thereby become irrelevant concepts with 
respect to all the others, who are to remain unrecognised, that is, who are to be 
perceived as non-persons. Thus membership in ‘the nation’, following the logic 
suggested by Rawls’s definition of the person, becomes the sole condition of one’s 
personality, that is, of one’s humanity. Non-members, as non-persons, quickly come 
to be regarded as non-humans, with which members remain in the (Lockean, or 
Hobbesian) ‘state of nature’.   
Given the fact that the ‘free and equal’ citizen is seen as a person, that is, as a moral 
agent by being a member of society (which is closed and self-sufficient, and into 
which a member enters only by birth, so that membership is understood as birthright), 
it is not difficult to see that for Rawls one cannot even be a moral agent without being 
a member of a closed, self-sufficient society. Being a moral agent becomes a matter 
of birthright for those who belong to this or that particular closed society, and those 
who are left out by accident of birth are also deprived of being ‘free and equal’ 
citizens. For, it is only citizenship, that is, membership that makes them ‘free and 
equal’. ‘Freedom’ and ‘equality’ are thus someone’s birthright, which s/he can only 
be deprived by death. As such, Rawls’s ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ are not extendible to 
non-members; nor can members be deprived of them while alive. It is sufficient to be 
born into ‘the nation’ of the ‘free and equal’; nothing else is required for one to be 
recognised as ‘free and equal’. True, his/her ‘freedom and equality’ will be 
recognised only by his/her co-nationals, but Rawls does not envisage for anyone to 
live outside his/her own ‘nation’.  
Perhaps some might say that Rawls, in depicting his ideal society as ‘a structure we 
enter only by birth and exit only by death’, actually attempts to simulate 
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experimental, laboratory conditions in which the unit in question is to be regarded and 
examined as isolated and self-contained, like in his hypothetical ‘original position’. 
However, if we accept Rawls’s claim that “the fundamental organizing idea of justice 
as fairness …is that of society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one 
generation to the next”293, then the definite, ‘laboratory’ scope of the unit in question 
is brought to its very negation: such a society is endlessly extended ‘over time’ (in the 
nationalist discourse it would be called ‘eternal’) and can be regarded as definite only 
in terms of the politically controlled, ‘national’ space it occupies.    
In the image of ‘the nation’ as ‘a structure we enter only by birth and exit only by 
death’, ‘the nation’ is seen not only as the ultimate bearer of political power within 
the defined space it occupies (‘all sovereignty essentially resides in the nation’!), but 
also as the ultimate scope of its members’ lives, with the ultimate boundaries of their 
lives converging with those of ‘the nation’. In such a context, citizens are bound to 
honour the structure of their regime and to abide by the statutes and laws enacted by 
that regime by their ‘national’ consciousness, characteristic only for members of that 
particular ‘nation’.  This ‘national’ consciousness, that is, their nationalism – and not 
some abstract sense of reciprocity, fairness and justice – is what makes them treat one 
another reciprocally, as ‘free and equal’ members of ‘the nation’. (Such an exercise of 
reciprocal recognition is in the nationalistic discourse commonly labelled as ‘national 
solidarity’. A perpetual exercise of this reciprocal recognition is what actually 
constitutes ‘the nation’ as such.) It is ‘the nation’ itself and its membership based on 
reciprocal recognition that members perceive as justice itself, and only members 
perceive their ‘nation’ as justice itself and the display of their nationalism as simply 
exercising justice; for non-members, it is the ultimate source of political and social 
exclusion.  
For Rawls, “The answer is given by the criterion of reciprocity: our exercise of 
political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for 
our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of 
those actions.”294 Such a picture, however, is misleading: reciprocity is not the answer 
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because in the context of democratic society, that is, of the liberal ‘nation-state’, 
reciprocity is not the individual’s rational choice; it is simply membership in ‘the 
nation’ that makes all members behave reciprocally. In this sense, membership is 
‘comprehensive’ since it embraces all citizens and since it presupposes reciprocity in 
their recognising one another as members of ‘the nation’, that is, as ‘free and equal’ 
citizens. In order to fulfil their political role, citizens do not have to have “the 
intellectual and moral powers appropriate to that role, such as a capacity for a sense 
of political justice given by a liberal conception and a capacity to form, follow, and 
revise their individual doctrines of the good”, nor do they have to be “capable also of 
the political virtues necessary for them to cooperate in maintaining a just political 
society.”295 No matter how appealing and seductive it may sound, citizens do not 
have to be viewed as possessing, or to truly possess, a “capacity for a sense of 
political justice given by a liberal conception”; it is enough for them to have a sense 
of ‘national solidarity’, mirrored in their permanent display of reciprocal recognition 
of one another as ‘free and equal’. Let us not forget, the other side of this reciprocal 
recognition for members is a non-reciprocal non-recognition for non-members, that 
is, their absolute exclusion; and it is precisely the awareness of the non-members’ 
existence that stimulates members to continuously and perpetually exercise the 
required reciprocity towards one another and thereby maintain ‘the nation’s’ 
continuity. No intellectual nor moral powers are needed, only perceived (not 
necessarily real) existence of the other, and members’ consensus on (the necessity of) 
their ‘nation’s’ existence.296        
Rawls declares that his ideal is that citizens “conduct their public political 
discussions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice within the 
framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of 
justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free and equal also 
might reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.” He says that “this is sufficient 
for political society to be stable for the right reasons: the political conception can now 
be honored by all citizens as at least reasonable and for political purposes that is the 
                                                                                                                                            
‘national’ identity and ‘the nation-state’, labelling this permanent subscription as a matter of their 
‘common human reason’. 
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 108 
most we can expect.”297 Practically, however, political society which is in a non-
Rawlsian discourse known as ‘the nation-state’ is always stable for the wrong 
reasons, through ‘national solidarity’ and homogeneity, centred around mere 
belonging and membership, that is, around inclusion and exclusion, without serious 
discussion of any matter other than these two. Thus in reality of modern society 
citizens do not discuss either constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice; they 
simply endorse as ‘just’ and ‘reasonable’ whatever is presented as ‘national’. For, it is 
‘nationality’ and ‘nationhood’ that guarantee the reciprocity of recognition and 
equality in membership for all those included. The display of nationalism and 
‘national solidarity’ appears to them as endorsement of ‘justice’ and ‘reasonableness’: 
the most appealing and penetrating nationalisms are those which are not consciously 
displayed and spread, those that appear in the form of self-understandable 
reasonableness.    
 
Consensus, of doctrines or of citizens?  
 
Having realised that a ‘comprehensive doctrine’ in a society constituted as ‘the 
nation-state’ can secure the basis of social unity only in the form of a 
‘comprehensive’ and aggressively homogenising ideology (although he never admits 
that such an ideology is necessarily that of nationalism), Rawls introduces another 
concept whose task is to distinguish that type of ideology from a supposedly 
moderate, civic one, inherent in his ‘political liberalism’. This concept is ‘overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines’, which is supposed to function 
only on the level of the political and to bring a lasting social and political stability:  
 
In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its 
own point of view. Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception; and 
stability is possible when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s 
politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with 
citizens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements.298 
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Such a consensus,299 although political, is not necessarily identical to what Rawls 
labels as ‘overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines’. This consensus is 
supposed to be permanently displayed between citizens rather than between 
‘comprehensive doctrines’. Its function is to create/maintain social/national unity and 
stability even at the price of suppressing individual liberties and choices by forcing all 
citizens to be permanently politically active in affirming the consensus as their 
permanent ritual display of mutual, reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and 
equal’ citizens. They (rather than the doctrines to which they subscribe) have a 
political consensus on permanently, ritually recognising one another as ‘free and 
equal’, regardless of their ethnic identities and the religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines they may otherwise hold. ‘Justice as fairness’ in ‘political liberalism’ is thus 
designed not as an ‘overlapping consensus’ of various ‘comprehensive doctrines’ but 
rather as a political consensus on citizens’ willing display of perpetual recognition of 
one another as ‘free and equal’:     
 
If justice as fairness were not expressly designed to gain the reasoned support of citizens who 
affirm reasonable although conflicting comprehensive doctrines – the existence of such 
conflicting doctrines being a feature of the kind of public culture that liberal conception itself 
encourages – it would not be liberal. The point, then, is that the problem of stability is not that 
of bringing others who reject a conception to share it, or to act in accordance with it, by 
workable sanctions, if necessary, as if the task were to find ways to impose that conception 
once we are convinced it is sound. Rather, justice as fairness is not reasonable in the first 
place unless in a suitable way it can win its support by addressing each citizen’s reason, as 
explained within its own framework.300  
 
‘Justice as fairness’ is thus designed not so much to gain support of citizens because 
of, or in spite of, their affirming conflicting comprehensive doctrines; it gains support 
of citizens through their recognising one another as ‘free and equal’, that is, through 
their recognising one another as members of the same ‘nation’. Potentially conflicting 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ are thus bypassed by the very institution of citizenship: 
every individual comes into relationship with another individual only as a citizen, by 
recognising another and by being recognised by another as a citizen.301 In that 
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process of mutual, reciprocal and ritual recognition, they do not act as advocates of 
particular comprehensive doctrines, but only as citizens. This is what Rawls labels as 
‘political’: on the political level, there are only citizens, there are no ‘comprehensive 
doctrines’ nor are there their advocates: as persons possibly endorsing such doctrines, 
they are simply bypassed.302 Rawls claims that liberalism “tries to show both that a 
plurality of conceptions of the good is desirable and how a regime of liberty can 
accommodate this plurality so as to achieve the many benefits of human diversity”.303 
However, the point is that in liberal society citizens never actually discus, and refrain 
from referring to, the diversity of their conceptions of the good: they only ritually 
endorse their common good, namely, that they are all, and that they recognise one 
another as, ‘free and equal’ citizens.304 Citizens reach a consensus without their 
personal doctrines overlapping. They simply reach a consensus on their very 
membership in such a consensual enterprise which they in non-Rawlsian terms prefer 
to call ‘the nation’, and their respective comprehensive doctrines are actually not part 
of it. This consensus is made of citizens themselves, not of their respective 
comprehensive doctrines. As such, it is inherently stable, consisting of the same, 
mutually and reciprocally recognising parts. Their perpetual, ritual mutual recognition 
as ‘free and equal’ members of the same ‘nation’ is what brings it stability, unity, and 
homogeneity. Within the discourse of ‘nation’ and citizenship, there is no place for 
destructive quarrels over diverging ‘comprehensive doctrines’, there is only a place 
for the permanent active consensus on each citizen’s participation in that discourse, 
through which citizens perpetually, ritually affirm one another as ‘free and equal’, 
without ever bothering with their respective religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines. This is the great invention of the age of liberalism and nationalism: no 
genuine conflicts over doctrines, only genuine conflicts over membership, over 
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inclusion in, and exclusion from, the perpetual ritual display of reciprocal 
recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’.     
In permanently recognising one another as ‘free and equal’, citizens actively affirm 
this permanent ritual display of mutual recognition as a permanent political 
consensus, thereby permanently affirming the consensus itself as the basic structure 
of the society they live in. This ‘basic structure’, that is, the political consensus they 
permanently endorse is ‘the nation’ itself (made of citizens who reciprocally 
recognise one another as its members). This, civic ‘nation’ is a permanent political 
consensus based on active and perpetual ritual recognition of each citizen by another 
citizen, and vice versa, as ‘free and equal’, that is, as a member of ‘the nation’. Thus 
every citizen is not only forced to be free (to use Rousseau’s famous phrase) and 
equal by all the others who constitute ‘the nation’ he belongs to; he also has no choice 
but to affirm his ‘freedom’ by recognising others as ‘free and equal’, once he was 
born into ‘the nation’ – as a permanent consensus on this recognition – from which he 
can only exit by death. Although less exclusive than ethnic nationalism which 
imposes common ethnicity as a comprehensive homogenising ‘doctrine’, this ideal of 
unity and stability for members of the civic homogenous ‘nation’ may also become 
the chief source of social exclusion for all those who were not born into the society in 
question: in a ‘well-ordered society’ all those who are ignorant of the ritualised 
procedures of public recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ citizens (such as 
members of other cultures) are automatically excluded from the entire recognising 
discourse and are not to be treated as ‘free and equal’. This ideal of unity and 
homogeneity may also become the chief source of induced political instability for all 
other societies which possess a lesser degree of unity and homogeneity. For, almost 
as a physical rule, societies/‘nations’ with a greater degree of unity and homogeneity 
(they commonly refer to it as a greater degree of ‘freedom’) tend to destabilise those 
societies with a lesser degree of unity and homogeneity by attempting to impose their 
own model of permanent consensus on the latter while calling it ‘liberation’ (or, else, 
labelling it as ‘nation-building’).                    
However, despite the permanent consensus on membership and members’ active 
persistence on mutual recognition as ‘free and equal’ citizens, Rawls refuses to refer 
to this ‘well-ordered’, homogenous society as a ‘political community’, since he 




Liberalism rejects political society as a community because, among other things, it leads to 
the systematic denial of basic liberties and may allow the oppressive use of the government’s 
monopoly of (legal) force. Of course, in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness citizens 
share common aim, and one that has high priority: namely the aim of insuring that political 
and social institutions are just, and of giving justice to persons generally, as what citizens 
need for themselves and want for one another. It is not true, then, that in a liberal view 
citizens have no fundamental common aims. Nor is it true that the aim of political justice is 
not an important part of their noninstitutional, or moral, identity.305 
 
This alleged rejection of political community, understood as a political society united 
in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine, clearly demonstrates that the 
foundations of Rawls’s ‘overlapping consensus’ are not to be found at the doctrinal 
level whatsoever. For, ‘reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines’, as Rawls 
calls it, is never in fact the aim of ‘well-ordered society of justice as fairness’. It is 
rather a background fact, discretely hidden behind the public consensus on citizens’ 
perpetual recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’.306 The aim is to establish and 
maintain this consensus on mutual, reciprocal recognition, which includes “insuring 
that political and social institutions are just”, thereby “giving justice to persons 
generally, as what citizens need for themselves and want for one another”. Since 
Rawls’s conception of justice, and of what persons as citizens need for themselves 
and want for one another, boils down to citizens’ perpetual recognition of one another 
as ‘free and equal’, it is clear that ‘reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines’ 
is not an essential part of that justice: doctrines, on their level, do not display any 
degree of fairness and reciprocity, even if they formally recognise one another, so that 
their overlapping pluralism does not bring justice and is not the aim of ‘well-ordered 
society of justice as fairness’. The aim is to push these ‘comprehensive doctrines’ (for 
example, mutually exclusive religious or ethno-religious discourses)  in the 
background and establish a ‘well-ordered society of justice as fairness’ by putting 
citizens’ recognition  of one another as ‘free and equal’ in the front, by making it 
perpetual, ritual, and omnipresent. This is the common aim of all persons who 
recognise one another as citizens, ‘free and equal’; such mutual recognition, 
reciprocal and perpetual, is both the founding principle and the ultimate aim of ‘well-
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ordered society’; it is ‘justice’ itself. ‘Giving justice’ thus means publicly recognising 
one another as a ‘free and equal’ citizen, and this recognition has its ritualised form 
and is supposed to be performed perpetually and be permanently affirmed by all 
members of Rawls’s closed society. By permanently performing such a ritualised 
mutual recognition, they permanently “affirm the same political conception of 
justice” and support its (presumably ‘just’) institutions. While recognising one 
another as ‘free and equal’, they simultaneously “express the kind of person they very 
much want to be”,307 that is, ‘free and equal’. Thus, they come to make up a 
community, a community of the ‘free and equal’, in which reciprocity in recognising 
one another’s ‘freedom and equality’ becomes a ‘comprehensive doctrine’.308 This 
type of political community is known under the name ‘the nation’, while the 
permanent display of ritualised perpetual recognition of one another as a member of 
this community of the ‘free and equal’ (with exclusion of all non-members as unfree 
and unequal) is what is known under the name of ‘nationalism’.309  
 
From ‘public reason’ to ‘social cooperation’ 
 
This political community (or, as Rawls would prefer, political society), like every 
reasonable and rational agent, individual or collective, has “a way of formulating its 
plans, of putting its ends in an order of priority and of making its decisions 
accordingly”, and this way, together with the ability to do these things, is called its 
‘reason’. “Public reason,” says Rawls, “is characteristic of a democratic people: it is 
the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship”:310  
 
In a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, 
exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending 
their constitution. The first point is that the limits imposed by public reason do not apply to 
all political questions but only to those involving what we may call “constitutional essentials” 
and questions of basic justice. This means that political values alone are to settle such 
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fundamental questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or 
who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property. These and similar 
questions are the special subject of public reason.311 
 
Equal citizens are said to exercise final political and coercive power over one another, 
which means that their recognising one another as ‘free and equal’ is at the same time 
a means of binding one another “in enacting laws and in amending their constitution”. 
This reflexivity between citizens’ rights to membership in the community of the ‘free 
and equal’ and their obligations to sustain such a community of fixed membership is 
what constitutes the foundations of Rawls’s ‘public reason’, to which the settling of 
any fundamental questions for that community (that is, “constitutional essentials and 
questions of basic justice”) inevitably refers. It is no surprise, then, that such a ‘public 
reason’, consisting of the fundamental questions derived from Rawls’s conception of 
‘justice as fairness’, deals exclusively with the issues of social and political inclusion 
and exclusion. For, as Rawls himself suggests, these questions are: who has the right 
to vote, what religions are to be tolerated, who is to be assured fair equality of 
opportunity, or who is to hold property. The exclusionary nature of these very 
questions, that is no accident, testifies to the exclusionary nature of his conception of 
‘justice as fairness’, which boils down to the question of who is to be recognised as a 
member of the community of the ‘free and equal’ (i.e. to recognise, and be recognised 
reciprocally by, other members as ‘free and equal’) and who is to be excluded from 
that community as a non-member (by all members, by their very act of recognising 
one another as members). Otherwise, if exclusion of non-members were not the top 
priority in the exercise of ‘justice as fairness’, as much as mutual inclusion of 
members by their reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ (for, it is 
the exclusion that encircles the community and thus enables members within the 
boundaries to recognise one another as ‘free and equal’), there would be no sense in 
raising these very questions – everyone would be welcome to vote, all religions 
would be tolerated, fair equality of opportunity would be guaranteed for all, and 
holding property would not be a matter of public, but of private, reason.         
In ‘justice as fairness’ and in many other liberal views, Rawls suggests, “the 
guidelines of inquiry of public reason, as well as its principle of legitimacy, have the 
same basis as the substantive principles of justice”. Thus adopting ‘the principles of 
justice’ for ‘the basic structure’ means also adopting ‘guidelines and criteria of public 
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reason’ for applying these norms: “The argument for those guidelines, and for the 
principle of legitimacy, is much the same as, and as strong as, the argument for the 
principles of justice themselves.”312 To unite Rawls’s ostensibly distinct conceptions, 
one has to understand that ‘the guidelines of inquiry of public reason, as well as its 
principle of legitimacy’ are practically the same principles that constitute ‘the basic 
structure’, that is, the same principles of which ‘fairness’ is made up, whose 
realisation in socio-political reality in turn brings about what Rawls calls ‘justice’. 
These principles are the principles of reciprocity, mutuality and recognition. On one 
hand, they constitute citizens by their reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free 
and equal’; at the same time, they constitute ‘the basic structure’, which comes into 
being only by citizens’ perpetual recognising of one another as ‘free and equal’ 
(“adopting principles of justice for the basic structure”). Adopting ‘guidelines and 
criteria of public reason’ is, then, the same as adopting the principles of citizens’ 
reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’: the act of the perpetual 
recognising of one another as ‘free and equal’ which constitutes both citizens as such 
and ‘the basic structure’ of which they are part, also constitutes ‘public reason’ of all 
citizens, perpetually united into ‘the nation’ in their exercising ‘justice as fairness’ by 
recognising one another as ‘free and equal’. Thus this piece of tautological exercise, 
precisely because of the self-referential, self-legitimising and reflexive quality of the 
categories used in it, only testifies to the fact that tautology and reflexivity are built-in 
not only into Rawls’s conception of ‘justice as fairness’ but into the entire liberal 
conceptual complex, consisting of the mutually referential concepts of ‘the citizen’, 
‘the nation’, ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’.313 One of such concepts is that of 
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‘social cooperation’, which within the Rawlsian discourse also describes the very 
same set of social practices:                  
 
The notion of social cooperation is not simply that of coordinated social activity efficiently 
organized and guided by publicly recognized rules to achieve some overall end. Social 
cooperation is always for mutual benefit and this implies that it involves two elements: the 
first is a shared notion of fair terms of cooperation, which each participant may reasonably be 
expected to accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of 
cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality: all who cooperate must benefit, or 
share in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion judged by a suitable benchmark of 
comparison. This element in social cooperation I call “the reasonable”. The other element 
corresponds to “the rational”: it refers to each participant’s rational advantage; what, as 
individuals, the participants are trying to advance. Whereas the notion of fair terms of 
cooperation is shared, participants’ conceptions of their own rational advantage in general 
differ. The unity of social cooperation rests on persons agreeing to its notion of fair terms.314  
 
It has been clearly indicated in the passage above that social cooperation, based on 
‘fair terms’ of participation, themselves based on ‘reciprocity and mutuality’, 
involves mutual, reciprocal recognition of participants as ‘free and equal’. Yet, there 
are no indications pointing to any other possible social activity that might be declared 
as ‘participation’ or ‘social cooperation’. Simply, ‘fair terms of cooperation’ which 
are to be reasonably accepted by everyone are those terms that put participants into a 
relationship of reciprocal recognition of one another’s membership, i.e. of one 
another’s participation in the declared project of social cooperation. Within such a 
context, it is ‘reasonable’ to participate, provided that all others do so, which makes it 
‘reasonable’ for all participants to display the same type and the same degree of 
mutual recognition of one another as members of the social cooperation unit. The unit 
in question, whose ‘basic structure’ is constituted by the ‘reasonable’ universal 
acceptance of the uniform type and degree of mutual recognition, thus reaches a 
degree of social homogeneity by the very establishment of social cooperation based 
on ‘fair terms’: all accept the same terms of social behaviour in order to match the 
concept of ‘the reasonable’ and all perpetually recognise one another as members of 
the unit of ‘social cooperation’ in order to match the concept of ‘fairness’ (this 
capacity in Rawls’s terms is called ‘the capacity for justice’). At the same time, their 
mutual recognition is individually recognised as advantageous (this capacity for 
recognition of the mutual recognition as individually advantageous i.e. ‘rational’ is 
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called by Rawls ‘the capacity for the good’) for all participants whose individual 
interests are thereby recognised as automatically advanced, as opposed to the denial 
of social recognition for all individual non-members whose individual interests within 
the given social unit are by implication denied. However, even for members ‘social 
cooperation’ is far from being voluntary and in fact has no alternative:                  
 
We start by viewing the basic structure of society as a whole as a form of cooperation. This 
structure comprises the main social institutions – the constitution, the economic regime, the 
legal order and its specification of property and the like, and how these institutions cohere 
into one system. What is distinctive about the basic structure is that it provides the framework 
for a self-sufficient scheme of cooperation for all the essential purposes of human life, which 
purposes are served by the variety of associations and groups within this framework. Since I 
suppose the society in question is closed, we are to imagine that there is no entry or exit 
except by birth and death; thus persons are born into society taken as self-sufficient scheme 
of cooperation, and we are to conceive of persons as having the capacity to be normal and 
fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. It follows from these stipulations 
that while social cooperation can be willing and harmonious, and in this sense voluntary, it is 
not voluntary in the sense that our joining or belonging to associations or groups within 
society is voluntary. There is no alternative to social cooperation except unwilling and 
resentful compliance, or resistance and civil war.315 
 
This Rawlsian conception of ‘social cooperation’ is thus without any alternative, once 
a person is born into society (except “unwilling and resentful compliance, or 
resistance and civil war”). Besides being non-liberal in its form (no-alternative 
conceptions are, at least by formal definition, non-liberal), such a conception of 
‘social cooperation’ hardly deserves the name, since it practically forces participants 
to ‘cooperate’, that is, to act as members of society (they are, much more than 
Rousseau envisaged, ‘forced to be free’), no matter whether they are willing to be 
members and act jointly or not. On the other hand, there is a question of what kind of 
joint social action is possible among members of society who are denied the 
possibility not to act as members of society, at the price and under the threat of death 
in civil war (I guess this is the true meaning of the phrase “exit only by death”). It 
seems that the only logical answer to this question is that such a joint social action, 
uniform and compulsory for all members of society, can only be the action of jointly 
being members of society, that is, of recognising one another as members. If this is 
so, then Rawls’s ‘social cooperation’ is all about non-voluntary social inclusion for 
all members and about non-voluntary exclusion of all non-members: recognising one 
another as members of society (simultaneously with a denial of recognition for all 
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non-members) is the only joint activity on which all members of society can non-
voluntarily co-operate:   
 
Those who can take part in social cooperation over a complete life, and who are willing to 
honor the appropriate fair terms of cooperation, are regarded as equal citizens. (...) Given 
these assumptions, variations and differences in natural gifts and abilities are subordinate: 
they do not affect persons’ status as equal citizens and become relevant only as we aspire to 
certain offices and positions, or belong to or wish to join certain associations within society. 
Thus political justice concerns the basic structure as encompassing institutional framework 
within which the natural gifts and abilities of individuals are developed and exercised, and the 
various associations in society exist.316 
 
Honouring ‘the appropriate fair terms of cooperation’, as well as taking part in ‘social 
cooperation’, the passage above clearly confirms, is all about reciprocally recognising 
one another as ‘free and equal’ citizen. Regarding one another and being regarded as 
‘free and equal’ citizens is what Rawls’s labels as ‘social cooperation’, and there is no 
other content to which the term practically refers within the Rawlsian discourse. The 
same goes for ‘the basic structure’: it is constituted in terms of ‘political justice’ as 
the framework for ‘fair social cooperation’, that is, as an institutional framework 
through which citizens’ mutual and reciprocal recognising of one another as ‘free and 
equal’ citizens is being institutionalised and effectively carried out: 
 
Fair terms of social cooperation are terms upon which as equal persons we are willing to 
cooperate in good faith with all members of society over a complete life. To this let us add: to 
cooperate on a basis of mutual respect. Adding this clause makes explicit that fair terms of 
cooperation can be acknowledged by everyone without resentment or humiliation (or for that 
matter bad conscience) when citizens regard themselves and one another as having to the 
requisite degree the two moral powers which constitute the basis of equal citizenship.317 
 
Here it is made explicit that ‘fair terms of social cooperation’ are, in fact, about 
citizens’ regarding themselves, and one another, as ‘free and equal’ citizens, whose 
‘two moral powers’ are constituted by their recognising one another as ‘free and 
equal’ citizens rather than the other way round. For, their first moral power, that of 
‘the capacity for justice’, is realised through ‘fair terms of social cooperation’, by 
their recognising one another as ‘free and equal’ citizens; and their second moral 
power, that of ‘the capacity for the good’, is realised through their realising that by 
recognising one another as ‘free and equal’ citizens they pursue their own individual 
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interests, which are advanced and protected by the institutional framework of ‘the 
basic structure’ (which is, in turn, established as an institutional framework for 
perpetual realisation of citizens’ mutual recognition as ‘free and equal’ in terms of 
rights, duties, obligations, etc.). ‘The capacity for the good’ Rawls in Kantian terms 
labels as ‘rational autonomy’, while the capacity to combine ‘the two moral powers’ 
(‘the capacity for the good’ and ‘the capacity for justice’) is what Rawls, also in 
Kantian manner, labels as ‘full autonomy’:  
   
The difference between full autonomy and rational autonomy is this: rational autonomy is 
acting solely from our capacity to be rational and from the determinate conception of the 
good we have at any given time. Full autonomy includes not only this capacity to be rational 
but also the capacity to advance our conception of the good in ways consistent with honoring 
the fair terms of social cooperation; that is, the principles of justice. In a well-ordered society 
in which citizens know they can count on each other’s sense of justice, we may suppose that a 
person normally wants to act justly as well as to be recognized by others as someone who can 
be relied upon as a fully cooperating member of society over a complete life. Fully 
autonomous persons therefore publicly acknowledge and act upon the fair terms of social 
cooperation moved by the reasons specified by the shared principles of justice.318 
 
Following Rousseau and Kant, Rawls proposes that the person’s ‘full autonomy’ is 
not only in the unlimited application of ‘rational autonomy’ (or of ‘the capacity for 
the good’), but also in the person’s freely accepting the constraints of ‘the 
reasonable’, that is, in his endorsing ‘social cooperation’ based on the ‘shared 
principles of justice’. However, Rawls’s contribution when compared to that of 
Rousseau and Kant is that he practically introduces the exact model of behaviour 
which makes the person ‘fully autonomous’, as well as ‘free, equal and just’: this 
model is everyday, ritual, reciprocal recognition of one another as society’s ‘free and 
equal’ citizen, whereby ‘social cooperation’ is established as a homogenising, self-
perpetuating display of universally performed mutual recognition. Such a display of 
mutual recognition is what establishes the person as ‘fully autonomous’, that is, 
establishes the person as such, at the same time perpetually homogenising society and 
transforming it into the fully autonomous ‘nation’, which recognises, and enjoys 
recognition of, other such ‘nations’.  
 Recognition, together with reciprocity, is thus certainly to be regarded as the central 
category in Rawls’s ‘theory of justice’ and the central value in his entire moral 
outlook. For Rawls, “our sense of our own value, as well as our self-confidence, 
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depends on the respect and mutuality shown by others.” For, “by publicly affirming 
the basic liberties citizens in a well-ordered society express their mutual respect for 
one another as reasonable and trustworthy, as well as their recognition of the worth 
all citizens attach to their way of life”.319 If our own value, as well as our self-
confidence, depends on the recognition shown by others, then it is of the vital 
importance for our own sense of value and self-confidence to establish a society in 
which citizens’ mutual recognition and ‘respect for one another as reasonable and 
trustworthy’, as well as the worth they all attach to ‘their way of life’, will be set as 
the dominant pattern of social behaviour. Yet, it is precisely this pattern of social 
behaviour through which nationalism is being articulated. The worth that citizens all 
ritually attach to one another as members of the society defined as closed for all non-
members, combined with the worth they all ritually attach to ‘their own way of life’, 
is the point where only one aspect of the nationalism-proper lacks: the worth they all 
attach to their own state, as (supposedly) the only institutional framework in which 
they can ‘fully’ realise ‘their way of life’, ‘freely’ attaching worth to it and to one 
another. Since there is no question whether Rawls conceives of such a society as 
endowed with its own state or not (this becomes even more transparent in The Law of 
Peoples, where he presupposes that ‘peoples’ exist already endowed with their own 
states), there is no doubt that his ‘well-ordered society’ is in fact the well-known 
‘nation-state’, in which citizens ritually attach the ultimate worth to their own, 
‘national’ state, to their own, ‘national’ way of life (that is, to their ‘national’ culture), 
and to one another as ‘co-nationals’. However, it is only when the other (rather 
discrete) side of this model – that of excluding all non-co-nationals from members’ 
own state and from members’ way of life – becomes transparent that liberals of the 
Rawlsian kind concede to call it ‘nationalism’.    
  
The decency of ‘peoples’ 
 
Rawls’s deep attachment to the concept of ‘nation-state’ is fully emphasised in his 
last work, The Law of Peoples, in which he deliberately conflates the concepts of 
state, society, country, ‘nation’ and citizenry into the single concept of ‘people’.320 
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Conflation of these concepts points to the fact that Rawls takes ‘the nation-state’, 
which by itself practically conflates all these concepts into one, as the built-in norm 
of his ‘Society of Peoples’. The very term ‘Society of Peoples’ presupposes that these 
‘peoples’, just like ‘nations’, act within that ‘society’ as collective individuals. Rawls 
thus intends to draw a full analogy between individuals as members of his ‘well-
ordered society’ and ‘peoples’ as collective individuals and members of his ‘Society 
of Peoples’. Within the ‘Law of Peoples’, ‘peoples’ are conceived “as the actors in 
the ‘Society of Peoples’, just as citizens are the actors in domestic society”:321  
 
It is important to see that the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism and is an 
extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples. I 
emphasize that, in developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we 
work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people.322 
 
Besides ‘liberal peoples’, in this work Rawls introduces several new categories, to 
describe the diversity and plurality of ‘domestic societies’ as actors in international 
relations. Among them, particularly interesting is that of ‘decent peoples’:    
 
I propose considering five types of domestic societies. The first is reasonable liberal peoples; 
the second, decent peoples (…). The basic structure of one kind of decent people has what I 
call a “decent consultation hierarchy”, and these peoples I call “decent hierarchical peoples”. 
Other possible kinds of decent peoples I do not try to describe, but simply leave in reserve, 
allowing that there may be other decent peoples whose basic structure does not fit my 
description of a consultation hierarchy, but who are worthy of membership in a Society of 
Peoples. (Liberal peoples and decent peoples I refer to together as “well-ordered peoples”.) 
There are, third, outlaw states and, fourth, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions. 
Finally, fifth, we have societies that are benevolent absolutisms; they honor human rights; 
but, because their members are denied a meaningful role in making political decisions, they 
are not well-ordered.323 
 
                                                                                                                                            
members, or only the notion of country.  Rawls’s decision to practically substitute ‘the nation’ with 
‘the people’ testifies to his intention to use the term which is not exhausted by such a practice and 
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It is difficult to imagine Rawls’s ‘decent’, hierarchical ‘people’ framed in any state-
form other than its own ‘nation-state’, comprising a single culture (which makes it 
one ‘people’) based on social hierarchy. On the other hand, it is difficult to overlook 
the fact that such a state would lack some of the essential ingredients of the classical 
‘nation-state’ – socially equal citizens, social homogeneity based on their equal 
rights, and an egalitarian, state-centred ideology promoting both of these under the 
motto of ‘national’ unity. Such a state would, then, probably have to be heavily 
ethnocentric, dominated by aggressive tribalism (whether religiously inspired or not), 
in order to produce a homogenous society required by the classical ‘nation-state’ 
norm. However, Rawls never goes so far as to describe what he assumes by a non-
liberal, ‘decent people’, but is content with saying that such a category does exist: 
 
The reason we go on to consider the point of view of decent peoples is not to prescribe 
principles of justice for them, but to assure ourselves that the ideals and principles of the 
foreign policy of a liberal people are also reasonable from a decent nonliberal point of view. 
The need for such assurance is a feature inherent in the liberal conception. The Law of 
Peoples holds that decent nonliberal points of view exist, and that the question of how far 
nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated is an essential question of liberal foreign policy.324 
 
The greatest achievement of The Law of Peoples, Rawls admits, compared to his 
earlier works, is in this refusal to prescribe principles of justice to the newly-
established category of ‘decent peoples’, whose point of view is to be taken into 
account. Yet, it remains unclear how is it that such a liberal toleration of others’ 
points of view remains questionable and conditional, so that “the question of how far 
nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated is an essential question of liberal foreign 
policy”. Even if it is admitted that ‘decent peoples’ (by definition) do not threaten the 
existence of liberal regimes, it remains a matter of the latter’s arbitrary foreign policy 
decisions how far to tolerate the former. It is probably implied that ‘the third type of 
domestic society’, ‘outlaw states’, by definition does not fit ‘the nation-state’ norm 
(although the category ‘outlaw’ may imply a violation of some other rules), so that 
this type is not to be tolerated at all, also by liberal regimes’ arbitrary foreign policy 
decisions on who belongs to this category. ‘The fifth category of domestic society’, 
that of ‘benevolent absolutisms’, does not seem commensurable with the category of 
‘the nation-state’, so that the question of toleration of such a type remains open to 
arbitrary foreign policy decisions of liberal regimes, again. Yet, it is difficult to make 
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such a conclusion logically, because Rawls puts even some non-benevolent absolutist 
monarchies under the label of ‘nation-states’ (although not under the label of 
‘peoples’):     
     
Compare democratic societies with the nation-states of the earlier modern period in Europe. 
England, France, Spain, Hapsburg Austria, Sweden, and others fought dynastic wars for 
territory, true religion, for power and glory, and a place in the sun. These were wars of 
Monarchs and Royal Houses; the internal institutional structure of these societies made them 
inherently aggressive and hostile to other states. The crucial fact of peace among democracies 
rests on the internal structure of democratic societies, which are not tempted to go to war 
except in self-defense or in grave cases of intervention in unjust societies to protect human 
rights. Since constitutional democratic societies are safe from each other, peace reigns among 
them.325 
 
This passage clearly demonstrates the confusion that reigns in Rawls’s understanding 
of the state, society and inter-state relations. It is not clear how these early modern 
states can be called ‘nation-states’, and why. They did have their Monarchs and Royal 
Houses – and not their respective homogenised ‘nations’ – competing for power and 
glory, fighting wars for territory and for ‘true religion’. These wars were dynastic, 
fought by professional armies, without mass conscription or any other form of 
homogenisation or mass mobilisation of population in the pursuit of these goals. 
These states treated their inhabitants as subjects, not as citizens, that is, not as 
political agents who constituted a potentially active political body that might then be 
called ‘the nation’. The internal structure of their societies was hierarchical, so that 
only upper, aristocratic castes had a say in political and military affairs of the state 
(indeed, they were the state); excluded were all others, with no political 
representation whatsoever and no horizontal comradeship or solidarity or unity 
among different social layers that might be called ‘national’. Unlike in the system of 
‘nation-states’, neither their territories nor their populations (nor the mutual 
relationship between these two) were fixed, since these states sought to permanently 
expand their possessions, whereby both territories (subject to exploitation of natural 
resources) and inhabitants (subject to taxation) were treated as inheritable and 
exploitable possessions of the ruling elites. Hostility towards other, rival states (that 
is, towards the rival ruling elites) was inherent in their striving to expand these 
exploitable private possessions. None of these characterises modern ‘nation-states’. 
They, of course, can wage aggressive wars for territory and resources (World War I 
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and World War II are certainly such cases); these wars can serve economic interests 
of the ruling elites; but they are typically fought in the name of their entire 
populations, popularly labelled as ‘nations’. Their governments always claim to 
represent the will of entire ‘nations’, even when these states are not formally 
democratic. Typically, their populations are imposed conscription, mobilisation and 
homogenisation, in the name of ‘the nation’ (presented as a permanent horizontal 
comradeship between all layers of society) and by governments who claim to do all 
that on behalf and in defence of ‘the nation’. The internal structure of these ‘nation-
states’ aims to reflect the notion of social equality, treating its inhabitants as citizens 
i.e. as equally positioned members of ‘the nation’, rather than as mere subjects of the 
state (even when the government is not elected through a democratic procedure, its 
authoritarian or totalitarian leaders, as a norm, never question the concept of 
citizenship and social equality). Accordingly, their ruling elites’ interest is not 
presented as ‘interest of the state’ (or, of the crown) but rather as ‘national interest’, 
that is, as the common interest of all citizens i.e. of the entire society, perceived as a 
clearly bounded entity comprised within fixed and monitored borders of the state. 
And it is only such states that may rightfully be called ‘nation-states’. Indeed, they 
cannot possibly be compared to the early modern European empires described here by 
Rawls. However, this confusion only reflects to what extent ‘the nation-state’ is built-
in into the liberal worldview, so that its protagonists cannot conceive of any other 
form of state.    
As for the distinction between democratic and non-democratic states (it is mistaken 
to speak of ‘democratic societies’, let alone of ‘constitutional democratic societies’; 
for, it is a property of political regimes and states, not societies, to be democratic; the 
phrase ‘democratic societies’ implies that some societies are inherently prone to 
democracy and constitutionalism while others are not), it is not disputable that 
‘nation-states’ do not have to have democratic regimes in order to remain ‘nation-
states’; it is sufficient that their regimes recognise the principles of citizenship and 
social equality and claim to speak and act on behalf of all citizens, that is, of ‘the 
nation’. However, it is questionable whether there can be a modern democracy 
without ‘the nation-state’: indeed, it is difficult to imagine a democratic regime that 
would not rest upon the notion of citizenship and social equality, whose demos would 
not be referred to as ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’.  
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Sovereignty as property, morality as reciprocity 
 
It would also be difficult for apologists of democracy to imagine it without the 
institution of property. It is significant that Rawls links this institution with the 
institution of the sovereign ‘nation-state’, practically equating the concept of 
sovereignty with the concept of property:  
 
I argue that an important role of government, however arbitrary a society’s boundaries may 
appear from a historical point of view, is to be the effective agent of a people as they take 
responsibility for their territory and the size of their population, as well as for maintaining the 
land’s environmental integrity. Unless a definite agent is given responsibility for maintaining 
an asset and bears the responsibility and loss for not doing so, that asset tends to deteriorate. 
On my account the role of the institution of property is to prevent this deterioration from 
occurring. In the present case, the asset is the people’s territory and its potential capacity to 
support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people itself as politically organized. The 
perpetuity condition is crucial. People must recognize that they cannot make up for failing to 
regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into 
another people’s territory without their consent.326  
 
In this brief but important passage, Rawls gives an account of, and defends, the 
institutions of property, exploitation, government, and ‘the nation-state’, 
simultaneously (the very possibility to defend them simultaneously may well point to 
their essential convergence and interconnectedness). At the same time, he discretely 
introduces Malthusian principles of population control as the guiding principles of his 
‘Law of Peoples’. Property is thus advocated as a necessary means to prevent 
deterioration of assets, which tend to deteriorate unless a definite agent is given 
responsibility to maintain them. As the passage suggests, such a definite agent may 
step in either as a private individual, or a government, or a ‘people itself as politically 
organized’. In the first case, which was also historically predominant, it was 
individuals who sought to enclose land and other assets, thereby establishing the 
institution of private property. According to Rawls, such an initiative is principally 
justified as a means to prevent the deterioration of assets, given the need to 
perpetually exploit them. The lack of a definite agent in charge of perpetuation of the 
exploitation necessarily leads to deterioration of assets; thus any concrete form of 
exploitation of assets by a definite agent is to be defended as preferable to their 
presumed, hypothetical deterioration without such an agent. This argument was 
                                                 
326
 LP, p. 8. 
 126 
commonly used by European colonial powers to justify the conquest and enclosure of 
overseas lands: without European governmental agencies, private companies and 
individual colonisers, all of them as definite agents in charge of exploitation, these 
assets would necessarily deteriorate. The same argument here justifies ‘the nation-
state’: a particular group of population in a particular territory proclaims the territory 
its own collective property, claiming to protect it from inevitable deterioration by 
establishing itself as a definite agent who owns the territory and controls it through its 
own definite agency, the state. The type of state that serves the proclaimed purpose of 
acting on behalf of the group is called ‘the nation-state’. The group’s presumed, 
mythical establishment of itself as ‘the people’, that is, as a definite agent in charge of 
a definite territory, is commonly referred to as ‘birth of the nation’. ‘The nation’ thus 
takes responsibility for the territory and its perpetual exploitation, while attempting to 
protect its ‘environmental integrity’ by controlling the size of the population within 
the territory through the controlled inclusion (of citizens) and exclusion (of non-
citizens). Within such a Malthusian logic, accepted by Rawls as self-understandable, 
there is no overexploitation, there is only overpopulation. Moreover, population 
control is seen not only as a means of environmental protection; Rawls here portrays 
it as a universal means of conflict- and conquest-prevention: after fixing the territory 
as exclusive property, thereby fixing ‘the people’ as the territory’s exclusive owner, it 
is sufficient to control the size of the population within the territory, chiefly by 
controlling immigration (that is, by controlling inclusion of non-citizens),327 to make 
the exploitation of the territory perpetual, without a need to conquer some additional 
territory and exploit its natural resources, presumably already appropriated (in the 
form of ‘the nation-state’) by some other ‘people’. It is essential that property 
relations are fixed, so that everyone knows what one owns. The parallel with how 
apologists of private property depict its advantages is obvious: once it is clear who 
owns the asset, there are no reasons for conflict and its perpetual exploitation is then 
guaranteed. Once the territory is enclosed and fixed as group property, it can be 
exploited in perpetuity, provided that the group treats this asset reasonably, by 
controlling both its own size and the number of immigrants. ‘The nation-state’ is here 
essential as the guarantor of fixed property relations between different groups 
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(‘nations’, i.e. ‘peoples’), and that is what ‘Society of Peoples’ and ‘Law of Peoples’ 
practically advocate.   
Rawls employs both utilitarian and Malthusian arguments to justify both the 
institution of property and the idea of collective utilisation of land. Without noticing, 
he thus introduces a certain tension between a basically pre-modern concept of 
collective utilisation of land and a modern (typically capitalist) institution of property, 
which presupposes individual rather than collective ownership. This is particularly 
important since property, as a legal category, is in principle to be understood as 
private property (unless it is explicitly defined as public property), and that 
presupposes the existence of the state and of the legal system that guarantee the very 
institution of property. As such, any asset, and particularly land, can hardly be 
assigned as property to a collectivity called ‘the people’: as a pre-legal category, ‘the 
people’ may not act as a collective landowner. ‘The people’ is/are only constituted as 
a legal category if and when the state proclaims ‘the people’s sovereignty’ over the 
territory and natural resources under the state’s sovereign control. And then, the state 
constitutes itself as a ‘nation-state’, in which a particular ‘nation’ (i.e. ‘people’) is 
assigned a particular asset (territory and its natural resources), comprised within the 
state boundaries.   
Another reason for using the term ‘peoples’, says Rawls, is to distinguish it from 
states “as traditionally conceived, with their powers of sovereignty included in the 
(positive) international law for the three centuries after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648)”. These powers of sovereignty “grant a state a certain autonomy… in dealing 
with its own people”.328 Rawls is quite correct in presenting sovereignty as a certain 
autonomy of the state in dealing ‘with its own people’. Traditional states, indeed, 
treated ‘their own peoples’ as if these were their own property: that is one of the 
essential meanings of the traditional concept of sovereignty. ‘The nation-state’, on the 
other hand, pretends to act fully on behalf of ‘its own people’ – the state is there 
conceived as a property of a particular ‘people’ and there is no room left for any 
autonomy in dealing with that very ‘people’: 
 
By saying that a people have reasonably just (though not necessarily a fully just) 
constitutional democratic government I mean that the government is effectively under their 
political and electoral control, and that it answers to and protects their fundamental interests 
as specified in a written or unwritten constitution and in its interpretation. The regime is not 
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an autonomous agency pursuing its own bureaucratic ambitions. Moreover, it is not directed 
by the interests of large concentrations of private economic and corporate power veiled from 
public knowledge and almost entirely free from accountability.329 
 
By saying that ‘the people’ politically control the government, Rawls attempts to 
persuade that it suffices to rename the state into ‘the people’ (and simply claim that 
‘they’ – as ‘the people’ – have ‘reasonably just constitutional democratic 
government’) to effectively eliminate both ‘bureaucratic ambitions’ (characterising 
modern states) and ‘economic and corporate power’ (characterising modern capitalist 
societies). Thus, with this lexical manoeuvre, Rawls promotes ‘the nation-state’ – as a 
typically modern political form in which the state and society are commonly 
perceived as united into one entity – as free from the most basic traits of both modern 
society and the modern state. It is simply enough to suggest that ‘the people’ are 
effectively in control of government – by not calling this specific form of government 
in which ‘the people’ presumably exercise control by its proper name, ‘the nation-
state’, but by labelling it as ‘the people’ – in order to practically liberate the regime 
(and thereby liberate ‘the people’, as presumably one with such a regime) from both 
bureaucratic and corporate control. It is, of course, a legitimate right of the author to 
prefer ‘the nation-state’ to other forms of state, but Rawls’s claim that this form of 
state – typical for modern capitalist society and the most typical among modern forms 
of state – is not subject to bureaucratic and corporate power remains unpersuasive.  
Yet another reason why Rawls calls ‘nation-states’ ‘peoples’ is in his assumption 
that ‘peoples’, unlike states, can be attributed moral motives, such as allegiance to the 
principles of his ‘Law of Peoples’: 
   
The reasonably just Society of well-ordered Peoples is realistic in the same ways as a liberal 
or decent domestic society. Here again we view peoples as they are (as organized within a 
reasonably just domestic society) and the Law of Peoples as it might be, that is, how it would 
be in a reasonably just Society of just and decent Peoples. The content of a reasonable Law of 
Peoples is ascertained by using the idea of the original position a second time with the parties 
now understood to be the representatives of peoples (§3). The idea of peoples rather than 
states is crucial at this point: it enables us to attribute moral motives – an allegiance to the 
principles of the Law of Peoples, which, for instance, permits wars only in self-defense – to 
peoples (as actors), which we cannot do for states (§2).330                           
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The very phrase “peoples as they are (as organised within a reasonably just domestic 
society)” clearly suggests that these ‘peoples’ are a result of a priori unification and 
homogenisation of their respective societies: it is a specific, ‘reasonably just’ 
organisation of ‘domestic societies’ that makes them so homogenous as to be called 
‘peoples’ (rather than ‘societies’). So, the phrase ‘people as they are’ assumes that 
these societies are already homogenised as ‘peoples’. Of course, societies, especially 
in modern times, do not appear without some form of tightly organised political 
structure i.e. the state. The kind of state that fits the size of ‘the people’ is commonly 
referred to as ‘the nation-state’, and it does not help much to cover this fact by using 
the word ‘the people’ to replace it. However, by avoiding to use the word ‘states’, 
Rawls goes so far as to imply inherent immorality of states as they are, so that 
‘nation-states’ (as the preferred form of state) are not even to be put among states-as-
they-are but are to be re-named as ‘peoples’. At the same time, ‘nation-states’ under 
the name of ‘peoples’ become the very standard in inter-state relations because 
‘peoples’ are taken as they already are, that is, as societies already homogenised into 
‘nation-states’. Such a manoeuvre is supposed to legitimise ‘nation-states’ exclusively 
(albeit under the name of ‘peoples’) as the only bearers of morality in inter-state (i.e. 
‘inter-national’) relations.331  
Because of the presumed immorality of states as such, the state’s autonomy is to be 
denied completely and absolutely, even in name: by labelling states ‘peoples’ 
(assuming the former to be inherently immoral), Rawls has denied them all 
sovereignty, which is reserved exclusively for ‘peoples’ to exercise it over 
themselves. In Rawls’s world, all sovereignty and morality reside exclusively (rather 
than essentially, as in The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) in ‘the 
people’. Yet, even more than in the rest of the social contract theory, this triggers a 
paradox: if such sovereignty is granted to ‘the people’ exclusively, it remains 
questionable how sovereignty can be delegated to the individual members of ‘the 
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people’. For, as members of ‘the people’, they exercise absolute sovereignty as 
citizens; but, they lose their sovereignty as individuals, since it is granted entirely and 
exclusively to ‘the people’: to the extent that ‘the people’s’ attainment of sovereignty 
is granted, so is individuals’ loss of individuality.     
A logical problem also arises when Rawls says that “liberal peoples limit a state’s 
right to engage in war to wars of self-defense (thus allowing collective security), and 
their concern for human rights leads them to limit a state’s right of internal 
sovereignty”.332 Rawls here employs the phrase ‘state’s right’, although he 
permanently speaks of ‘peoples’ rather than states. Thus ‘the people’ is said to ‘limit 
a state’s right’, as if  ‘the people’ is structurally opposed to the state, which, in turn, 
possesses a sovereignty of its own (which ‘the people’ only limits), although Rawls 
commonly speaks of ‘the people’s sovereignty’, blurs ‘the people’ with both society 
and the state (or, blurs the distinction between society and the state by using the term 
‘the people’ to cover both simultaneously), and depicts ‘the people’ as possessing all 
capacities of the state, including sovereignty. This paradoxical logic is hard to follow, 
since the logic of sovereignty suggests that two sovereign entities (‘the people’ and 
the state) cannot occupy the same space, sharing or limiting one another’s 
sovereignty. Since ‘peoples’ have already been depicted as sovereign agents, who 
ultimately decide on matters of war and peace, it is not clear why sovereignty of 
states is being mentioned at all. However, since ‘peoples’ are also depicted as those 
who have ‘concerns for human rights’, as opposed to the state’s right of internal 
sovereignty, Rawls was careful enough not to oppose the right of ‘the people’ to 
internal sovereignty to the same ‘people’s’ concern for human rights, which would 
probably create an absurd. That is probably why he introduced an otherwise missing 
distinction between ‘the people’ and the state, so that the very same sovereign agent, 
‘the people’, would not be opposed to its own ‘concern’ for human rights of its own 
members. This case only demonstrates the arbitrary nature of Rawls’s concept of ‘the 
people’, as the point where society and the state merge into one, or split into two, 
depending on circumstances.  
The institution of property, the way Rawls conceives of it, is not without similar 
problems: although the entire human aggregation called ‘the people’ may be assigned 
this asset, this asset still may not be codified as this aggregation’s property; for, in 
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order to be treated as property, it has to be owned by definite agents and itself has to 
be defined as definite. The modern ‘nation-state’ defines the territory it comprises as 
definite and tends to portray its population (as politically organised) as a definite 
collective agent (calling it ‘the nation’ or ‘the people’), which claims the territory as 
its exclusive property. Yet, the problem is precisely with that exclusivity: the very 
same asset may not exclusively be owned by one collective owner (‘the nation’ or 
‘the people’) and, at the same time, by many other individual owners (individual 
members of ‘the nation’ and their associations); if that were the case, the very concept 
of property would lose its meaning. For, in order to be defined as property, assets – 
whatever they may be – have to have exclusive owners. Thus the asset controlled by 
‘the nation-state’ (territory and its natural resources) may not be defined as the 
exclusive property of ‘the nation’ (even the most passionate nationalists would 
probably refrain from such a radical view), because that would either deprive all 
individual members of that ‘nation’ of their private property (even of the possibility 
to have one), or the very concept of property of its proper meaning and thereby 
practically equate it with that of sovereignty. For, despite all similarities between 
property and sovereignty, particularly in terms of exclusivity they both presuppose, 
property in principle applies to definite, individual agents as its holders and is 
guaranteed by the state and its legal system, while sovereignty applies to states as its 
definite bearers and is guaranteed by the pre-legal (rather than supra-legal) system of 
sovereign states. For, despite the attempts by Rawls and his predecessors (from Kant 
to the authors of the UN Charter) to establish a comprehensive legal system on the 
level of the sovereign states system, sovereignty is essentially guaranteed by the 
practice of checks and balances in mutual relations between states rather than by a 
legal code.333 In other words, it is still – from the Peace of Westphalia that established 
the system of sovereign states to the present day – a matter of the state’s arbitrary, 
sovereign will whether it will respect the sovereignty of another state and refrain from 
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interference in its internal affairs or not, and there is no legal mechanism that can 
force it to do so (that is what sovereignty is about!). The state’s sovereignty over a 
territory and its natural resources may be linked to the concept of utilisation of land; 
indeed, probably all sovereign states in history claimed that their sovereignty over a 
territory was a matter of utilisation of land and its natural resources, as well as a 
matter of preventing its possible abuse by unauthorised users (other sovereign states, 
foreign populations, immigrants, domestic non-propertied classes). However, territory 
and its natural resources have never been treated as the state’s (or ‘the people’s’) 
property in the proper (i.e. exclusive) sense, not even by the most radical communist 
regimes. Even they have not gone so far as to confuse sovereignty with property, so 
that private property was still co-existent with public property and the state 
demonstrated its sovereign control over the territory and its resources (as opposed to 
that of other sovereign states over their territories and resources), without treating the 
territory and its resources as its exclusive property (as opposed to private ownership 
of some parts of that territory by its citizens, or to corporate ownership of other parts 
of the territory by these citizens’ associations). It is difficult, therefore, to justify the 
modern concepts of property and sovereignty simultaneously, from the same, 
utilitarian perspective, without confusing them. From a utilitarian perspective, 
sovereignty is to be justified as a check on state expansionism, as well as on religious 
or ideological wars (wars of ‘comprehensive doctrines’, as Rawls would call them). 
Property, on the other hand, may in principle be justified (as Rawls does it) as a 
means of utilisation of assets and a check on their deterioration. However, the state’s 
(or ‘the people’s’) sovereignty should not be confused with the state’s (or ‘the 
people’s’) property. For, as liberal economics to which Rawls subscribes teaches, the 
state’s (or ‘the people’s’) absolute monopoly on the utilisation of assets (and that is 
what the state’s or ‘the people’s’ property would practically mean, apart from its 
strictly legal aspect) would necessarily lead to this asset’s deterioration. Thus Rawls’s 
acceptance of the nationalist rhetoric that refers to claimed territories as a group’s 
property produces contradiction with his effort to justify the typically capitalist 
concept of property. 
‘Peoples’ vs. ‘nationalities’ 
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It is interesting to note that, presumably acting within the logic that equates 
sovereignty with property, the regimes that commonly declare themselves as liberal-
democratic in both the Rawlsian and the Millian sense have frequently opted for 
partition of the territories where, presumably, different ethnic or religious groups 
were potentially (or actually) in conflict over ‘property relations’, that is, over 
exploitation of the natural resources (cases like India/Pakistan, Palestine/Israel, 
Cyprus or Bosnia). In order to prevent such hypothetical conflicts from occurring (or 
acting after they have occurred), those liberal-democratic regimes proposed territorial 
partition and creation of new ‘nation-states’ as a means of fixing ‘national’ territories 
as the property of respective groups, through which a fixing of property relations 
between those groups was to be achieved. 
 As their legitimate predecessor, Mill (see the next chapter) used to regard a mixture 
of ‘different nationalities’ as one of those unfavourable historical and social burdens 
which make it impossible for a society to produce ‘free’ (that is, liberal) institutions 
(this is Rawls’s ‘fourth type of domestic society’). Therefore a partition of the 
common territory was to be conceived as the only way to fix property relations 
between ‘nationalities’ and enable them to establish their own ‘free institutions’. The 
question is whether Rawls, too, would see such a mixture as an obstacle for a society 
to produce a liberal regime, so that – in order to achieve a liberal regime – Mill’s 
‘different nationalities’ should be unmixed, that is, separated into their own 
homogenous ‘nation-states’ (whether with liberal or ‘decent’ regimes), with fixed 
ownership over their respective territories. Although Rawls does not make an explicit 
argument in favour of such a partitionist enterprise, the logic of his argument which 
equates states, regimes, societies and populations suggests that he might well support 
it as self-understandable: if the mixing of ‘different nationalities’ creates an obstacle 
for a society to be homogenised into a single ‘nation-state’ and thus produce ‘free 
institutions’, the aim of the ‘Law of Peoples’ would be to remove these obstacles, 
create ‘mono-national’ units, and thereby establish liberal regimes.  
It may seem that Rawls is of the contrary opinion from Mill who proposed 
‘national’ homogeneity as a precondition of the existence of ‘free institutions’: Rawls 
assumes ‘reasonable pluralism’ within societies to be a condition produced by “the 
nature and culture of free institutions”.334 However, this ‘reasonable pluralism’ does 
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not assume ‘national’ heterogeneity; on the contrary, it presupposes ‘national’ 
homogeneity as a precondition of ‘reasonable pluralism’ of political and religious 
views (‘comprehensive doctrines’) within society. The very logic of Rawls’ 
terminology suggests that societies and states have to be organised in the form of 
homogenous ‘nation-states’ if they are to be called ‘peoples’. ‘Reasonable pluralism 
within or between peoples’ is practically possible in ‘international’ relations only if 
the term ‘peoples’ in fact stands for homogenous ‘nation-states’, each with its 
homogenising ‘national’ culture or ideology, which can absorb Mill’s ‘nationalities’ 
into one ‘people’.  
For Rawls, “Liberal peoples have three basic features: a reasonably just 
constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental interests, citizens 
united by what Mill called ‘common sympathies’;335 and finally, a moral nature.”336 
Given the fact that Mill proclaimed that ‘free institutions’ were “next to impossible in 
a country made up of different nationalities”, it is clear that he held that ‘free 
institutions’ were inseparably entwined with the existence of ‘common sympathies’, 
characterising ‘nationalities’, so that these ‘common sympathies’ (of ‘nationality’) 
were in fact to be seen as the chief precondition of ‘free institutions’ in a country. 
Rawls’s ‘peoples’ do resemble Mill’s ‘nationalities’: without ‘common sympathies’ 
(as one of the three ‘basic features’), it is hard to imagine Rawls’s ‘peoples’ 
possessing either their ‘reasonably just constitutional democratic government’ or their 
‘moral nature’. Indeed, both morality and democratic character of such ‘peoples’ 
seem to be impossible without ‘common sympathies’ among their citizens. It would 
be impossible even to have ‘different peoples’ within the boundaries of one state, 
even without Mill’s ‘free institutions’. For Rawls, in order to be considered at all, the 
state is by definition to be equated with ‘the people’, so that these two in fact form 
one – ‘the nation-state’: 
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As for a liberal people being united by common sympathies and a desire to be under the same 
democratic government, if those sympathies were entirely dependent upon a common 
language, history, and political culture, with a shared historical consciousness, this feature 
would rarely, if ever, be fully satisfied. Historical conquests and immigration have caused the 
intermingling of groups with different cultures and historical memories who now reside 
within the territory of most contemporary governments. Notwithstanding, the Law of Peoples 
starts with the need for common sympathies, no matter what their source may be. My hope is 
that, if we begin in this simplified way, we can work out political principles that will, in due 
course, enable us to deal with more difficult cases where all the citizens are not united by a 
common language and shared political memories.337 
         
Although Rawls here takes Mill as a starting point, he significantly departs from 
Mill’s position that presupposes the existence of clearly demarcated entities called 
‘nationalities’, sharing common language, history and political culture. Rawls 
acknowledges “the intermingling of groups with different cultures and historical 
memories”, albeit as a consequence of historical developments with ascribed negative 
connotations, such as conquests and immigration (in historical reality, immigration as 
a concept has come into being only with the establishment of ‘national’ homogeneity 
and monitored borders characterising modern ‘nation-states’). However, unlike Mill 
who sees ‘common sympathies’ as a product of certain, prescribed conditions, Rawls 
seeks to produce them, “whatever their source may be”. He admits that “where 
citizens are not united by a common language and shared political memories” a sense 
of common sympathies can be produced by other means, whatever they may be. This 
distinction between Mill and Rawls is important because Mill’s vision of ‘common 
sympathies’ implies a typical ethnonationalist view of how ‘nations’ and 
‘nationalities’ are to be defined; on the other side, Rawls’s approach is much closer to 
that of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism, of course, also takes ‘national’ 
homogeneity as a necessary condition of the functioning society, and ‘the nation-
state’ as the only conceivable form of the modern state, but treats different ethnic 
identities and historical experiences as a minor problem for that homogeneity to 
develop and for ‘the nation’ to be built. Such cases, Rawls admits, are difficult but 
they can still be dealt with, if we are (as he is) determined to create a single, 
‘national’ identity out of those different ethnic ones.  
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Modus vivendi or modus operandi? 
 
Rawls says that ‘political liberalism’, with its ideas of ‘realistic utopia’ and ‘public 
reason’, proposes that stability among ‘peoples’ – contrary to what political life 
normally suggests – can be more than a mere modus vivendi.338 However, it is not 
clear how ‘peoples’ (if we take that the word ‘peoples’ here truly means peoples-as-
human-aggregations rather than states) can actually interact with each other, if not 
through states. If one, following Rawls literally, takes it as possible for ‘peoples’ as 
such (without ‘nation-states’ as the mediators) to interact with each other so as to 
create stability, then it becomes unclear how these ‘peoples’ would interact with each 
other with pretensions to have anything more than a simple modus vivendi, while at 
the same time preserving their own group integrity and identity. In other words, if 
‘peoples’ do not act and interact through ‘nation-states’ with their fixed and 
monitored borders, any interaction that would aspire to be more than a modus vivendi 
would bring these ‘peoples’ so close as to gradually blur their symbolic cultural 
boundaries and eventually erase their clear-cut divisions. This is not to say that they 
would necessarily all merge into one ‘people’ (certainly not without some gigantic 
and paradoxical supra-national ‘nation-state’); however, it is probably correct to 
assume that, without ‘nation-states’ and without a modus vivendi among them, their 
symbolic boundaries and divisions would become relative at the least.339 Yet, Rawls’s 
vision of such ‘peoples’ is deeply pervaded by a typical nationalistic logic that starts 
from the assumption that human beings are naturally and eternally divided into 
separate cultural entities called ‘peoples’, whose cultural interaction is practically 
denied by their very nature, so that this starting, ‘original’ position can never change. 
However, much of political life suggests that some of the present-day ‘peoples’ were 
actually created in the pursuit of their own ‘nation-states’ (take the example of 
Americans first) and that others – as articulated and stimulated by their intellectual 
and financial elites driven by the same nationalistic logic – claimed their own 
sovereign ‘nation-states’ precisely in order to fully assert their presumed identity and 
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protect their presumed integrity, both from political domination by imperial powers 
and from possible merging with other ‘peoples’. In this process, the relationship 
between ‘nation-states’ may have appeared to be a modus vivendi, as much of 
political life may suggest, indeed. Still, the process of creation of ‘nation-states’ was a 
systemic issue from its very beginning, pursued by the nationalistic elites influenced 
by the nascent ‘nation-state system’. To ignore these historical facts may be a 
reasonable advantage for someone who attempts to create a ‘realistic utopia’; 
however, the problem with Rawls’s vision of the ‘stability among peoples’ is that it 
tends to ignore the fact that such a stability has been established systemically, as an 
imperative imposed by the system on each of its potential and actual members. As 
such, this stability has never actually been a modus vivendi for ‘peoples’ organised 
into (or created by) ‘nation-states’, although it may have appeared as such; is has 
always been a modus operandi of ‘the nation-state system’, itself created under the 
decisive influence of historical liberalism.    
 
Reciprocity as the system        
 
Elevating his own distinction between rationality and the reasonable (see above) to 
the ‘international’ level, Rawls claims that states differ from ‘peoples’ in ignoring the 
criterion of reciprocity, thereby promoting ‘rationality’ at the expense of ‘the 
reasonable’: “If a state’s concern with power is predominant; and if its interests 
include such things as converting other societies to the state’s religion, enlarging its 
empire and winning territory, gaining dynastic or imperial or national prestige and 
glory, and increasing its relative economic strength – then the difference between 
states and peoples is enormous.”340    
Here the question arises: why ‘peoples’ would not be as concerned with power (as 
presumably states are) as to enlarge their territories, convert other peoples to their 
religion, fight for prestige and glory, increase their relative economic strength, etc.? It 
seems that the only decisive and conclusive reason why ‘peoples’ (that is, ‘nation-
states’) would be decisively stimulated not to ignore the criterion of reciprocity is that 
the system of ‘nation-states’ guarantees each ‘nation-state’ (or, as Rawls prefers it, 
each ‘people’) a position within the system: the system rests on reciprocity and 
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reciprocity guarantees its existence. Put another way, the presence of reciprocity (or, 
as Rawls would have it, the presence of ‘justice’) in international relations depends on 
the existence of ‘nation-states’: Rawls’s ‘justice’ in international relations is made for 
‘nation-states’; and, it is also made of their mutually reciprocal relations. Yet, position 
of each ‘people’ within the system does not depend only on the recognition of its 
position by other ‘peoples’; such a recognition depends equally on its assertiveness 
with respect to that position: only those ‘peoples’ that can forcefully enough assert 
their place in ‘the nation-state system’ (as ‘nations’ possessing, or aspiring to, their 
own states) can count on others’ recognition; otherwise, recognition of the weaker 
claims is far from guaranteed. That is why ‘peoples’ – as presumed members of ‘the 
nation-state system’ – have no choice but to develop and stimulate their respective 
nationalisms, as a matter of reciprocity in asserting their own claims to equal status 
within the system. Recognising others’ claims is thus a matter of reciprocity; but, 
asserting one’s own claims forcefully enough is a matter of reciprocity, too. They 
may not compete for glory or prestige or for any of the traditional reasons; but, they 
may as well compete for equal status within the system, more so since the system 
claims to guarantee this status to all claimants that are persuasive enough to assert 
their equality, respectively and reciprocally. To have ‘peoples’ as claimants, that is, 
as members of the system, one has no choice but to acknowledge the existence of 
their competing nationalisms, and this is what Rawls fails to acknowledge. For, it is 
only through their respective nationalisms that ‘peoples’ can assert their existence and 
their own, ‘guaranteed’ place in the system of ‘nation-states’. Reciprocity in 
‘international’ relations happens, at best, as reciprocity in checking and recognising 
one another’s assertiveness, that is, one another’s nationalism; and that assertiveness 
(i.e. nationalism) happens, irrespectively, as a precondition of one’s existence and 
status within this system of reciprocal nationalist claims, which its apologists tend to 
depict as ‘justice’ itself. Still, such a theory of justice in ‘international’ relations may 
well be depicted as no more than a perpetual struggle of competing nationalisms. 
     
‘The people’ as the good 
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Theoretically, liberal society is not homogenised around a comprehensive conception 
of the good;341 the latter is reserved for citizens (and for their civic, ethnic or religious 
associations and communities), whose comprehensive conceptions presumably cancel 
one another. However, in practice their respective ‘comprehensive doctrines’ are 
cancelled out by one, supra-doctrinal ideology, portraying all citizens as ‘free and 
equal’, which opposes each of them and all of them (as a single body) to all non-
citizens, i.e. non-members of their society of the ‘free and equal’. This ideology thus 
unites them and homogenises them as ‘free and equal’ members of their society, and 
opposes them, collectively, to other such societies. The consensus they reach on 
membership i.e. citizenship i.e. ‘nationality’ is, in practice, what functions as a 
comprehensive conception of the good for liberal society. On the other hand, 
‘peoples’, to be able to “conceive of themselves as free and equal peoples in the 
Society of Peoples”,342 first have to be homogenised around the vision of themselves 
as collective individuals which are ‘free and equal’ with other such collective 
individuals in the ‘Society of Peoples’. And this vision of themselves as ‘free and 
equal’ (thereby granting ‘freedom and equality’ to all its members) is that 
comprehensive conception of the good which liberal society has, both ‘nationally’ 
and ‘internationally’. Of course, Rawls claims that “a people of a constitutional 
democracy has, as a liberal people, no comprehensive doctrine of the good…, 
whereas individual citizens within a liberal domestic society do have such 
conceptions, and to deal with their needs as citizens, the idea of primary good is 
used”.343 However, the idea that the entire ‘people’ can be liberal already presupposes 
this ‘people’s’ homogeneity built around liberal ideas. Still, the problem is that there 
is no comprehensive definition of what exactly these ideas would be; and then, it is 
difficult to assume that homogeneity can be built around a set of diverse ideas, which 
can only conditionally be put under the joint label of liberalism. It seems logical to 
assume, then, that ‘the people’ is to be homogenised around the ‘national’ idea (i.e. 
the idea of this ‘people’s’ right to possess its own sovereign state and thereby exercise 
its ‘freedom’), which is in fact what constitutes it as ‘the people’. In this sense, it is 
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probably quite correct to assume that ‘constitutional democracy’ is about constituting 
‘the people’ as its own sovereign (‘popular sovereignty’ is thus closely linked with 
‘constitutional democracy’, although there can be sovereign, democratic states 
without a formal constitution – take Great Britain as the most obvious example), as 
much as it is about popular vote (again, it is difficult to imagine popular vote without 
popular sovereignty, except as a charade). The idea that ‘the people’ possessing its 
own state is by definition to be perceived as ‘free’ is, of course, typically nationalist, 
to which Rawls adds a notion that ‘the people’ living in the state defined as 
‘constitutional democracy’ is to be labelled as ‘liberal’. Yet, ‘the people’, call it 
‘liberal’ or ‘non-liberal’, can hardly have a truly comprehensive idea of the good 
mainly because it lacks total homogeneity, which is a condition of its having only one 
idea of the good, call it ‘comprehensive’ or ‘non-comprehensive’. The most minimal 
idea around which ‘the people’ can build a consensus (indeed, it is the very idea 
which constitutes it as ‘the people’) is the idea of its having its own ‘nation-state’, 
that is, the idea which constitutes it as ‘the nation’ (i.e. ‘the people’). Without this 
idea, ‘the people’ would cease to exist as such, so that within nationalist discourse 
this idea performs the role of the good itself. Yet, this idea by definition is never to be 
acknowledged as such, because that would expose the fact that ‘the people’ itself is 
constituted by this idea rather than by historical or biological processes. Therefore, in 
order to prevent any reference to ‘the people’s’ true, discourse-based origin, 
nationalist discourse commonly projects the idea of the good into ‘the people’ itself, 
thus making it the good. This, nationalist idea of the good, projected into ‘the people’ 
itself, is as comprehensive as it can possibly be. For, in the nationalist discourse this 
idea becomes the measure of all things, so that whatever affirms ‘the people’ as the 
good is to be affirmed itself; whatever happens to deviate from the idea of ‘the 
people’ as the good is to be eliminated as such. Following the typical liberal analogy 
that Rawls himself draws, between domestic society and its individual citizens and 
‘Society of Peoples’ and its members, the same may be said of the position that the 
autonomous individual takes in the individualist strand of liberal ideology. Just like 
‘the people’ in the nationalist strand of liberalism, the idea of the good is projected 
into the individual, and the individual as such effectively becomes the good itself. 
This idea of the good is also as comprehensive as it can be, so that in the individualist 
discourse the individual becomes the measure of all things. Developing the analogy 
further, it may be said that in domestic liberal society the idea of the individual as the-
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value-in-itself is imposed on all individuals, forcing them to perceive themselves as 
individuals rather than as members of some community (in Rousseau’s repeatedly 
quoted phrase, they are forced to be free); also, that in the ‘international’ system 
(Rawls’s ‘Society of Peoples’) the idea of ‘the people’ as the-value-in-itself is 
imposed on all states, forcing them to become ‘free’ as ‘nation-states’; indeed, they 
are even advised to stop calling themselves ‘states’ and adopt instead the name of 
‘peoples’ (or the name of ‘nations’, in the more common, everyday discourse). Rawls, 
however, depicts such an imposition as ‘free will’: 
 
[Liberal peoples] strive to protect their political independence and their free culture with its 
civil liberties, to guarantee their security, territory, and the well-being of their citizens. Yet a 
further interest is also significant: applied to peoples, it falls under what Rousseau calls 
amour-propre. This interest is a people’s proper self-respect of themselves as a people, 
resting on their common awareness of their trials during their history and of their culture with 
its accomplishments. Altogether distinct from their self-concern for their security and the 
safety of their territory, this interest shows itself in a people’s insisting on receiving from 
other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality. What distinguishes peoples 
from states – and this is crucial – is that just peoples are fully prepared to grant the very same 
proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals.344 
 
This is Rawls’s fullest and most explicit endorsement of the common nationalist 
theme: in the nationalist discourse ‘culture’ is one – and interchangeable – with ‘the 
people’, and ‘freedom’ of both can be ‘protected’ only by ‘political independence’, 
that is, by the sovereign state. Otherwise, it is by definition ‘threatened’ to be treated 
as ‘unequal’ by other such ‘cultures’/‘peoples’, presumably possessing or striving to 
possess their own states (see Gellner’s famous definition of nationalism, which also 
adopts a great deal of nationalist logic by treating ‘culture’ and ‘people’ as one; 
Rawls goes even further by treating ‘the people’ and ‘their free culture with its civil 
liberties’ as one – and interchangeable – with ‘the nation-state’). Every ‘free culture 
with its civil liberties’, as one with ‘the people’, is to be ‘protected’ by ‘political 
independence’, and thereby granted ‘respect’ by, and ‘equality’ with, other state-
possessing or state-seeking ‘free cultures’. ‘Equality’, then, and ‘respect’, is a matter 
of having the sovereign state, which ‘the people’ (being already one with ‘the nation-
state’!) reasonably and rationally grants to other ‘peoples’, because it is only a 
distribution of sovereignty that guarantees the existence of the system of ‘nation-
states’, which in turn guarantees the existence of each of its members. Without such a 
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distribution of sovereignty, sovereignty of the member-states would not be 
guaranteed. Such a system was already established by the Peace of Westphalia, by its 
principle cuius regio, eius religio, so that every member-state was granted 
sovereignty to impose its own, state religion onto the entire population under its 
control, which greatly contributed to the development of homogenous cultures. This 
distribution of sovereignty was reciprocal and therefore ‘just’, in Rawlsian terms. At 
the same time, this reciprocal distribution of sovereignty between the Westphalian 
states served as the basis for future Rawls’s ‘peoples’, perceived as inherently 
homogenous and as one and the same with their ‘free’, homogenous cultures and with 
their sovereign states. Indeed, these ‘peoples’ – as inherently homogenous and 
sovereign, as one with their homogenous cultures and sovereign states – would not 
have come into being without this reciprocal distribution of sovereignty. That is why 
it was, and still is, both reasonable and rational for them to grant that sovereignty to 
one another, as a matter of reciprocity, as well as of pure self-interest and simple self-
preservation. However, the other side of that generosity in distribution of sovereignty 
has been the imposition of ‘national’ homogeneity and ‘cultural’ (sometimes 
including religious and racial) exclusivity, through fixed individual membership 
(citizenship, i.e. ‘nationality’) and its ever-intensifying purification, carried out by the 
underlying, ever-intensifying nationalist discourse. A part of that other side in 
distribution of sovereignty is also the principle of discriminatory right of some (i.e. 
‘liberal) states to interfere with the internal affairs of ‘non-liberal’ states. Rawls does 
not hesitate to endorse this principle: 
 
A principle… of non-intervention… will obviously have to be qualified in the general case of 
outlaw states and grave violations of human rights. Although suitable for a society of well-
ordered peoples, it fails in the case of a society of disordered peoples in which wars and 
serious violations of human rights are endemic. The right to independence, and equally right 
to self-determination, hold only within certain limits, yet to be specified by the Law of 
Peoples for the general case. Thus, no people has the right to self-determination, or a right to 
secession, at the expense of subjugating another people. Nor may a people protest their 
condemnation by the world society when their domestic institutions violate human rights, or 
limit the rights of minorities living among them. A people’s right to independence and self-
determination is no shield from that condemnation, nor even from coercive intervention by 
other peoples in grave cases.345    
 
This passage is important because Rawls here openly advocates foreign – if eminently 
multilateral – interference with domestic affairs of independent states, to the extent of 
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military intervention, under the pretext of protection of human rights. All that is done 
by introducing a typically Manichean dichotomy between ‘well-ordered peoples’ and 
“a society of disordered peoples in which wars and serious violations of human rights 
are endemic”. Of course, a claim that there are “disordered peoples in which wars and 
serious violations of human rights are endemic” is necessarily arbitrary, based on 
arbitrarily ascribed (that is, prescribed) features, supposedly belonging to entire 
‘peoples’ as their genetic baggage. But not only does Rawls identify entire peoples as 
endemically ‘disordered’ (that is, as presumably genetically predisposed for “wars 
and serious violations of human rights”), he also – rather paradoxically – depicts them 
as already organised into a well-ordered-society of their own. This society is, still 
paradoxically, based on its own outlaw laws, against which his society of ‘well-
ordered peoples’ has a legitimate right to militarily intervene, using ‘human rights 
violations’ as a pretext, without claiming self-defence and thus (again paradoxically) 
violating its own rules of non-intervention in non-self-defence cases. This paradoxical 
logic is even more emphasised in the claim that “no people has the right to self-
determination, or a right to secession, at the expense of subjugating another people”, 
which – quite paradoxically but inevitably – triggers (rather than limits) an endless 
series of ethnonationalist claims (take the Balkans, or the post-Soviet states, as 
paradigmatic), whereby every ethnic minority – no matter how small – can claim self-
determination and secession in order to ‘protect itself’ from the ethnic majority’s 
claims to self-determination and secession. Simply, following this paradoxical logic, 
whatever number of individuals (or a group) happens to be in minority anywhere, it 
may constitute itself as majority and claim the right to self-determination and 
secession, provided that it can convincingly assert its homogeneity and contiguity 
with a certain piece of territory (claiming it to be its historical heritage, i.e. its 
exclusive property), no matter how small or economically non-viable. Actually, it is 
the logic of this argument that has produced ‘endemic’ ethnonationalisms, not the 
other way round, and Rawls has given his own contribution to the production and 
perpetuation of such ‘endemic’ phenomena. This logic of (ethno)nationalism in its 
entirety is probably best summarised in the following passage: 
 
If a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is a basic feature of a constitutional 
democracy with its free institutions, we may assume that there is an even greater diversity in 
the comprehensive doctrines affirmed among the members of the Society of Peoples with its 
many different cultures and traditions. Hence a classical, or average, utilitarian principle 
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would not be accepted by peoples, since no people organized by its government is prepared to 
count, as a first principle, the benefits for another people as outweighing the hardships 
imposed on itself. Well-ordered peoples insist on an equality among themselves as peoples, 
and this insistence rules out any form of the principle of utility.346 
 
‘Comprehensive doctrines’ of different ‘peoples’ which are to be seen as congruent 
with ‘cultures’ or based on the latter’s perpetual affirmation are, in fact, their 
respective nationalisms, especially given the fact that in Rawls’s perspective 
‘peoples’ are at the same time to be seen as congruent with states (in Gellner’s 
famous definition of nationalism, it is a doctrine that promotes ‘congruence between 
culture and the state’). Thus, in a typically nationalist perception, not only is 
population congruent with ‘culture’ and ‘culture’ is congruent with the state, but they 
simply merge into a single unit, which some call ‘the nation’, while others, like 
Rawls, prefer to call it ‘the people’. More precisely, not only does such a unit have its 
own ‘comprehensive doctrine’, which puts this very unit at its centre, as that in which 
unity between ‘culture’, population and state is to be perpetually displayed, but such a 
‘comprehensive doctrine’ (of nationalism) is what actually brings such a unit into 
existence. This universal ‘comprehensive doctrine’ is effectively imposed on all such 
units through the ‘international’ system (that is, as Rawls call it, ‘the Society of 
Peoples’), which promotes the idea that state sovereignty is (to be) ‘culturally’ based, 
acquired and retained (or, that the ‘culturally-based people’ should have ‘its’ state, or 
that ‘the people’ should be ‘organised by its government’ and thus effectively 
imposed a ‘culture’ which it would then regard as its own). Given the basic premise 
of this universally-spread ‘comprehensive doctrine’, that a ‘people organised by its 
government’ necessarily affirms itself as the-absolute-good-in-itself, it is logical then 
that such ‘peoples’, by promoting themselves as the absolute good, become equal in 
their self-absolutisation (just like ‘autonomous individuals’ domestically, as promoted 
by the individualist strand of liberalism). In this process of absolutisation of ‘the 
people’ itself, crucial is the importance of the perceived ‘hardships imposed on itself’, 
as Rawls puts it. For, it is precisely these perceived (imagined or real) ‘hardships 
imposed on itself’ that serve as a universal excuse for self-absolutisation, and the 
insistence on such perceived ‘hardships’ is the most common of all commonplaces in 
the nationalist discourse. Self-absolutisation of ‘peoples’, with the insistence on 
‘hardships’, is what makes these ‘peoples’ ‘equal’ and insistence on this ‘equality’ 
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leads to the comprehensive and all-embracing doctrine of nationalism, in which all 
‘peoples’ are ‘equal’ in their self-absolutisation, and none of these ‘peoples’ may 
abstain from that ‘equality’ if it is to preserve its position as a ‘people’ in the ‘Society 
of Peoples’:                     
 
The representatives of well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these 
principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose 
alternatives. These principles must, of course, satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, since this 
criterion holds at both levels – both between citizens as citizens and peoples as peoples.347  
 
Perhaps it is not so difficult to present the criterion of reciprocity as ‘fair’ on the level 
of citizens, given the fact that every individual is at least a physical whole that can be 
treated as a unit equal to other such units, so that their mutually reciprocal treatment 
and exchange may well be perceived as an exchange of equal shares. However, the 
analogy with ‘peoples’ as collective individuals can hardly hold if reciprocity as a 
principle is to be taken seriously. For, ‘peoples’ have significant differences in their 
size, in their populations’ density, in the size of the territory they inhabit and claim as 
their own, in the wealth of the natural resources that these territories contain, in the 
degree of their populations’ socio-political homogeneity, in the strength of their 
economy and in the strength of the military power they can project, etc. How can they 
establish a reciprocity of ‘the original position’, of which Rawls so extensively writes 
in A Theory of Justice, when ‘peoples’ cannot claim to have equal starting positions 
(no matter how thick their self-imposed ‘veil of ignorance’ may be), given all these 
possible differences? Of course, individuals have their differences, too (physical, 
intellectual, social, economic, etc.), which are to be ignored in Rawls’s theory due to 
the application of the ‘veil of ignorance’; but ‘peoples’ can hardly be identified as 
‘peoples’ with the same certainty with which individuals are commonly identified as 
individuals. For, ‘the people’s’ boundaries – physical, political, ethnic, economic, 
cultural, linguistic – are far from being as clear-cut as the individual’s psycho-
physical ones. Application of the ‘veil of ignorance’ would make them even more 
uncertain, because these boundaries are necessarily a product of interaction between 
‘peoples’, and this interaction and the consequent boundary-creation (see Fredrik 
Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries) require full and permanent awareness of all 
the differences. Indeed, it is full and permanent awareness of these differences that 
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creates boundaries between ‘peoples’ and thereby constitutes ‘peoples’ as such. The 
question of homogeneity, which makes ‘the people’ act as a collective individual 
rather than as a collection of individuals, is also very significant: those ‘peoples’ 
which can display a greater degree of homogeneity can more powerfully assert 
themselves and are more likely to be able to project their power, both militarily, 
economically, and politically. This factor may lead those smaller in numbers to strive 
for greater homogeneity, in order to enhance their assertiveness and gain respect by 
those more numerous who assert themselves by their sheer size. This, of course, may 
well, and does, evolve into a race of competing nationalisms, as a logical 
consequence of the system which takes ‘peoples’ as collective individuals and claims 
equality and reciprocity as its basic features.                   
               
Conclusion 
 
No less than Mill’s utilitarianism, which deliberately disregards the individual and his 
authentic interests and imposes the eminently collectivistic concept of ‘the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number’, Rawls’s ‘theory of justice’, based on the idea of 
perpetual display of procedural reciprocity in individual relations, in fact remains 
attached to the collectivistic concept of ‘the nation’ (‘the people’ in Rawls’s 
terminology), based on the concept of perpetual extension of the ritual recognition of 
one another as ‘free and equal’ between ‘the nation’s’ individual members. The ritual 
recognition, reciprocally extended between the members, that is, between ‘co-
nationals’, non-reciprocally is denied to all non-members; they can only be 
recognised collectively, as members of analogous collective bodies i.e. of other 
‘nations’. Between ‘the nation’s’ members, this ritual recognition of one another as 
‘free and equal’ does not remain only procedural: an abstract procedure of 
individuals’ mutual recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ evolves into an 
empty ritual of members’ endorsement of one another as members of a ‘free nation’, 
equal to all other ‘nations’, a collectivistic ritual that equally disregards the individual 
and his authentic interests and imposes ‘national’ homogeneity and uniformity on all 
individual members of ‘the nation’. As Rawls stresses, these individuals do not even 
come into existence as individuals outside ‘the nation’ as the only form of social 
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cooperation that provides their recognition as individuals.348 Thus the paradoxical 
circle that ostensibly opposes the individualistic doctrine of liberalism and the 
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John Stuart Mill is commonly perceived as the quintessential liberal. Already in his 
own time regarded as ‘the saint of rationalism’ (as Gladstone called him), Mill has 
become the most sacred figure of the 19th-century liberalism, ‘the apostle of 
liberty’349 – the position which can only be compared to that of Locke within the 
earlier liberal tradition. Those among Mill’s contemporaries who questioned this 
orthodox view of his role in the promotion of individual liberty already found it 
“impossible to criticize Mr. Mill’s writings without the danger of rousing 
animosity.”350 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that his name in the 20th-century 
liberal discourse has become almost synonymous with the very concept of individual 
liberty. Even those who deny him any original contributions to the history of Western 
political thought admit that, nevertheless, he was the teacher of a generation.351   
So crucial was Mill’s contribution to the shaping of the liberal perspective, that any 
attempt to portray Mill as less than the absolute champion of individual liberty has 
had to encounter heated and angry reactions on the part of the liberal audience. 
Dissenting, heretical opinions – depicting Mill’s theory of liberty as “something 
resembling moral totalitarianism”, seeking to establish “oppressive consensus” 
through “moral indoctrination”352, or as a theory of controlled social engineering353 – 
have been extremely rare, and perceived almost as morally outrageous. Despite the 
obvious fact that Mill himself, besides his concern with individual liberty, explicitly 
advocated the concept of collective, ‘national self-determination’, there are 
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surprisingly few authors354 who have attempted to point to the – equally crucial – 
contribution of Mill’s theory of ‘international’ relations to the development of the 
eminently liberal doctrine of ‘national self-determination’ and, therefore, of the 
doctrine of nationalism.355 
 
‘Principle of Liberty’ and ‘Principle of Nationality’ 
 
The case for individual liberty is usually regarded as most vigorously advocated by 
John Stuart Mill, particularly in his famous essay On Liberty. The principles 
presented there have clearly distinguished him from the prophets of economic liberty, 
such as Adam Smith or David Ricardo, as well as from those who were mostly 
inclined to conflate these two, like Friedrich A. Hayek. According to Mill’s ‘simple 
principle’, as presented in On Liberty, “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. (...) The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is 
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns 
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign.”356 Therefore, “the only freedom which deserves 
the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not 
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attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.”357 The 
‘appropriate region of human liberty’ thus becomes the entire area of the individual’s 
conduct that affects only the individual himself.358 The doctrine of free trade differs 
from the ‘principle of liberty’ precisely because it refers to the “part of conduct which 
society is competent to restrain”: 
 
Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all 
restraint, qua restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct 
which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really 
produce the results which it is desired to by them. As the principle of individual liberty is not 
involved in the doctrine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise 
respecting the limits of that doctrine. (...) Such questions involve considerations of liberty, 
only in so far leaving people to themselves is always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling 
them: but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle 
undeniable.359 
 
Therefore, in the fullest exposition of the ‘principle of liberty’ that Mill offers, the 
“appropriate region of human liberty” is said to comprise, 
 
First, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most 
comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty 
of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it 
belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being 
almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the 
same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of 
tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we 
like, subject to such consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow 
creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our 
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the 
liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any 
purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full 
age, and not forced or deceived.360 
 
Freedom to unite for any purpose is here depicted in terms of ‘positive liberty’, one 
that is almost absolute, limited only by the imperative of not harming others. In 
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Considerations on Representative Government Mill claims along the same lines that 
“one hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to 
determine, with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose 
to associate themselves.” Yet, although Mill explicitly refers to “any division of the 
human race” that is free to choose “various collective bodies of human beings” with 
which it may associate itself, the whole paragraph from which the sentence is taken is 
quite prescriptive in terms of strictly defining which division of the human race is free 
to associate itself with which collective bodies: 
 
Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting 
all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to 
themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided 
by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, 
if not to determine, with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose 
to associate themselves. But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more 
vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities. Among a people without a fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak 
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative 
government, cannot exist.361 
 
It is not easy to follow Mill in his claim that the united (or, effectively, uniform) 
public opinion is a precondition of freedom or of ‘free institutions’. It is especially 
difficult to perceive this claim as consistent with the rest of his theory, since 
elsewhere, particularly in On Liberty, he wages a real war against ‘the yoke of 
opinion’ (being particularly ‘heavy’, as he says, in England of his own time) as the 
main impediment to individual liberty. Yet, such a yoke of ‘united public opinion’, 
labelled as the ‘sentiment of nationality’362 is, paradoxically, offered as a general 
requirement for the existence of ‘free institutions’ at the level of country: “It is in 
general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments 
should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.”363   
In Gellner’s famous definition, the doctrine that prescribes congruence between the 
state boundaries and those of ‘culture’/‘nationality’ is labelled as nationalism.364 
However, Mill here does not hesitate to practically equate ‘free institutions’ – 
applying the same logic of congruence between the boundaries of states and the 
boundaries of ‘nationalities’ – with ‘national’ institutions. Thus ‘the nation-state’ 
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arises as a ‘necessary condition of free institutions’; therefore, only ‘national’ 
institutions are to be regarded as ‘free institutions’, and only those peoples with their 
‘nation-states’ and their ‘national’ institutions are to be regarded as ‘free peoples’. In 
turn, as derived from the logic proposed by Mill, their members are to be regarded as 
the only ‘free individuals’. No less does this doctrine of ‘free institutions’ resemble 
another famous definition of the nationalist doctrine, that by Elie Kedourie:  
 
What is beyond doubt is that the doctrine [of nationalism] divides humanity into separate and 
distinct nations, claims that such nations must constitute sovereign states, and asserts that the 
members of a nation reach freedom and fulfilment by cultivating the peculiar identity of their 
own nation and by sinking their own persons in the greater whole of the nation.365 
  
Given these structural similarities between Mill’s doctrine of ‘free institutions’, as 
presented in Representative Government, and the doctrine of nationalism, as defined 
by Gellner and Kedourie, it remains contestable whether these two doctrines – being 
so closely entwined in Mill’s account – are actually to be distinguished from one 
another or not.   
Yet another paradox, along the same lines, can be found in the fact that the 
“freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others” is prescribed as a 
freedom of combination within only one clearly defined cognitive and socio-political 
framework, that of ‘nationality’. Freedom of “framing the plan of our life to suit our 
own character” becomes a freedom defined by what is presumed to be our character, 
which, in turn, as suggested by Mill, is to be regarded as an uncontested cognitive 
category. What is ‘our’ character, and who are ‘we’, be that as members of ‘various 
collective bodies’ or of the entire ‘human race’, is not a question for Mill: our 
‘character’ is simply determined by our being ourselves, and that is equally applicable 
to individuals as well as to ‘nationalities’, as collective individuals possessing their 
respective ‘national characters’. However, the problem with this logic may seem 
trivial, but it nevertheless remains essential: although boundaries of the individual self 
can be ultimately determined by the boundaries of his physical being, the difficulty 
with the collective divisions of mankind is that there are no “boundaries defining the 
collective self”.366 Of course, even the problem of defining identity of the individual 
member of society, as emphasised by numberless 20th-century philosophical and 
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psychological theories, is far from being uncontested; yet, the question of collective 
identity, subject to ‘self-determination’, by virtue of being a political question, 
necessarily becomes a matter of political arbitrariness. As Ivor Jennings summed it 
up in a remark concerning the United Nations debates on decolonisation and ‘self-
determination’: “On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the People decide. It was in 
fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the 
people.”367   
Within the cognitive frame of political arbitrariness, then, it may seem plausible to 
assert that a people are, or are not, “ripe for free institutions”. Thus, according to Mill, 
a people who are to be left free to unite are only those who are “supposed to be of full 
age, and not forced or deceived”, whereby being of ‘full age’ means to be ‘ripe for 
free institutions’. In turn, ‘freedom to unite’ and thus form ‘free institutions’ is to be 
regarded as practically impossible unless a people are free from mingling with other 
‘nationalities’ under one government. It is, therefore, a necessary condition of 
people’s being ‘ripe for free institutions’ to be first clearly distinguished from other 
‘divisions of the human race’, then defined as ‘nationality’ and, finally, extricated 
from mingling with other ‘divisions of the human race’ (that is, extricated from 
mingling with other ‘nationalities’). 
“A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality,” says Mill, “if they 
are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between 
them and any others – which make them co-operate with each other more willingly 
than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it 
should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively.” The 
‘feeling of nationality’ can be generated by various causes – such as ‘identity of race 
and descent’, or ‘geographical limits’. ‘Community of language, and community of 
religion’ also greatly contribute to it. But, says Mill, “the strongest of all is identity of 
political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community 
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with 
the same incidents in the past.” However, “none of these circumstances however are 
either indispensable, or necessarily sufficient by themselves.”368  Thus, quite 
tautologically, the possession of ‘national history’ is proclaimed the strongest among 
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the various causes of the ‘feeling of nationality’.369 The conspicuous presence of such 
a circular argument is probably a result of Mill’s deeply rooted belief in the 
uncontested nature (or, rather, the natural uncontested-ness) of the collective self, 
though he partly admits that such an identity may be formed due to various historical, 
social and geographical conditions.     
‘Freedom to unite’ – while assuming ‘nationality’ to be a definable collective self – 
is therefore limited by the prescriptive nature of the unit itself: although “one hardly 
knows what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine, 
with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate 
themselves”, people are free to actually associate themselves with, or free to unite 
into, the unit of ‘nationality’. Other ‘divisions of the human race’ are not proposed or 
suggested as available. On the other hand, the ‘nationality’s’ collective self, though 
assumed to have long existed as potentially present, is assumed to fully assert itself 
only in terms of ‘negative liberty’, by being isolated and extricated from the impeding 
company of its fellow-‘nationalities’, and put under the rule of its own ‘national 
government’. ‘Negative liberty’ at the level of ‘nationality’ is thus derived from the 
‘positive liberty’ of the individual to associate himself with his presumed ‘co-
nationals’. In turn, the latter liberty is derived from the primary ‘negative liberty’, the 
liberty of the individual to pursue his own ends in his own ways without external 
impediments.   
The foundation of such a ‘positive liberty’ is to be found in what Mill regards as 
‘the firm foundation’ of the ‘utilitarian morality’ he proposes; this ‘firm foundation’ 
is “the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful 
principle in human nature, and happily one of those which tend to become stronger, 
even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization”. For 
Mill, “the social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, 
except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he 
never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body; and this association is 
riveted more and more, as mankind are further removed from the state of savage 
independence.”370  Thus ‘the freedom to unite’ is derived from the ‘desire to be in 
unity with our fellow creatures’: since ‘unity with our fellow creatures’ is ‘naturally’ 
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desired, the individual should be granted freedom to realise what he ‘naturally’ 
desires, and be ‘in unity’ with his ‘fellow creatures’, thereby simply realising his 
human nature. Therefore, ‘freedom to unite’, and, more broadly, ‘the principle of 
liberty’, is not only to be regarded as compatible with ‘the principle of utility’: more 
profoundly, it is to be regarded – due to its appeal to ‘human nature’ – as directly 
promoting the latter, while promoting the realisation of the ‘desire to be in unity with 
our fellow creatures’ as the realisation of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number’. Moreover, not only does the realisation of the ‘freedom to unite’ promote 
‘the principle of utility’ by promoting ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number’; it also promotes the ‘advancement in civilization’, since it ‘further removes’ 
mankind ‘from the state of savage independence’.  
I believe that the significance that Mill attaches to his theory of ‘nationality’ 
demonstrates that for him collective, ‘national liberty’ is understood as the fullest 
possible realisation of the (revised) utilitarian principle of ‘the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number’. Therefore, by increasingly conceiving himself as a ‘member of 
a body’, the individual practically ‘advances civilization’, while simultaneously 
promoting ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’. The “state of society”, by 
becoming “more and more an inseparable part of every person’s conception of the 
state of things which he is born into, and which is the destiny of a human being”,371 
thus by itself ‘advances civilization’ and removes mankind further from ‘the state of 
savage independence’. Therefore, being a ‘member of a body’, thereby realising the 
‘natural desire to be in unity’, is for the individual necessarily a matter of his being 
civilised, as much as of his being free; at the same time, it is necessarily a matter of 
his being human. Thus, from the utilitarian point of view, the individual’s 
‘membership in a body’ may well arise as the central category of the entire Mill’s 
theory, one that simultaneously promotes both ‘liberty’ and ‘civilization’, while fully 
realising ‘human nature’.   
It is, therefore, no surprise that selfishness is in Mill’s theory regarded as a matter of 
a lower degree of ‘civilization’, one which is closer in its manifestations to ‘the state 
of savage independence’. Consequently, altruism is considered a matter of a higher 
degree of ‘civilization’, one which is closer to the state held to be the ‘destiny of a 
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human being’.372 Solidarity among the members of a body is thus necessarily what 
distinguishes them, as those who are fully civilized, from those who are still ‘in the 
state of savage independence’, as well as from those who are only semi-civilised, 
whom Mill commonly labels as ‘barbarians’: “The peculiar characteristic, in short, of 
civilized beings, is the capacity of co-operation; and this, like other faculties, tends to 
improve by practice, and becomes capable of assuming a constantly wider sphere of 
action.”373  
The state of social solidarity and co-operation, being directly opposed to ‘the state 
of savage independence’, thus arises as the mark of civilised human beings; 
consequently, the existence of a sentiment of solidarity becomes the threshold which 
distinguishes ‘civilization’ from both ‘barbarism’ and ‘the state of savage 
independence’. Hence, the existence of the ‘sentiment of nationality’, as a form of 
social cohesion (which is to be regarded as a higher stage of social solidarity), is what 
definitely distinguishes ‘civilized beings’ from both ‘savages’, who live in the state of 
absolute self-regarding independence, and ‘barbarians’, who have yet to establish 
such a form of social cohesion as to make themselves clearly distinct from other 
‘divisions of human race’ (which may or may not possess this sentiment and, 
therefore, may or may not be fully ‘civilized’), as well as to extricate themselves from 
mingling with the latter. “A strong and active principle of cohesion among the 
members of the same community or state”, thus becomes the “essential condition of 
stability in political society”, whereby ‘political society’ is to be equated with 
‘civilization’: 
 
We need scarcely say that we do not mean nationality in the vulgar sense of the term. (…) 
We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility; of union, not of separation. We mean a 
feeling of common interest among those who live under the same government, and are 
contained within the same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of the 
community do not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another part; that they set 
a value on their connexion; feel that they are one people, that their lot is cast together, that 
evil to any of their fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves; and do not desire selfishly to free 
themselves from their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connexion.374 
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It is not surprising, then, that Mill’s theory prescribes for such a highly elaborated 
form of social solidarity to be imposed, if necessary, on all the individuals and groups 
who lack in such a sentiment, and who are, therefore, to be regarded as being on a 
lower level of ‘civilization’.375 Being less advanced in ‘civilization’, they are to be 
taught to embrace altruism, whereby the very act of imposing on them the unit of 
‘nationality’, as the prescribed framework for the promotion of social solidarity 
through membership, is itself to be regarded as an act of altruism: if such individuals 
or groups refuse to embrace the ‘freedom to unite’ by actually uniting into the 
prescribed body of ‘nationality’, they can only – as an act of ultimate altruism – 
forced to be free (to use Rousseau’s famous paradox) and thus form ‘political society’ 
by embracing the cohesion of the ‘sentiment of nationality’. Thus Mill’s opposition to 
the Christian concept of individual, selfish desire for ‘private salvation’376 remains 
consistent with his parallel attempt to propose the ‘altruistic’ concept of public 
salvation377(or, in utilitarian terms, the concept of ‘the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number’) through the super-imposition of ‘freedom to unite’ at home, and the 
super-imposition of ‘civilization’ overseas. ‘Civilization’ thus logically stems from 
‘unity’: only ‘nations’ (as ‘mature’, cohesive ‘political societies’) can promote 
‘civilization’. The institutional framework which actually forces them to be 
‘civilized’ is the system of ‘nation-states’; the doctrinal framework, one which 
prescribes that they can only be free by developing from ‘nationality’ into a ‘nation’, 
is that of ‘national self-determination’.378 It is this doctrinal framework that 
represents the point of conceptual convergence between nationalism and liberalism. 
The point of convergence between liberalism, nationalism and imperialism can be 
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found in efforts of the liberal-democratic ‘nation-states’ to impose ‘civilization’ on 
the ‘uncivilized’ and semi-‘civilized’ groups abroad.   
 
The Threshold of Maturity 
 
Neither of the proposed forms of ‘liberty’, says Mill, is to be exercised by those 
whom he defines as ‘uncivilized’, or as ‘not being of full age’. They are to be taught 
to embrace both ‘liberty’ and ‘civilization’, by imposing on them a despotic mode of 
government:   
 
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected 
against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may 
leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be 
considered as in its nonage. (...) Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing 
with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually 
effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to 
the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal 
discussion.379 
 
In Representative Government, along the same lines, Mill argues that “a rude people, 
though in some degree alive to the benefits of civilized society, may be unable to 
practise the forbearances which it demands.” In such a case, he says,  
 
A civilized government, to be really advantageous to them, will require to be in a 
considerable degree despotic: to be one over which they do not themselves exercise control, 
and which imposes a great amount of forcible restraint upon their actions. Again, a people 
must be considered unfit for than a limited and qualified freedom, who will not co-operate 
actively with the law and the public authorities, in the repression of evil-doers.380 
 
According to the logic proposed by Mill’s forerunners in the theory of representative 
government, a people co-operate actively with the law and the public authorities only 
under the provision of exercising control over the government through the institution 
of representation. If a people are not represented in, and therefore do not exercise 
control over, the government, the theory principally does not expect them to obey the 
public authorities, let alone to actively co-operate with the law. However, Mill 
practically claims that the principle of paternalism (instead of that of self-
government) is applicable to what he treats as pre-political societies, those which are 
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not capable of improvement by ‘free and equal discussion’: if they are not able to 
assert themselves as a ‘nationality’, thereby not adopting the standard of ‘the nation-
state system’ (which, in turn, represents the very standard of ‘civilization’), they are 
simply to be treated as ‘not being of full age’ and governed despotically by a 
‘civilized government’. Thus the only test of the people’s claimed capacity for self-
government becomes their actual ability to assert themselves, first as a ‘nationality’ 
and then as a ‘nation’. Therefore, ‘national revolution’ serves as the only solid proof 
of someone’s being fit for more than a ‘limited and qualified freedom’: a people are 
to be considered unfit for ‘civilization’ until they prove the opposite. Paradoxically, a 
‘national revolution’, being necessarily an act of political violence, is thus to be 
regarded as the ultimate measure of ‘civilization’. 
 
The Principle of Arbitrariness 
 
Thus, as a matter of such paradoxical consistency, an ‘uncivilized’ people are 
supposed to co-operate actively with the law over whose imposition they had no 
influence or with the public authorities in which they had no representatives of their 
own. An ‘uncivilized’ people are to be a priori considered unfit for more than a 
‘limited and qualified freedom’ without ever being given a chance to exercise the 
freedom of a politically represented people and thus actively co-operate with the law 
and the public authorities that represent them. An ‘uncivilized’ people should find it 
even advantageous that a great amount of forcible restraint be imposed upon their 
actions, being arbitrarily proclaimed unfit for any other form of government. And it is 
precisely in this last claim that one can find a key to understanding Mill’s paradoxical 
consistency: to claim a people ‘uncivilized’ and therefore fit only for despotic form of 
government (and to consequently impose it on them), is necessarily a matter of 
political arbitrariness: such an argument is necessarily based on the political and 
military power to project such a form of government onto a targeted people; and, such 
an argument is regularly combined with another, ‘objective’ one - the people’s actual 
incapacity for effective political and/or military resistance to the super-imposed 
despotism. As the history of the imperialist enterprises (in which Mill, just like his 
father before him, actively took part, working for the British East India Company) 
shows, the argument that the imposition of despotic government was beneficial to the 
subjected people was consistently entwined with the military power to actually 
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subject them to the governments which otherwise claimed to be representative of their 
own peoples.381 Thus Mill does not hesitate to advocate the government intervention 
in colonisation, as a matter of “the permanent welfare of nations afterwards to arise 
from these small beginnings”; but, more importantly, “the question of government 
intervention in the work of colonization involves the future and permanent interests of 
civilization itself, and far outstretches the comparatively narrow limits of purely 
economical considerations.”382 As Souffrant points out,  
 
Colonization is, in effect for Mill, the building of nations; nations, for him, should be 
civilized groups. His equation of nations with civilized groups leads one to think that the 
welfare of nations is akin to the welfare of civilized groups or of civilization as it is expressed 
by different groups. The interest of the civilized groups is therefore to be construed as the 
interest of civilization. Colonization as it pertains to the interest of civilization must be 
undertaken.383  
 
 Not only should the government interfere with the process of colonisation; the whole 
enterprise should be placed, “from its commencement, under the regulations 
constructed with the foresight and enlarged views of philosophical legislators; and 
the government alone has power either to frame such regulations, or to enforce their 
observance”.384 In order to re-assert his own position as a ‘philosophical legislator’, 
employed by the British government to oversee its colonial enterprise in India, and 
thus justify the pursuit of his private interest as an employee of the government’s 
specialised agency, Mill readily advocates – contrary to the principles of economic 
liberalism – the government intervention into the hitherto private colonising 
activities. More importantly, he advocates the colonial enterprise itself as one that 
“involves the future and permanent interest of civilization”. For, “to appreciate the 
benefits of colonization, it should be considered in its relation, not to a single country, 
but to the collective economical interests of the human race”,385 whereby the 
“economical interests of the human race” are equated with the economic interests of a 
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‘civilized’ colonial power.386 The argument in favour of colonial, despotic 
government over ‘barbarians’, implying unlimited arbitrariness in its imposition, is a 
problematic one: at the very least, there are no valid criteria for determining the 
grounds for declaring some to be ‘civilized’ while denouncing others as ‘uncivilized’ 
or ‘immature’; also, it is difficult to support the principle of ‘altruistic’ interference in 
affairs of those who are thus denounced as ‘uncivilized’ or ‘immature’ (be that on 
individual or group level) by imposing standards of those who arbitrarily claim 
themselves to be ‘civilized’.   
 
‘Freedom’ and ‘Freemen’ 
 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Mill does not look at the British labouring classes 
as ‘uncivilized’, ‘immature’ or entirely ‘unfit’ for representative government. Thus, 
for example, he claims that, 
 
The limitation in number...of beer and spirit houses ... is suited only to a state of society in 
which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages, and placed under an 
education of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not 
the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly governed in any free country; 
and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so 
governed, unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and 
govern them as freemen, and it has definitively been proved that they can only be governed as 
children.387 
 
It is worth noting that Mill here practically concedes that what he labels as ‘freedom’ 
is essentially a privilege confined to a particular non-labouring social class, the class 
of ‘freemen’. Mill’s ‘principle of liberty’ thus remains essentially exclusionary, 
although not exclusivist. He allows that the ‘labouring classes’, if put under a 
tutelage, may gradually become so prepared as to be eventually admitted to the 
privileged class of ‘freemen’. However, the former still may be treated ‘as children’, 
as long as the government or the non-labouring class of ‘freemen’ find it convenient 
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for their purposes – and these do not necessarily have to be the proclaimed ones of 
preparing the governed for the privileges of ‘freedom’. Although it is not clear from 
the passage (nor from other Mill’s writings) whether the governing structure itself is 
to be regarded as distinct from, or as part of, the non-labouring class of ‘freemen’, it 
seems that, in Mill’s understanding, ‘freedom’ consists not so much of the privilege 
to govern, as of the privilege to pursue and promote certain non-labouring, that is, 
entrepreneurial activities – such as commerce, manufacturing, banking etc. If this 
interpretation is correct, then the assumed progress of the labouring classes towards 
the privileged status of ‘freemen’ – and therefore towards ‘freedom’ itself – 
essentially depends on their adopting the non-labouring strategies for pursuit of their 
material well-being. This is quite consistent with Mill’s ‘utilitarian’ ethics, promoting 
‘higher’, non-physical pleasures as superior to the ‘lower’, physical ones.388 
Therefore, it may be said that Mill – very much like Marx – depicts the realm of 
freedom as a realm of non-labour; yet – unlike Marx and quite in the economistic 
liberal tradition – he projects the realisation of the ‘principle of liberty’ into the 
present forms of entrepreneurship and the existing class of free entrepreneurs, and not 
into a distant future of the state-controlled material abundance. However, by 
practically depicting liberty as a matter of non-labouring economic activities, Mill – 
despite the proclaimed intentions – cannot escape from promoting liberty as 
essentially confined to the economistic principles of ‘free trade’, as the ultimate 
measure of ‘freedom’ within society. Thus his attempt to establish a new principle of 
liberty practically ends up – perhaps not surprisingly – in his adopting a particular 
strategy of a particular social class.                        
 
Obedience and ‘Civilization’ 
 
Claiming that the true aim of a colonial government is to prepare ‘barbarians’ for a 
‘better freedom’, as compared to their ‘savage independence’, Mill is clear that the 
first lesson in ‘civilization’ is that of making ‘barbarians’ obedient; hence, obedience 
is to be imposed, if necessary even through ‘personal slavery’: 
 
A people in a state of savage independence, in which every one lives for himself, exempt, 
unless by fits, from any external control, is practically incapable of making any progress in 
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civilization until it has learnt to obey. The indispensable virtue, therefore, in a government 
which establishes itself over a people of this sort is, that it makes itself obeyed. To enable it 
to do this, the constitution of the government must be nearly, or quite, despotic. (...) Again, 
uncivilized races, and the bravest and most energetic still more than the rest, are averse to 
continuous labour of an unexciting kind. Yet all real civilization is at this price; without such 
labour, neither can the mind be disciplined into the habits required by civilized society, nor 
the material world prepared to receive it. (...) Hence even personal slavery, by giving a 
commencement to industrial life, and enforcing it as exclusive occupation of the most 
numerous portion of the community, may accelerate the transition to a better freedom than 
that of fighting and rapine.389 
 
Unlike Hobbes, Mill does not depict the ‘state of nature’ as one of perpetual ‘war of 
all against all’: ‘the state of savage independence’ is a state of freedom, albeit one that 
is necessarily worse than what he defines as a ‘better freedom’ of ‘civilized’ life. 
Hence, the reason for the establishment of political society which abolishes ‘the state 
of savage independence’ (in Mill’s terminology, political society is labelled as 
‘civilization’) is not a Hobbesian concern with mere survival: Mill’s ‘civilization’ is 
not to be regarded as instrumental, as a means to the supreme end of one’s self-
preservation; it has intrinsic, supreme, value; indeed, it is the supreme end itself. And 
progress towards the supreme end requires that all other, ‘lower’ values and ends be 
sacrificed for the sake of the supreme one, and Mill is quite clear that all can, and 
ought to be, sacrificed to that end.   
In the first instance, ‘the savage freedom’ is to be immediately sacrificed on the way 
towards what he calls ‘progress in civilization’; and, as the paragraph above seems to 
suggest, this progress is to be measured simply by a degree of obedience to despotic 
power: the indispensable virtue of a despotic government, established over those who 
hitherto used to live in ‘the state of savage independence’, is in making them 
obedient. Moreover, to be clear as to what kind of command these should learn to 
obey, Mill specifies that the only path to ‘civilization’ leads through their subjection 
to ‘continuous labour of an unexciting kind’, to which they are ‘naturally averse’. It is 
less clear, however, whether subjection to such a labour is the price they pay for a 
‘better freedom’, that is, for something they may eventually arrive at, which is beyond 
the realm of ‘continuous labour’; or, such an unexciting labour is to be regarded as 
‘freedom’ itself, indeed, a freedom ‘better’ than their previous ‘savage 
independence’. As suggested above, the realm of ‘freedom’ arrives with the pursuit of 
certain, non-labouring, entrepreneurial strategies; yet, it is not clear whether this 
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option is within reach of the ‘labouring classes’ and former ‘savages’ who are ‘taught 
obedience’; or, it is to be understood as necessarily confined to the non-labouring, 
entrepreneurial class of ‘freemen’. Since it remains rather obscure whether there is 
any ‘freedom’ for the former beyond the state of continuous labour, it is hard to 
understand why ‘the state of savage independence’ is to be regarded as necessarily 
inferior to that of ‘continuous, unexciting labour’. A Hobbesian reply to that question 
would be that even ‘the state of continuous, unexciting labour’ is better than ‘the state 
of war of all against all’, since the former, unlike the latter, ultimately promotes 
preservation from violent death. Yet, Mill’s ‘savage independence’ is not ‘the state of 
war’ but ‘the state of freedom’. Therefore, imposition of obedience to a despotic 
government, an obedience that promotes ‘continuous labour of an unexciting kind’, 
can not be justified as intrinsically better than ‘the state of war’ (to which Mill does 
not refer at all). Instead, paradoxically, that obedience is to be justified as intrinsically 
better than ‘the state of freedom’ itself, since it (indirectly) promotes a state of ‘better 
freedom’. Thus a hierarchy of ‘freedoms’ has to be established in order to serve as a 
measure of desirability of ‘progress in civilization’: such a progress is desirable, 
whatever its immediate price, since it ultimately leads from the inferior ‘freedom’ to a 
superior one. However, the problem with the proposed hierarchy of ‘freedoms’ is that 
the only measure of superiority of one ‘freedom’ over another is, quite tautologically, 
the ‘progress in civilization’ itself: a remote ‘freedom’, as an uncertain product of a 
despotic government, is thus to be regarded as more desirable than the immediate 
‘freedom’ of ‘the savage independence’, precisely because it is to be seen as the 
‘progress’ itself. Otherwise, without the concept of ‘progress in civilization’ (and 
given the fact that Mill’s ‘state of savage independence’ is not depicted as one of ‘war 
of all against all’), it would be absurd to claim the obedience to a despotic 
government to be superior to the ‘freedom’ of ‘the state of savage independence’. By 
employing the concept of a remote, ‘better freedom’, Mill has saved himself from 
falling into the absurd; however, the weakness of his argument, especially when 
compared to that of Hobbes, remains: compared to Hobbes’s difficulties to prove the 
supreme value of life itself, Mill’s problem to prove the supreme value of ‘progress in 
civilization’, based on his arbitrary definition of both ‘progress’ and ‘civilization’ 
(which is, in turn, based on an arbitrarily defined hierarchy of ‘freedoms’), does not 
seem soluble. The only possible – and yet paradoxical – solution, consistent with the 
arguments above, would be to propose that a remote, ‘better freedom’ is to be found 
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in the individual’s voluntary subjection to the imperative of social solidarity (seen as 
the foundation of ‘civilization’), the degree of which is, then, to be regarded as a 
measure of ‘progress’: the greater sentiment of solidarity within a society, the greater 
‘progress in civilization’. And then, the greatest degree of ‘civilization’ is possessed 
by those societies which have developed certain well-elaborated forms of social 
solidarity, such as ‘the sentiment of nationality’, and imposed them on majority of 
their members. Only within this mind-frame can such a state of ‘civilized’, collectivist 
inter-dependence be seen as a ‘better freedom’ than ‘the state of savage 
independence’.   
 
Masters and Slaves 
 
It is worthy of note that, for Mill, only a civilisation of ‘unexciting, continuous 
labour’ is to be regarded as the real one. And then, only the capitalist civilisation to 
which he himself belonged can be so described as to entirely fit the projected ideal of 
a civilisation which consists mainly of ‘continuous, unexciting labour’. Therefore, to 
promote the civilisation that defines itself in terms of ‘continuous, unexciting labour’ 
(and, for Mill, it is the only real civilisation), it is necessary to impose that kind of 
labour on all who are still averse to it, and even slavery may well serve that purpose:                 
 
A slave, properly so called, is a being who has not learnt to help himself. He is, no doubt, one 
step in advance of a savage. (...) He has learnt to obey. But what he obeys is only a direct 
command. It is the characteristic of born slaves to be incapable of conforming their conduct 
to a rule, or law. They can only do what they are ordered, and only when they are ordered to 
do it. If a man whom they fear is standing over them and threatening them with punishment, 
they obey; but when his back is turned, the work remains undone. The motive determining 
them must appeal not to their interests, but to their instincts; immediate hope or immediate 
terror. A despotism, which may tame the savage, will, in so far as it is a despotism, only 
confirm the slaves in their incapacities. Yet a government under their own control would be 
entirely unmanageable by them. Their improvement cannot come from themselves, but must 
be superinduced from without. (...) They have to be taught self-government, and this, in its 
initial stage, means the capacity to act on general instructions.390  
 
Perhaps the definition of the slave, not as a being that has been enslaved by force, but 
rather as a being who has not learnt to help himself, implies that only by learning to 
use force to liberate himself from slavery can the slave learn to help himself. 
However, by characterising those who were ‘born slaves’ as those who are “incapable 
                                                 
390
 Mill, Utilitarianism, op. cit., p. 233. 
 167 
of conforming their conduct to a rule or law”, Mill seems to suggest that learning to 
help oneself is, essentially, about learning to obey a rule rather than to obey naked 
force. Hence, the obedience to the rule, in contrast to a forced obedience, is to be 
regarded as being in the interest of the obedient. However, if the rule, or the general 
instruction to which the slave is supposed to conform his conduct, is identical with 
the direct command to which the slave commonly obeys, it is hard to understand why 
it should be in the slave’s interest to conform his conduct to the rule which contains 
the very same command he obeys under the threat of immediate punishment. The 
only interest of the slave, as follows from this logic, would be to avoid punishment by 
conforming his conduct to such a command, and that is exactly what slaves usually 
do; however, it does not seem logical to claim that, without his being forced to obey 
the command, the slave necessarily promotes his own interest by unconditional 
submission to it. Perhaps an unconditional, voluntary submission to Rousseau’s 
‘general will’, as a way of promoting one’s self-interest, may look desirable as the 
optimal result which Mill’s underlying perfectionism intends to produce; however, to 
claim that the slave’s unconditional voluntary submission to the general instruction of 
obedience is in the slave’s own interest, is to push the logic of submission to ‘the 
general will’ well beyond the point of Rousseau’s paradox.391 Of course, such a claim 
stems from another – logically paradoxical and empirically absurd – assumption, that 
of identity of interests between the master and the slave. Thus, according to Mill’s 
assumption, if the interest of the master requires that the work be done, it is 
necessarily in the slave’s interest to conform his conduct to his master’s interest, 
identifying the master’s interest with his own. Yet, whereas identity of interests is 
assumed to a priori exist between the master and the slave (proceeding from the 
assumption that, by definition of the slave as a being who cannot help himself, the 
slave cannot articulate any interest of his own; hence, that his interest can only be 
identical with that of the master), identification of the slave with the master is to be 
regarded as impossible, by virtue of the slave’s being a slave and the master’s being a 
master, and Mill is careful to keep this distinction inherently present so as not to 
abolish the very relationship between the two. Still, he assumes that the obedience 
that stems from identification of their interests can actually bring the slave closer to 
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the master and – given the assumption that the master is, by virtue of possessing 
superior means of compulsion, necessarily regarded as possessing a superior degree 
of ‘civilization’ – thus bring the slave closer to ‘civilization’ itself (though he can 
never actually reach it, due to the assumed impossibility for the slave to eventually 
abolish the distinction between himself and the master). Hence, enslavement 
promotes ‘civilization’, to the extent that it promotes the slave’s voluntary obedience 
through identification of his interest with that of the master. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the institution of slavery does not represent an ethical problem for 
Mill: from a perfectionist point of view, it is to be condemned only in so far as it fails 
to generate the unconditional voluntary obedience and thus, as Mill puts it, confirms 
the slave in his ‘incapacities for civilization’. This shows that Mill attaches absolute 
priority to his perfectionist concept of human self-development (or, to be more 
precise, of super-induced development).392 In this sense, human capacity for freedom 
is to be regarded as a faculty that can gradually be acquired only through the process 
of learning, that is, of becoming ‘civilized’ through the perpetual unconditional 
voluntary obedience to those who are already ‘civilized’. ‘The capacity for 
civilization’, as Mill seems to understand it, is thus a capacity for the slave to 
unconditionally voluntarily obey the commands of the master: only those who can 
learn to help themselves by learning to voluntarily and unconditionally obey the 
command of the masters can eventually become prepared for self-government. 
Although it may seem that this leads to Rousseau’s paradoxical conclusion that the 
freedom of self-government can only be exercised through the total alienation of 
one’s will to the will of the governing entity, it is the present distinction between the 
master and the slave that prevents Mill from ultimately reaching such a conclusion, 
while launching yet another paradox: the extent to which members of the master race 
do not alienate their will to the will of the governing entity which they themselves 
constitute is to be regarded as liberty; the extent to which members of the race of 
slaves do alienate their will to the governing entity constituted by the master race is to 
be regarded as civilization. This double-standard mode of thought is commonly 
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referred to as moral relativism, and Mill’s perfectionism is in this sense paradigmatic: 
“A people of savages should be taught obedience, but not in such a manner to convert 
them into a people of slaves.”393  
 
In Search for the Master-Race 
 
The term ‘the people of savages’ may denote a group which the author for whatever 
reason happens to depreciate; but, it still may serve to describe – no matter how 
inadequately – some objective aspects of those people’s way of living. On the other 
hand, the term ‘the people of slaves’ hardly describes any objectively recognisable 
mode of living; it rather represents a value judgement on the psychological make-up 
of those people, with no visible basis in social reality. As such, it only extends the 
connotations of Mill’s phrase referring to those who are ‘born slaves’, so as to 
embrace all of them and denote them as ‘the people of slaves’. However, it also 
implies the possibility of its semantic opposite – ‘the people of masters’. Given the 
definition of the slave cited above, as one that ‘has not learned to help himself’, it is 
relatively easy to imagine this feature’s being projected into the whole people, as a 
collective individual, with its peculiar, slavish character. It is also relatively easy to 
imagine ‘the people of masters’ possessing a self-helping character, as opposed to 
those who have not learned to help themselves. And then, it is easy to see ‘the self-
helping people’ as fit to play the role of masters over those who lack in such a 
character. Mill’s obsession with ‘character’ led him to entertaining a life-long idea of 
establishing a science of morality and character, labelled as ‘ethology’.394 However, it 
should be noted that Mill, in an attempt to portray ‘national characters’ in the manner 
of Montesquieu, as having been formed under the impact of the climate conditions, 
does indeed refer to the Northern and, generally, Occidental peoples (Anglo-Saxons 
in particular) as ‘struggling’ and ‘self-helping’, while depicting both Orientals and 
Southerners as inactive and ‘envious’: 
    
In proportion as success in life is seen or believed to be the fruit of fatality or accident, and 
not of exertion, in that same ratio does envy develop itself as a point of national character. 
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The most envious of all mankind are the Orientals. (...) Next to Orientals in envy, as in 
activity, are some of the Southern Europeans. The Spaniards pursued all their great men with 
it, embittered their lives, and generally succeeded in putting an early stop to their success. 
With the French, who are essentially a southern people, the double education of despotism 
and Catholicism has, in spite of their impulsive temperament, made submission and 
endurance the common character of the people, and their most received notion of wisdom and 
excellence: and if envy of one another, and of all superiority, is not more rife among them 
than it is, the circumstance must be ascribed to the many valuable counteracting elements in 
the French character, and most of all to the great individual energy which, though less 
persistent and more intermittent than in the self-helping and struggling Anglo-Saxons, has 
nevertheless manifested among the French in nearly every direction in which the operation of 
their institutions has been favourable to it.395   
 
Mill develops Montesquieu’s argument further, by proposing that the culture of hard-
struggling labour and ‘self-helping’ has developed, due to the specific climate 
conditions, among Northern and Western ‘nations’ (of which Anglo-Saxons are the 
most prominent example). He thus practically suggests that the ‘national character’ of 
Anglo-Saxons is to be regarded as exactly the opposite of the character of those who 
are defined as incapable of helping themselves. With the notion of the master being 
the exact opposite of that of the slave, it logically follows that Mill here implies that 
the ‘national character’ of Anglo-Saxons makes them fit to actually assume the 
position of the master-race, entitled to despotically govern those whose ‘national 
character’ is assumed to be one of slaves, in order to educate the latter for ‘self-
helping’. This educational process, as has been emphasised by Mill himself, is 
primarily about teaching the slaves to voluntarily subject themselves to ‘continuous 
labour of an unexciting kind’, to which they are ‘naturally averse’; from that, it 
follows that acquiring the capacity for voluntary subjection to ‘continuous, unexciting 
labour’ may be regarded as identical with acquiring ‘the capacity for self-help’. Since 
this ‘capacity for self-help’ is, in its absolute form, regarded as the property of the 
(presumably ‘civilized’) master-race, it follows that, in proportion to the level of 
development of their ‘capacity for self-help’, the ‘civilized nations’ are entitled to 
govern the ‘uncivilized’ peoples in a despotic manner, as the master governs the 
slave. Following such logic further, one is tempted to assume that the degree of 
despotism exercised in this educational process proportionately rises with the master-
race’s ‘capacity for self-help’: in that sense, it may seem that ‘the self-helping Anglo-
Saxons’ would be entitled to exercise the ultimate degree of despotic power over 
those who are the least capable of helping themselves. However, since, as Mill says, it 
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would only ‘confirm’ the slaves in their ‘incapacity for self-help’, it is assumed, 
paradoxically, that the least degree of despotic power is to be actually exercised by 
those who are the most capable of helping themselves; and, it is this paradoxical turn 
that enables the advocates of the Anglo-Saxon domination over the subjected peoples 
to portray this domination as ‘civilizing’ rather than ‘despotic’, in comparison with 
the overtly despotic power of those whose ‘capacity for self-help’ is lesser than that 
of Anglo-Saxons.                              
  
Forced to be Free 
 
As demonstrated above, Mill holds that super-imposed slavery may play a civilising 
role, teaching ‘savages’ to obey; as such, it is not contrary to the ‘principle of liberty’, 
since it ultimately promotes a ‘better freedom’. Yet, paradoxically, self-imposed 
slavery is to be principally denied by the same principle: 
 
In this and most other civilized countries, for example, an engagement by which a person 
should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither 
enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily 
disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. The 
reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person’s voluntary acts, is 
consideration for his liberty. (...) But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; 
he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, 
the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. He is no 
longer free; but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour, 
that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot 
require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his 
freedom.396  
 
Like in Rousseau’s society established by the social contract, in Mill’s society 
founded on the ‘principle of liberty’, no one is permitted not to be free: the individual 
– being established by such a society as inherently free – can not and must not 
abdicate his liberty, lest he be accused of undermining the very foundations of the 
society. Society, according to the theory, has been established with the aim of 
protecting the individual’s freedom, while simultaneously promoting social solidarity; 
therefore, it is entitled to protect the individual from alienation of his freedom, unless 
the alienation is being exercised – as a matter of altruistic solidarity – by society 
itself. If society does not protect the individual’s liberty from an alienation which is 
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not the alienation of his liberty by society, it ceases to play the role prescribed by the 
theory, and thus ceases to be the society founded on the ‘principle of liberty’. That is 
why the individual in liberal society must be, and therefore inevitably is, forced to be 
free: the concern is not an immediate preservation of his actual liberty; the concern is 
the preservation of the ‘liberty’ prescribed to him; that is, the ultimate concern is the 




Mill applies the very same logic on the collective level to a people who have 
excessively been ‘taught obedience’ by having been exposed to a long-lasting 
tyranny, thereby having been brought to the point of becoming a ‘people of slaves’. 
Whereas a representative assembly from among those who have not been taught 
obedience would “simply reflect their own turbulent insubordination”, a ‘people of 
slaves’, by their ‘extreme passiveness, and ready submission to tyranny’ would be ‘no 
less unfitted’ for representative government. Since “they would inevitably choose 
their tyrants as their representatives, and the yoke would be made heavier on them by 
the contrivance which prima facie might be expected to lighten it”,398 they should a 
priori be denied the right to ‘self-determination’, as much as individuals should a 
priori be denied the freedom to enslave themselves.  
However, it follows from Mill’s perfectionist logic that a ‘passive’ people, a ‘people 
of slaves’, should not be denied the right to ‘self-determination’ for good, but instead 
be taught to liberate themselves from ‘passivity’, no matter whether they prefer to be 
free from their tyrants or not. The question, then, arises: who is to determine what 
their preference should be, if their own determination is not to be taken as definitive? 
It seems that the only answer to this question is that some external power should 
arbitrate in this matter, thus imposing either its own preference or some other, more 
general principle. As has been demonstrated, for Mill, arbitration of such an external 
power presupposes essential identity between this power’s preference and the general 
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principle, which he labels as ‘improvement in civilization’. Hence, it would 
necessarily be an ‘improvement in civilization’, if an external power – provided that it 
be a ‘civilized’ one – were to impose its own arbitrary preference, instead of that of 
the people in question. Thus the principle of ‘improvement in civilization’, which has 
an a priori value in Mill’s theory of history, seems to refute his other principle, that of 
‘self-determination’. However, this does not seem to pose a logical problem before 
Mill’s perfectionist logic: while ‘improvement in civilization’ is necessarily regarded 
as an absolute requirement, ‘self-determination’ is to be seen as a conditional one, 
whereby the scope of the latter’s application depends on the extent to which the latter 
promotes the former. Since the perpetuation of tyrannical power, according to Mill’s 
theory, does not contribute to the ‘improvement in civilization’, the people who prefer 
their tyrants as their representatives are to be denied ‘self-determination’ and 
representative government; and, since the election of tyrants would only legitimise 
the tyranny, this possibility should be denied in advance. For, a legitimised tyranny 
could not plausibly be subjected to the arbitration by an external power, claiming to 
promote the ‘improvement in civilization’. If the tyranny were legitimised, it could 
not be plausibly denounced, that is, de-legitimised as tyranny, and the external power 
would find itself at pains to legitimise its own intervention against it. Therefore, in 
order to keep the option of the external power’s intervention in domestic affairs of a 
‘passive’ people active, thereby keeping the option of the ‘improvement in 
civilization’ active, it is necessary to deny such a people the right to ‘self-
determination’. For the sake of stimulating the ‘improvement in civilization’, 
‘civilized humanity’ is therefore permitted to intervene, by military means if 
necessary, whenever historical development seems to lead in the opposite direction. 
For the same reason, in order to prevent the absorption of a more advanced people 
into a less advanced one, different ‘nationalities’ should be principally placed under 
separate governments: 
 
Experience proves, that it is possible to for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in 
another: and when it was originally and inferior and more backward potion of the human 
race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. (…) The nationalities brought together under 
the same government, may be about equal in numbers and strength, or they may be very 
unequal. If unequal, the least numerous of the two may either be the superior in civilisation, 
or the inferior. Supposing it to be superior, it may either, through that superiority, be able to 
acquire ascendancy over the other, or it may be overcome by brute strength, and reduced to 
subjection. This last is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one which civilised humanity 
with one accord should rise in arms to prevent. The absorption of Greece by Macedonia was 
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one of the greatest misfortunes which ever happened to the world: that of any of the principal 
countries of Europe by Russia would be a similar one. If the smaller nationality, supposed to 
be the more advanced in improvement, is able to overcome the greater, as the Macedonians, 
reinforced by the Greeks, did Asia, and the English India, there is often a gain to civilisation; 
but the conquerors and the conquered cannot in this case live together under the same free 
institutions. The absorption of the conquerors in the less advanced people would be an evil: 
these must be governed as subjects, and the state of things is either a benefit or a misfortune, 
according as the subjugated people have or have not reached the state in which it is an injury 
not to be under a free government, and according as the conquerors do or do not use their 
superiority in a manner calculated to fit the conquered for a higher stage of improvement.399 
 
Curiously, the very same Macedonian advance is treated by Mill as a ‘sheer mischief 
to the human race’ in the case of Greece and as a ‘gain to civilisation’ in the case of 
Asia. In both cases, Macedonians are assumed to have used brute force, thus reducing 
both Greece and Asia to subjection; yet, the subjection of Asia by brute force should 
have been welcomed as a ‘gain in civilization’, and that of Greece should have been 
prevented by the joint military action of the whole civilized humanity. However, such 
an inconsistency is attempted to be made plausible through application of the concept 
of ‘superiority in civilization’; thus it seems that European military conquest in Asia 
or Africa is to be regarded as a ‘gain in civilization’, whereas the counter-conquests 
by the non-European or semi-European powers – for this occasion, the hypothetical 
Russian conquest of Europe – are to be prevented by the whole ‘civilized humanity’. 
As for the claim that the conquerors and the conquered cannot live together under the 
same ‘free institutions’ in case that the conquered – despite their supremacy in 
numbers and size – belong to an ‘inferior’ civilisation, it has already been 
demonstrated that Mill’s ‘free institutions’ actually mean ‘national’ institutions; 
therefore, subjugated people are to be governed as subjects unless, or until, they are 
able to assert themselves as a ‘nationality’, that is, to advance their claims to possess 
their own ‘national’, ‘free’ institutions.  
 
Rationalism, or Nationalism? 
 
In principle, Mill assumes that the situation in which distinct ‘nationalities’ live under 
the same government is necessarily an ‘evil’, since that inevitably produces the state 
of affairs which to the greatest extent resembles Hobbes’s ‘war of all against all’: 
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Each fears more injury to itself from the other nationalities, than from the common arbiter, 
the State. Their mutual antipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the 
government. That any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the common ruler, is 
sufficient to determine another to support that policy. Even if all are aggrieved, none feel that 
they can rely on the others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is sufficient to 
resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it consults its own advantage most by 
bidding for the favour of the government against the rest.400 
 
In his condemnation of keeping different ‘nationalities’ ‘intermingled’ under one 
government, Mill almost reaches the logic employed by another ideologue of 
nationalism, J.G. Herder, notwithstanding all the rhetorical differences between their 
respective rationalist and romanticist accounts. Thus Herder says that, 
 
Nothing, therefore, is more manifestly contrary to the purpose of political government than 
the unnatural enlargement of states, the wild mixing together of various races and nations 
under one sceptre. A human sceptre is far too weak and slender for such incongruous parts to 
be engrafted upon it. Such states are but patched up contraptions, fragile machines, 
appropriately called state-machines, for they are wholly devoid of inner life, and their 
component parts are connected through mechanical contrivances instead of bonds of 
government. Like Trojan horses these machines are pieced together, guaranteeing one 
another’s immortality; yet since they are bereft of national character, it would only be the 
curse of Fate which would condemn to immortality these forced unions, these lifeless 
monstrosities. They were contrived by that kind of politics which plays with men and nations 
as if they were inanimate particles. But history shows sufficiently that these instruments of 
human pride are formed of clay, and, like all clay, they will dissolve or crumble to pieces.401  
 
Herder, in accordance with the romanticist discourse, condemns “the wild mixing 
together of various races and nations under one sceptre” as ‘unnatural’; Mill, as a 
utilitarian and liberal, is rather concerned with the promotion of a more rational goal, 
that of ‘free institutions’. Since he holds ‘free institutions’ to be “next to impossible 
in a country made-up of different nationalities”, he does not hesitate to proclaim that 
“it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of 
governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities”.402 However, 
unlike Herder and his romanticist followers, Mill admits that “several considerations 
are liable to conflict in practice with this general principle”. In the first place, its 
application is “often precluded by geographical hindrances.” Thus, “there are parts 
even of Europe, in which different nationalities are so locally intermingled, that it is 
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not practicable for them to be under separate governments.” Therefore, “there is no 
course open to them but to make a virtue out of necessity, and reconcile themselves to 
living together under equal rights and laws.”403 Although this may seem to moderate 
the rigidity of ‘the general principle’, a less visible implication of such a claim is, 
actually, that the intermingled-ness of different ‘nationalities’ – while being depicted 
as a barbarous state of ‘war of all against all’ – is to be seen as a feature that is 
essentially non-European. Thus, the European society of ‘nation-states’ is practically 
promoted into the very standard of ‘civilization’, as opposed to the non-European 
societies, in which ‘nationalities’ tend to be ‘barbarously’ intermingled.  
 
Diversity, or Uniformity? 
 
Unlike the European society of ‘nation-states’ in which, presumably, individuals 
freely develop different modes of living in isolation from one another, while 
‘nationalities’ in isolation from one another freely create their separate histories, “the 
greater part of the world has, properly speaking, no history, because the despotism of 
Custom is complete”. This, says Mill, is the case “over the whole East”. The result is 
that those ‘nations’ that “must once have had originality” have now become “the 
subjects or dependants of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when theirs 
had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only 
a divided rule with liberty and progress”. A people thus cease to be ‘progressive’ 
when they cease to ‘possess individuality’. However,  
 
If a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be in exactly the same 
shape: the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely 
stationariness. It prescribes singularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change 
together. (...) It is not progress that we object to; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we 
are the most progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we 
should think we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the 
unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws attention of either 
to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by 
combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either.404   
 
The Chinese, says Mill, “have become stationary” precisely by “making a people all 
alike, all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; and 
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these are the fruits”. What has “made the European family of nations an improving, 
instead of a stationary portion of mankind” is “their remarkable diversity of character 
and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: 
they have struck out a great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable; and 
although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of 
one another, ... their attempts to thwart each other’s development have rarely had any 
permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others 
have offered.”405 But Europe itself, warns Mill, “is decidedly advancing towards the 
Chinese ideal of making all people alike”:  
 
All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to 
lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people to 
the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication 
promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keep up the 
rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce 
and manufactures promote it, by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances, 
and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the 
desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes.406  
 
Although Mill’s description to a great extent resembles a description of the current 
process of globalisation in terms of its trans-‘national’ diffusion of uniformity, it still 
should be noted that in his own time the argument was rather applicable to the 
imposition of such uniformity – based on the imposition of common education and 
means of communication, combined with the increase of commerce and 
manufacturing – within ‘the nation-state’, and, on the level of ‘the nation-state 
system’. Thus, it would be more accurate to say that ‘the nation’ – having been the 
key unit for promoting the imposition of uniformity in Mill’s time – rather than 
Europe as a whole, tended to produce uniformity and therefore generated 
‘stationariness’. Or, at least, that is what Mill’s theory implies. According to the 
theory, ‘the nation’ ceases to be progressive when it adopts uniformity and loses its 
individuality. This presupposes that ‘nations’ exist as collective individuals, 
possessing individuality of their own (that is, their distinct ‘national characters’). And 
yet, it is exactly this presumed individuality on the ‘national’ level that imposes 
uniformity on the level of the individual: every individual within ‘the nation’ is thus 
supposed to “sink his own individuality” (Kedourie) into the uniform individuality of 
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‘the nation’. If Mill’s theory of progress is correct, the individual subjected to the 
uniformity of ‘the nation’ thus loses his individuality, ceases to be progressive and 
thus becomes stationary. Although ‘the nation’ ostensibly promotes mobility on the 
individual level, whereby ‘the desire of rising’ becomes the ‘character of all classes’ 
and individuals, it necessarily produces the loss of individuality (that is, the loss of 
‘character’). On the other hand, if the theory is correct, the adoption of such 
uniformity within ‘the nation’ – seen as a precondition for ‘the nation’s’ collective 
individuality – also leads to ‘the nation’s’ increasing ‘stationariness’. Although the 
system of ‘nation-states’ may seem to promote a competition among ‘nations’ based 
on their presumed individuality, it nevertheless forces the competing ‘nations’ (as 
much as the competing individuals) to adopt uniform strategies in order to 
successfully compete with each other – which may often be a matter of mere survival 
for particular ‘nations’ – and to consequently sacrifice their individuality to such a 
system-induced, compulsory uniformity. Hence, every society which defines itself in 
terms of ‘nationhood’ subscribes to the same rules of uniformity, both internally, on 
the individual level, and externally, on the level of ‘the nation-state system’. If Mill’s 
theory of progress is valid, according to its logic all these societies – as well as their 
individual members – tend to become stationary once they have adopted the 
uniformity of the nationalist discourse. Following this logic, it is the adoption of 
uniformity – whether of the discourse that promotes all societies as uniformly 
designed collective individuals, or of the discourse that promotes all individuals as 
uniformly designed citizens of ‘the nation’ – that ultimately leads in the opposite way 
from progress. 
 The problem is that the praised individual diversity and originality407 cease to 
exist once the individual subscribes to the nationalist discourse, which claims ‘the 
nation’ to be the only possible mode of his existence in the modern world, a unit that 
by definition possesses its own originality, and whose originality constitutes the 
diversity of ‘nations’. Freedom and variety of situations for the individual are thus 
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practically cancelled out (or, at least, significantly reduced) by his participating in the 
ritual perpetuation of the nationalist discourse, which imposes only one – ‘national’ – 
mode of thinking and living, with the idea that the freedom of ‘the nation’, consisting 
of the self-referential, ritual perpetuation of the discourse, compensates for the loss of 
variety of situations on the individual level. The paradox is that the actual loss of the 
variety of options and choices is doctrinally presented as the only way for the 
individual to actually be free to develop his individual capacities through the ritual 
perpetuation of the collectivist, nationalist discourse. This leads to another paradox, 
that of the nationalist discourse and the individualist discourse realising their common 
‘liberty’ by cancelling out each other’s respective freedoms. 
 Mill, predictably, escapes from reaching such ultimate paradoxical conclusions by 
going into – inconsistency. Thus, on the level of the individual, “unity of opinion, 
unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not 
desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable 
than at present of recognising all sides of the truth”; and these principles are 
“applicable to men’s modes of action, not less than to their opinions”. For, “as it is 
useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it 
that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to 
varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes 
of life should be proved practically, when one thinks fit to try them”.408 While 
claiming diversity not to be an evil but a good on the level of the individual, Mill 
claims the diversity of ‘nationalities’ under one government to be undesirable for the 
promotion of freedom. ‘Different nationalities’, being essentially what Mill elsewhere 
calls ‘different experiments of living’, and the varieties of their ‘characters’ – 
springing from their different historical experiences – should, by analogy, be also 
given a free scope, short of injury to others. Yet, such collective ‘experiments of 
living’, in Mill’s theory, inevitably conflict with each other, as long as they meet 
within the framework of one government. Inconsistently for a liberal doctrine of free 
competition, Mill claims that the common framework of one government, within 
which they fully and freely compare their externally different (and, presumably, 
internally united) opinions, ought to be dissolved, so as not to permit a free 
intercourse and competition of their ‘different experiments of living’. It is to be 
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dissolved, so as to permit the unity and uniformity of the system of ‘nation-states’ to 
reign. In such a system, every different mode of thought and living is to be subjected 
to the one of ‘the nation’, whereby every ‘nation’, by definition, has a prescribed 
strategy of becoming ‘the nation’ through the imposition of unity of opinion onto 
every one of its individual citizen-members. And, then, when constructed, such a state 




Contrary to traditional criticism of Mill’s project of reconciling a principle of 
individual liberty with the utilitarian ideas about collective well-being as an ‘exercise 
in squaring the circle’,410 I have demonstrated that Mill’s ‘theory of nationality’ 
indicates that his famous advocacy of individual liberty is principally derived from 
his (revised) utilitarian, eminently collectivist principle of ‘the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number’, as well as from his general concept of ‘improvement in 
civilization’. Thus the full assertion of ‘the sentiment of nationality’, through the 
establishment of the ‘nationality’s’ own ‘nation-state’, is to be regarded as the fullest 
realisation of both the principle of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ 
and the ‘principle of liberty’ (as projected onto the collective level), as well as of the 
concept of ‘improvement in civilization’. In turn, ‘the nation’s’ collective liberty 
(realised through the establishment of ‘the nation-state’, while simultaneously 
promoting ‘improvement in civilization’ and ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number’) is to be seen as the necessary condition of individual liberty. For, the 
existence of ‘free institutions’ is regarded as essential for the promotion of individual 
liberty, while the existence of ‘free institutions’ is held to be “next to impossible in a 
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country made up of different nationalities”. Therefore, only in ‘the nation-state’ can 
the individual actually be free, and the square of individual liberty can only be circled 
through the collectivist enterprise of ‘nation-building’. Thus understood, Mill’s 
‘theory of nationality’ provides the necessary key to an explanation of the puzzling 
co-existence of liberal individualism, utilitarian collectivism and nationalist 
imperialism in Mill’s philosophies of liberty and history. More importantly, Mill’s 
‘theory of national self-determination’ provides a key to an understanding of both the 
conceptual convergence and historical congruence of the – ostensibly opposed – 
doctrines of liberal individualism and ‘national’ collectivism, as they have been 






























































Lord Acton is mostly remembered as the author of the proverb “powers tends to 
corrupt; absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely”. Acton is also to be remembered 
and studied as the only liberal who openly rejected both nationalism and ‘the nation-
state’, denouncing them as the embodiments of illiberal, arbitrary power, and of the 
essentially absolutist character of the modern democratic theory and practice. 
However, unlike his contemporary, John Stuart Mill, who is still celebrated as the 
very paradigm of the 19th-century liberalism, Acton is nowadays almost completely 
forgotten and his argument in favour of liberty is regarded as being quite far from the 
mainstream of liberal thought. This chapter attempts to correct this failure and points 
to Acton’s significance for the study of both liberalism and nationalism.   
In the words of the author of one of the very few studies of his political and moral 
philosophy, Acton was an anomaly in many worlds: he was a Catholic in bad 
standing with the hierarchy, a politician without portfolio, and, for the most part, an 
historian without academic status and, still, commonly described as the most erudite 
man of his times,411 who “knew everyone worth knowing and had read everything 
worth reading”.412 His influence upon Gladstone was well-known both among his 
friends and among his adversaries and, yet, paradoxically, the traces of this influence 
were hardly visible in any of the official policies pursued either by Gladstone himself 
or by his liberal successors. Acton was distinguished from his fellow liberals by his 
privileged social position and from his fellow Englishmen by his Catholic religion. 
Acton’s liberalism, just like that of his stepfather, Lord Granville, “came to him 
together with the tradition of political power, as an adjunct of his inherited estate”.413 
Acton’s Catholicism was also rather inherited (from his German mother) than chosen, 
and he stuck to both with a rare persistence of a convinced moralist, attempting to 
promote his accidental heritage into the very standard of universal morality.  
 Having had problems with the idea of studying at the universities in England, where 
attendance of the Protestant service was compulsory for all students, Acton eventually 
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went to study at the University of Munich, where he met his teacher, Doellinger, a 
famous historian and theologian, whose theory of history left a life-long impression 
upon Acton. Doellinger’s was the idea that Christianity was essentially a history 
rather than a doctrinal system or philosophy, that its dogmas were not fixed for all 
time but underwent change and development. Thus the test of dogmas was not the 
logical consistency of the system, but historical evidence and fact.414 The idea of 
Christianity as a history led Acton to believe that the theory of liberty based on 
Christianity which he himself preached was, actually, the very history of freedom. 
Thus whatever was in accordance with this – Acton’s and Doellinger’s – view of 
Christianity was to be regarded as part of the history of freedom; and, whatever 
represented a discontinuity with Christianity as the historical unfolding of the 
abstract, Absolute Liberty, was to be condemned as an adversary of freedom itself. 
Hence every secular state was to be principally denounced as absolutist, despotic or 
tyrannical, merely by virtue of not having been a Christian, that is, free state. Thus the 
dilemma between liberty of religion or the Christian State would not be relevant to 
Acton; he would simply reply: both, for the unique character of the Christian State is 
liberty.415 In a similar manner, he would defend his inherited aristocratic status, 
proclaiming aristocracy and monarchy the most compatible with true liberty and thus 
turning on its head the modern democratic theory that aristocracy and monarchy are 
the paradigm of the absolute, arbitrary and illiberal. He thus declared not monarchy 
alone, but monarchy by divine right, to be the necessary condition of liberty. Liberty 
is secure and inaccessible to arbitrary change, he would argue, only when there is a 
recognised “divine, objective right, anterior to every human law, superior to every 
human will”.416   
Turning current theories on their heads seems to have been Acton’s favourite 
procedure. In his early essay, The Protestant Theory of Persecution,417 Acton 
proposed a theory according to which the modern absolutist State had been created 
when Protestantism had abolished the autonomy and privileges of the corporate 
bodies that had formerly made up society. In Acton’s view, the only liberty 
recognised by the Protestants was the liberty of the individual, just as the only 
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authority recognised was that of the State. The individual thus acquired the right to 
worship in whatever religion he wished, but the Church – as one among many 
corporate bodies deprived of their previous power – was deprived of the right to 
administer its own laws. For Acton, this meant that emancipation of the individual 
became a refined technique for ensuring his utter subjection, and a limited power 
previously exercised by the Church was replaced by absolute power of the State.418 
Whereas the Protestants introduced the revolutionary idea that persecution could be 
justified by purely speculative reasons and directed against purely speculative errors, 
the Catholic Church had persecuted only for practical-political reasons, in defence of 
religious and political unity threatened by the practical subversiveness of heresy.419   
During the American Civil War, Acton did not hesitate to publicly defend the 
South, claiming that the real enemies of the Constitution were not the Southern slave 
owners who were forced to secede, but the opponents of slavery who appealed from 
the Constitution to an abstract law of nature. Unlike absolutism, he claimed, slavery 
was not immoral since it did not suspend the divine law in favour of human will, but 
only denied to the slave certain specified rights; moreover, slavery was not anti-
Christian in principle, but always in the concrete, because the master was not 
necessarily a good Christian.420 In some stages of history, slavery was not only 
morally permissible, but prescribed as a necessary step in discipline,421 provided that 
the society administering discipline was Christian.422 This is not to say that Acton 
considered slavery a Christian virtue that should be perpetuated; he clearly saw 
slavery as an evil to be eventually eliminated, albeit a lesser evil when compared to 
the revolutionary act of its abolition. Hence, the only way to eventually eliminate it 
was to patiently labour to reform mankind, as the Church had always done, by 
assimilating realities with ideals.423 
Accordingly, he thought that the English had achieved their freedom due to the 
intensity of their conservatism, not due to the fanaticism of revolution. The 
conservative found law in history, the revolutionist found it in the will of ‘the 
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sovereign people’;424 the conservative laboured patiently to preserve the existing 
order by gradual change, assimilating ideals into realities; the revolutionist acted 
violently to introduce change by appealing to a higher order, imposing ideals onto 
realities. Acton thus pointed at the profound chasm within the liberal tradition itself, 
between the school of Macaulay that held the will of the people supreme, and the 
school of Burke preaching that only the authority rooted in history could produce 
legitimacy. He even went so far as to assert that “between these two families there 
was more matter for civil war than between Cromwell and King Charles”.425 
However, whereas a government in which the people were unrepresented was to be 
seen as ‘defective’, one in which the law was not supreme was to be considered 
‘criminal’.426 Still, his position was that of an untypical conservative liberal rather 
than that of the typical liberal conservative: while rejecting all radicalism, he 
nevertheless advocated the rule of law as a means to the pursuit of liberty, rather than 
gradual change as a means to the preservation of authority.  
Since Acton consistently appealed to the higher authority, as indeed many of the 
historical conservatives did, he also principally rejected the theory that located the 
origin of the state and of civil rights in the social contract, assembling a number of 
individuals together to promote their common interest. For in that case, he thought, 
right would become “a matter of convenience, subject to men, not above them”.427 
Based on the higher law, Acton’s ideal society would be one of organic growth of 
both institutions and corporations (including a delicate balance between the Church 
and the state), evolving through a process of “weighing instead of counting”, so that 
classes and interests, rather than single individuals, were represented.428 Thus his 
ideal was principally projected into the Middle Ages, where society was composed of 
distinct corporations and classes, each represented in their own way in the organism 
of the state. The mortal sin of modern society was the abolition of corporations: it 
replaced persons with moral duties towards their respective corporations and classes 
with mere units, with equal and isolated individuals without any duties towards any 
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body other than the state.429 Thus modern society acquired its mechanical character, 
and the state was promoted into the sole object of the individuals’ allegiance, thereby 
preparing the ground for the introduction of the concept of ‘the nation’, as a concept 
of artificially created community of free individuals to which alone the individual 
owed allegiance.   
Although Acton did not state it explicitly, it is very likely that he regarded the 
sovereignty of the isolated individual and the isolation of ‘the sovereign nation’ not 
only as two analogous but as two essentially related concepts. What was still missing 
in his analysis of the difference between modern and pre-modern society was the 
insight that in modern society all classes were either abolished – if higher – or 
absorbed – if lower – by the middle class. The middle class was thus self-represented 
not as one among the classes but as a quasi-organism called ‘the nation’, which 
swallowed all other classes and corporations in the process of its own emergence. 
This quasi-organism – consisting mainly of the middle class and representing its 
particular values and interests – then asserted its presumed sovereignty in relation to 
other such quasi-organisms through the seizure of the modern state’s sovereignty. At 
the same time, quite paradoxically, the middle class was self-represented as a 
mechanical collection of sovereign individuals, thereby asserting their presumed 
absolute freedom from any commitment to classes and corporations as such, as well 
as to other individuals, while simultaneously promoting absolute commitment to ‘the 
nation’ (as some sort of a ‘greater middle class’), as related to the modern state. In 
fact, the ‘free individual’ itself was part of the middle class mythology of social 
mobility,430 which in historical reality was realised through eminently collectivist acts 
of ‘national revolutions,’ aimed at the seizure of power of the modern state by 
elevating the whole middle class onto the level of the sole source (‘the nation’) of the 
state’s legitimacy.  
In Acton’s own view, which he called ‘the English theory of nationality’, 
“nationality or the nation was an essential but not the supreme element in the State: 
the nation was only one of a multitude corporations that went into the making of the 
free state, and the heterogeneity of nations within the State, like the variety of 
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corporations, was the test and security of freedom”.431 Indeed, “anything that might 
serve to divide society and prevent the levelling, unifying action of the State, however 
distasteful in itself the particular expedient might be,” would be approved by Acton, 
and he thus supported slavery as much as he opposed the modern state.  Therefore, 
“the traditions and idiosyncrasies of history, the diversity of classes, corporations, 
nationalities and races in society, the delicate balance of forces maintained by a 
constitution in which obsolete patterns of conduct and principles of organization were 
deliberately perpetuated – all were of use in resisting the ultimate evil, absolutism”.432  
However, given the absence of traditional corporations in modern society, Acton 
found the state consisting of diverse ‘nationalities’ the only possible form for the 
promotion of what he considered to be liberty. This brought him into the direct 
opposition to the mainstream English liberals (such as John Stuart Mill), who claimed 
the state consisting of only one ‘nationality’ to be the only possible framework for the 
promotion of ‘free institutions’ and, therefore, of freedom in society.      
           
The Dialectics of ‘Nationality’ and ‘Multi-Nationality’ 
 
Acton’s essay Nationality, first published in the Home and Foreign Review in July 
1862, was originally written in response to John Stuart Mill’s Considerations on 
Representative Government, where Mill claimed that, in general, “free institutions are 
next to impossible in a country made-up of different nationalities”; therefore, the 
general condition of liberty in society is to be found in the congruence between the 
boundaries of the state and those of nationality.433 While nowadays, following 
Gellner’s definition of nationalism, one has no great difficulties in identifying such a 
principle with what has later become known as nationalism, in Mill’s and Acton’s 
time these considerations were regarded as part of a broader theory of liberty, and 
their debate was in those times probably perceived as a minor disagreement between 
two liberal comrades. However, it was a great credit for Acton that he had denounced 
the nascent ‘theory of nationality’ as ‘absurd’ and ‘criminal’434 long before the 
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absurdities and crimes in the name of the nationalist doctrine were actually 
committed. 
 Although Acton did not hesitate to immediately proclaim ‘the theory of nationality’ 
‘false’, he nevertheless saw “theories of this kind” as “a normal and necessary 
element in the social life of nations”. As such, they are “useful in opposition, as 
warning or a threat, to modify existing things, and keep awake the consciousness of 
wrong”.435 Thus, from an absolute point of view (and Acton attempted to express that 
view), such theories are necessarily seen as errors when related to what is presumed 
to be the absolute truth; however, they still remain a historical necessity, which helps 
the historical unfolding of the absolute truth itself. Here the influence of Doellinger’s 
dialectics upon Acton is most visible. Doellinger sought to incorporate the existence 
of presumably anti-Catholic theories and principles (errors) into the unfolding of the 
errorless, Absolute Spirit. However, Doellinger’s philosophy of history, despite its 
being formally less rigid than Hegel’s triadic system, remained stuck in some form of 
ethical rigidity, regarding every antithesis as necessarily morally flawed. Thus the 
very existence of facts (or theories) which seemed embarrassing to a consistent 
Catholic could be justified by including error as a normal and necessary step in the 
unfolding of the errorless Spirit; but, in this way, all that seemed embarrassing to a 
Catholic moral outlook was not only to be proclaimed wrong but also to be fixed as 
such. Indeed, there was a room left for what was claimed to be wrong to be 
overcome; but there was no room left for it not to be overcome.   
Nowhere else has this theory of history proved so detached from historical reality as 
in the case of nationalist principles, which to the present day have resisted to be 
overcome by a ‘necessary’ next stage of historical development. Of course, their mere 
historical persistence does not confirm their ethical or even logical correctness, but 
this ‘false’ theory has nevertheless failed to be overcome by a ‘true’ one. Still, with a 
touch of double irony, Acton’s prophecy that ‘the theory of nationality’, while being 
“more absurd and more criminal than the theory of socialism”, “has an important 
mission in the world, and marks the final conflict, and therefore the end, of two forces 
which are the worst enemies of civil freedom – the absolute monarchy and the 
revolution”,436 has indeed proved correct, with regard to the fact that the former 
theory has eventually survived not only the historical fall of these two forces but also 
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the historical fall of the latter theory. In this respect, Acton’s theory of history, based 
on Doellinger’s dialectics, has – quite paradoxically – proved both wrong and right: 
while being wrong in its claim that false principles are necessarily to be overcome by 
the true ones, it has proved right in its claim that ‘the theory of nationality’ has put an 
end on both absolute monarchy and revolution. Indeed, in the contemporary world, 
not only has absolute monarchy become unviable; it is also revolution – be that social 
or ‘national’ one – that has become practically impossible: the ultimate triumph of 
Mill’s ‘theory of nationality’ (which is commonly conflated with the ultimate triumph 
of liberal democracy itself) has left room only for acts of nationalist secession or 
unification; by becoming a matter of common procedure within the ‘international’ 
system, the consistent application of ‘the theory of nationality’ has left room only for 
quantitative changes of borders, and not for qualitative changes of government within 
those borders.437 For, it has become commonly accepted that every act of secession or 
unification – thereby establishing a new ‘nation-state’ under ‘the principle of national 
self-determination’ – is to be regarded as the ultimate realisation of the principles of 
liberal democracy, as proposed in Mill’s claim that the necessary – and, presumably, 
sufficient – condition of ‘free institutions’ in society is the congruence between the 
borders of the state and the boundaries of ‘nationality’, whatever ‘nationality’ may 
have meant or still may mean. In Acton’s account, ‘the theory of nationality’ 
necessarily puts an end on, but also clearly originates in, the broader theory of 
revolution:                         
 
There are three principal theories of this kind, impugning the present distribution of power, of 
property, and of territory, and attacking respectively the aristocracy, the middle class, and the 
sovereignty. They are the theories of equality, communism and nationality. Though sprung 
from a common origin, opposing cognate evils, and connected by many links, they did not 
appear simultaneously. Rousseau proclaimed the first, Baboeuf the second, Mazzini the third; 
and the third is the most recent in its appearance, the most attractive at the present time, and 
the richest in promise of future power.438 
 
Prior to the emergence of the theory of revolution, in the old European system, “the 
rights of nationalities were neither recognised by governments nor asserted by the 
people,” so that “the interest of the reigning families, not those of the nations, 
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regulated the frontiers; and the administration was conducted generally without any 
reference to popular desires”. And, says Acton, “where all liberties were suppressed, 
the claims of national independence were necessarily ignored.” Within such a system, 
“to dispossess a sovereign of his hereditary crown, and to annex his dominions, 
would have been held to inflict an injury upon all monarchies, and to furnish their 
subjects with a dangerous example, by depriving royalty of its inviolable character”. 
For, “after the wars of religion came to an end in 1648, the only wars were those 
which were waged for an inheritance or a dependency, or against countries whose 
system of government exempted them from the common law of dynastic states, and 
made them not only unprotected but obnoxious.”439   
Thus, besides the wars against non-Christian and non-European countries and 
populations, the only war that the European powers of the old system waged was that 
against the only Christian and European country whose system of government 
exempted from the common law of dynastic states. Being an elective monarchy 
without a hereditary monarch, Poland “did not possess those securities for stability 
which were supplied by dynastic connections and the theory of legitimacy, wherever 
a crown could be obtained by marriage and inheritance”. Thus “the country was 
excluded from the European system by the nature of its institutions”. Having been 
excluded from the system, Poland was partitioned by its dynastic neighbours, as if it 
had not been a Christian and European country. Acton’s Christian sentiment finds this 
fact particularly painful:  
 
Till then no nation had been deprived of its political power by the Christian powers, and 
whatever disregard had been shown for national interests and sympathies, some care had 
taken to conceal the wrong by a hypocritical perversion of law. But the partition of Poland 
was an act of wanton violence, committed in open defiance not only of popular feeling but of 
public law. For the first time in modern history a great State was suppressed, and a whole 
nation divided among its enemies. This famous measure, the most revolutionary act of the old 
absolutism, awakened the theory of nationality in Europe, converting a dormant right into an 
aspiration, and a sentiment into a political claim. (…) Thenceforward there was a nation 
demanding to be united in a State – a soul, as it were, wandering in search of a body in which 
to begin life over again; and, for the first time, a cry was heard that the arrangement of States 
was unjust – that their limits were unnatural, and that a whole people was deprived of its right 
to constitute an independent community.440  
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Thus the partition of Poland, as the most revolutionary act of the old absolutism, 
awakened not only ‘the theory of nationality’, but legitimised revolution as such. 
However, what may also be seen as implied in this statement is that non-Christian 
peoples, even those belonging to civilisations which an impartial Westerner would 
label as ‘highly advanced’, are not to be regarded as ‘nations’, given the fact that they 
had already been deprived of their political existence by the European colonial 
powers and that Acton did not even take these acts into account, let alone proclaim 
them illegitimate. Thus only Christian peoples – be that in Europe or North America 
– were to be regarded as ‘nations’ and, consequently, were not to be legitimately 
deprived of political power over the territory they inhabited, merely on the basis of 
their being Christian. The further implication is, then, that Christian powers may well 
be licensed to deprive non-Christian populations of their political and physical 
existence, simply on the basis of the latter’s being non-Christian. This is also the 
point where Acton probably differs from Mill: whereas for Mill any people would be 
considered ‘civilized’ – regardless of their religion – provided that they could 
legitimise themselves as ‘the nation’ by a revolutionary act of ‘self-liberation’, for 
Acton probably only a Christian people would be recognised as ‘the nation’ and 
therefore could not be legitimately deprived of political existence by Christian 
powers. This, again, points to Acton’s traditional understanding of political 
legitimacy, which could only stem from the recognition of political power by the 
supreme institution of Christianity, not from an act of what he would label as 
arbitrary revolutionary violence.  
 
Liberty as Inequality 
 
The old despotic policy which made the Poles its prey, says Acton, had two – both 
principal and geopolitical – adversaries: these two were “the spirit of English liberty”, 
and “the doctrines of that revolution which destroyed the French monarchy with its 
own weapons; and these two contradicted in contrary ways the theory that nations 
have no collective rights”. The old system, which “overlooked national divisions”, 
was thus opposed not only by the two countries concerned with their respective 
geopolitical interests, but also “by liberalism in two forms, the French and the 
English”. Therefore the – essentially revolutionary – system that insists upon national 
divisions “proceeds from two distinct sources, and exhibits the character either of 
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1688 or of 1789.”441 However, for Acton, this means a fundamental difference: while 
the English liberalism is still to be regarded as the authentic one, the movement 
derived from the principles of the French Revolution, despite the fact that it calls 
itself ‘liberal’, is to be seen as essentially ‘national’. For, “if liberty were its object, its 
means would be the establishment of great independent authorities not derived from 
the State, and its model would be England; but its object is equality; and it seeks, like 
France in 1789, to cast out the elements of inequality”.442   
It is no secret that the French Revolution, unlike the English one, sought to cast out 
the elements of inequality. But in Acton’s account this claim is not seen as socially 
but racially grounded (Acton was sometimes confusing and conflating the notions of 
‘race’ and ‘nationality’): the elements of inequality in the French society were, 
according to his view, introduced among the ‘Gaules’ by the ‘Teutonic race’: 
 
Roman Gaul had so thoroughly adopted the ideas of absolute authority and undistinguished 
equality during the five centuries between Caesar and Clovis, that the people could never be 
reconciled to the new system. Feudalism remained a foreign importation, and the feudal 
aristocracy an alien race. (…) Monarchy unconnected with aristocracy became popular in 
France, even when most uncontrolled; whilst the attempt to reconstitute the throne, and to 
limit and fence it with its peers, broke down, because the old Teutonic elements on which it 
relied – hereditary nobility, primogeniture, and privilege – were no longer tolerated. The 
substance of the ideas of 1789 is not the limitation of the sovereign power, but the abrogation 
of intermediate powers. These powers, and the classes which enjoyed them, come in Latin 
Europe from a barbarian origin.443  
 
What seems particularly painful for Acton is the abolition of the classes – to which he 
himself belonged – that enjoyed ‘intermediary powers’. Understandably, this personal 
bias made him anti-egalitarian, albeit somewhat less anti-revolutionary, given his 
approval of the 1688 English Revolution, which re-asserted the ‘intermediary powers’ 
at the expense of both the royalty and ‘the people’. However, due to the changes in 
the public discourse of the 19th century, Acton found himself in a difficulty to defend 
privilege as an end in itself. Given the centrality of the idea of liberty in his own time 
– the idea that usually did not have to be legitimised by any other external point of 
reference – Acton launched a theory that claimed the existence of the privileged 
classes essential to the preservation of liberty; and those who sought to abolish them 
necessarily plotted against liberty and could only be driven by some irrational 
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motives. Thus it did not suffice for the theory that the privileged, intermediary classes 
were abolished simply because of their privilege; quite the contrary, it was the 
privilege itself that was abolished simply because it had been established by the 
classes of a ‘barbarian origin’ (“and the king perished because of the origin of his 
authority rather than because of its abuse”). And having been of a ‘barbarian origin’, 
their very existence had to be regarded not only as an offence against ‘egalitarianism’ 
of the subjugated ‘non-Teutonic races’; it was to be regarded as an offence against 
their presumed ‘racial superiority’ over those ‘barbarian’ ones.  
 Interestingly, this state of permanent offence had lasted for more than one thousand 
years, until it was abolished by the French Revolution, and throughout this entire 
period it had never been recorded in the public discourse of the time that the issue of 
the ‘Latin’ vs. ‘Teutonic race’ had ever been raised: in the Europe of Acton’s 
Universal Church, such an argument would have been simply inconceivable. Racialist 
discourse, to which Acton here subscribes, was a product of his own, post-1789 
epoch; it was far beyond the intended scope of the secular universalism employed by 
the Revolution itself to raise the issue of ‘racial injustice’ when the social one 
sufficed to legitimise its egalitarian claims.  
 Yet, says Acton, the idea of equality proclaimed by the French Revolution was 
essentially an idea of revenge of the once-defeated: its declared universalism was, 
actually, a disguise for a racialist resentment; and the liberty proclaimed was just a 
‘national’, and not a universal one, since it only sought to “cast out the elements of 
inequality which were introduced by the Teutonic race”. Curiously enough, the 
concept of liberty that sought to establish ‘great independent authorities’ – as a 
safeguard of that inequality which had presumably been transmitted to the English 
through their own, ‘Teutonic race’ – was to be regarded as non-racially or non-
‘nationally’ biased, despite its having been promoted by the Anglo-Saxon branch of 
‘the Teutonic race’ in opposition to the presumed egalitarian traditions of the ‘non-
Teutonic races’. And then, the liberty promoted by the advocates of racial and social 
inequality can be plausibly suspected of being deliberately designed for, and confined 
to, the privileged classes, whose privilege is to be justified as naturally stemming 
from their practically demonstrated racial superiority. Hence, nothing would seem 
more ‘unnatural’ to Acton than to abolish such, ‘naturally’ gained, social privileges. 
Acton’s personal antipathy towards social equality led him so far as to imply that the 
‘Latin nations’, by adopting the principles of equality, only demonstrated their 
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‘natural inferiority’ to, and envy of, ‘the Teutonic race’ – as the chief agency in the 
spreading of inequality throughout Europe – and, consequently, their natural 
inferiority to, and envy of, its Anglo-Saxon branch, as the main promoter of the 
inequality-based liberty i.e. the liberty of, and for, the socially privileged classes.  
 Thus, for Acton, ‘the theory of nationality’ itself, springing from the French 
Revolution, had begun as “a protest against the dominion of race over race” and then 
“grew into a condemnation of every State that included different races, and finally 
became the complete and consistent theory, that the State and the nation must be co-
extensive”.444 Quoting Mill’s famous claim that “it is, in general, a necessary 
condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in 
the main with those of nationalities”, as the ultimate stage of development of the 
theory, Acton rightfully argues that Mill had been the first one to articulate a well-
elaborated theory of congruence between ‘national’ and state boundaries (an earlier, 
less elaborated theory was introduced by Sidney, see the first chapter), later echoed 
by Gellner in his famous definition of the nationalist doctrine. However, it remains 
quite obscure whose theory was that which protested against “the dominion of race 
over race”. The only available explanation, already suggested by Acton, is that the 
French Revolution promoted such a theory as its hidden agenda, by secretly fighting 
the ‘Teutonic’ racial dominion over the ‘Latin’ Gaules while openly advocating a 
universally valid and applicable egalitarianism. 
 It was only due to the post-revolutionary Napoleonic conquests, says Acton, that 
“men were made conscious of the national elements of the revolution”, not having 
been aware of them during the revolution’s rise, so that the popular movement against 
the Napoleonic conquests was essentially “national, because it was directed against 
foreign institutions”. Thus, practically, it was Napoleon that “called a new power into 
existence by attacking nationality in Russia, by delivering it in Italy, by governing in 
defiance of it in Germany and Spain”.445 In all these cases, ‘nationality’ is assumed to 
have asserted itself in opposition to the French ‘national’ (perhaps even to the French 
‘racial’) and not to the French imperial, institutions. The French imperial conquest 
was thus to be regarded as an export of the French ‘national’ institutions, which 
helped other ‘nations’ to become aware of their own ‘nationality’ by merely opposing 
it to the French one.   
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However, rather inconsistently, Acton elsewhere446 claims that a similar export of 
the English liberal institutions to the colonies did not cause settler’s resistance to 
these institutions, but rather, in American case, a demand for these institutions to be 
consistently implemented. Although the American Revolution was, in its 
consequences, as ‘nation’-creating as the French one, Acton never refers to it as the 
one that actually brought about American ‘national’ institutions: American 
institutions, by virtue of being English in their origin, were so designed as to promote 
the spirit of English liberty, which for Acton necessarily meant the spirit of social 
inequality.447 Thus the non-egalitarian concept of liberty, as long as it remained 
rigidly non-egalitarian, was safe from becoming ‘national’, in spite of its openly 
proclaimed English spirit. Also, such a concept of liberty, as advocated by the South 
in the American Civil War, was safe from being denounced by Acton as racialist, 
despite its having been openly based on the concept of racial inequality. However, the 
egalitarian concept of liberty, by virtue of its being French and therefore presumably 
‘anti-Teutonic’, was to be simply denounced as racialist and therefore – in Acton’s 
peculiar understanding of ‘the nation’ as ‘race’ – as nationalist.  
 
Liberty as Disunity 
 
To what extent social inequality is essential to Acton’s understanding of liberty is 
evident in his radical rejection of the underlying principles of the French Revolution, 
particularly the principles of equality and unity. For Acton, even French 
republicanism is not to be seen as a true one, since “true republicanism is the 
principle of self-government in the whole and in all the parts”,448 and self-government 
must either be sacrificed to unity, or preserved by federalism.449 Since French 
republicanism did not introduce federalism, it follows that it sacrificed self-
government, and therefore true republicanism, to unity. And then, Acton suggests, 
this unity is to be understood as meta-historical rather than historical category. In 
Acton’s interpretation, it was thus assumed by the Revolutionaries that the unity of 
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‘the French nation’ had existed prior to, and independently from, any social or 
historical institution:   
 
The France of history fell together with the French State, which was the growth of centuries. 
(…) The state of nature, which was the ideal of society, was made the basis of the nation; 
descent was put in place of tradition, and the French people was regarded as a physical 
product: an ethnological, not historic, unit. It was assumed that a unity existed separate from 
the representation and the government, wholly independent of the past, and capable at any 
moment of expressing or of changing its mind. In the words of Sieyes, it was no longer 
France, but some unknown country to which the nation was transported. The central power 
possessed authority, inasmuch as it obeyed the whole, and no divergence was permitted from 
the universal sentiment. This power, endowed with volition, was personified in the Republic 
One and Indivisible. The tile signified that a part could not speak or act for the whole – that 
there was a power supreme over the State, distinct from, and independent of, its members; 
and it expressed, for the first time in history, the notion of abstract nationality.450  
 
Interestingly, while referring to ‘the state of nature’, Acton announced the future 
common places of the nationalist ideology, as referring to the timeless, abstract unity 
of ‘the nation’; but, he borrowed a concept that, actually, had never been articulated 
in that form by any of the thinkers who had introduced the notion. Although Acton 
accurately depicts the logic of the Revolutionaries (and, subsequently, of their 
nationalist followers), he nevertheless – while confusing and conflating Rousseau’s 
‘general will’ with his ‘state of nature’ – does not attempt to clearly associate 
Rousseau’s theory with the nationalist one.   
For Acton, it was “the idea of sovereignty of the people, uncontrolled by the past”, 
that “gave birth to the idea of nationality independent of the political influence of 
history”. As such, “it sprang from the rejection of the two authorities – of the State 
and of the past”.451 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say the idea of ‘nationality’ 
seized, rather than rejected, both the state and the past (hence not only the revolution 
but also Hobsbawm's ‘invention of tradition’). However, it still remains obscure in 
Acton’s account whether ‘the idea of sovereignty of the people’ is to be found in its 
entirety in Rousseau’s theory or its foundations may also be traced back to Locke and 
Sidney. This question is not merely a formal one, since Acton claims that ‘the spirit 
of English liberty’, springing from the 1688 Revolution (supposedly inspired by 
Locke’s and Sidney’s ideas), is fundamentally opposed to ‘the spirit of equality’, as 
promoted by the 1789 French Revolution (supposedly inspired by Rousseau’s ideas). 
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These two constitute “two views of nationality, corresponding to the French and to 
the English systems”, which “are connected in name only, and are in reality the 
opposite extremes of political thought”:  
 
In one case, nationality is founded on the perpetual supremacy of the collective will, of which 
the unity of the nation is the necessary condition, to which every other influence must defer, 
and against which no obligation enjoys authority, and all resistance is tyrannical. The nation 
is here an ideal unit founded on the race, in defiance of the modifying action of external 
causes, of tradition, and of existing rights. It overrules the rights and wishes of the 
inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity; sacrifices their several 
inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all 
established liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself. Whenever a single definite object is 
made the supreme end of the State, be it the advantage of a class, the safety or the power of 
the country, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the support of any speculative 
idea, the State becomes for the time inevitably absolute. Liberty alone demands for its 
realisation the limitation of the public authority, for liberty is the only object which benefits 
all alike, and provokes no sincere opposition.452  
 
However, the assumption that unity of ‘the nation’, as a necessary condition for 
imposing the perpetual supremacy of the collective will, presupposes a unit founded 
on race is not grounded in the theories – such as that of Rousseau – which were the 
first to promote the notion of the collective, ‘general will’. In Rousseau’s theory, it is 
‘the general will’ that founds ‘the nation’, and unity (which is not one of Rousseau’s 
favourite terms) is just another name for this Will, not a precondition of its coming 
into existence. By tacitly assuming that in Rousseau’s theory unity of ‘the nation’ 
somehow precedes the emergence of ‘the general will’, Acton suggests that this unity 
is not to be seen as a historical stage arrived at by the public deliberation by which the 
Social Contract is established, but as an a-historical state – which he conflates with 
Rousseau’s ‘state of nature’ – in which unity is already given as a unit; and then, the 
only unit which is supposed to have preceded the Social Contract, as well as ‘the 
general will’ reflected in the Contract, can be a pre-political unit of race.453   
  This error in interpreting Rousseau’s and Revolutionaries’ categories allows Acton 
to assert that Rousseau’s theory of collective, ‘general will’ presupposes that ‘the 
nation’ – seen as a pre-political and pre-societal, ethnological unit – can be founded 
on race alone. True, Acton accurately describes the subsequent interpretation of this 
theory and of historical events by his own nationalist contemporaries; but he 
nevertheless distorts both the theoretical and historical foundations of the French 
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Revolution itself. As for the theoretical foundations, the claim to supremacy of race 
would necessarily contradict the claim to supremacy of the Will: for, a will based on, 
and therefore limited by, pre-voluntary (and hence pre-political) categories, such as 
race, would cease to posses the unique quality of the free will, namely its absolute 
freedom; such a will would cease to be supreme over race and therefore over any 
other cognitive or historical category.   
  With regard to the historical foundations, Acton simply omits the fact that the 
Revolutionaries had no grounds in the socio-historical reality of their own time to 
claim ‘the French nation’ to be a unit based on the pre-voluntary and pre-political 
category of race: it was, actually, due to the visible absence of any such French race 
in the physical-ethnological sense that a need arose for many such pre-voluntary 
ethnological units to merge into ‘the French nation’ by the (revolutionary) act of 
establishing ‘the general will’. While it is true that some of the Revolutionaries, such 
as Sieyes, claimed that ‘the nation’ had precedence over all other ethical, cognitive 
and voluntary categories, it is both illogical and historically inaccurate to suggest that 
they ever seriously claimed that ‘the nation’ seen as a pre-political, pre-societal, 
racial unit had actually preceded its own historical – and therefore voluntary and 
political – birth. Otherwise, if that birth had not been a historical, voluntary and 
political one, the Revolution itself would have lost its principal rationale, that of 
asserting ‘the general will’ of ‘the nation’ by establishing ‘the nation’ itself. In other 
words, if ‘the French nation’ had always existed as a unit of the French race, there 
would have been no need for the Revolution to actually bring it into being, and there 
would have been no grounds for the Revolution to legitimise its own outbreak in the 
name of ‘the nation’s’ liberty. For, according to the Revolution’s self-referential 
logic, it was logical for the emerging ‘nation’ to demand liberty to assert itself as 
ever-existing, as it would be absurd for a presumed, ever-existing racial unit to 
demand liberty to assert itself as emerging.  
  The fact that Acton nationalist contemporaries subsequently adopted the view that 
‘the nation’ was to be regarded as a pre-voluntary, pre-political and pre-societal unit, 
based on race, language or religion, does not say much about the theory of the 
Revolution itself. On the contrary, the claim that the French Third Estate – in whose 
name the Revolution was supposedly launched – was racially based only reflects 
Acton’s own view that the former was not to be regarded as a social class (which, by 
definition, it was), but as a representative unit of the socially inferior ‘Latin’ race, 
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which had rebelled against the dominion of the first two Estates (which are, for his 
purpose, presumed to be of the socially and politically superior ‘Teutonic’ race) on 
purely racialist grounds. To prove his own racialist logic right, Acton practically 
redesigns the whole European history in racialist terms, including the episode of the 
French Revolution.  
 On the other hand, paradoxically, it is exactly Acton who stresses the essential 
connectedness of ‘the theory of nationality’ with “the democratic theory of the 
sovereignty of the general will”. While quoting Mill’s claim that “one hardly knows 
what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with 
which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate 
themselves,” Acton clearly sees that “it is by this act that a nation constitutes itself”; 
for, “to have a collective will, unity is necessary, and independence is requisite in 
order to assert it.”454 Acton’s insight obviously refers to Rousseau’s concept of ‘the 
general will’. Unlike most of his contemporaries (e.g. Mill and other promoters of the 
nationalist doctrine), Acton here does not presuppose the existence of ‘the nation’ as a 
given, a-historical, pre-political category, whose ‘general will’ is to be articulated 
only in its own, independent state (thus exercising a collective form of ‘negative 
liberty’); for him, such a ‘nation’ is constituted at a particular point in history, by a 
voluntary, political act of contractual association (as an exercise of ‘positive liberty’). 
Thus it is suggested that the existence of ‘the nation’ does not precede the will “to 
exist and have name”, as Mazzini put it: it is the will-to-exist-and-have-name that, 
actually, constitutes ‘the nation’.  
 As unity is seen as a precondition for ‘the general will’ to assert itself, both unity 
and ‘the general will’, according to the theory’s self-referential logic, are presumed to 
be already contained in a demand for political independence; it is thus understood that 
a demand for political independence alone always signals the existence of both unity 
and ‘the general will’; or, in other words, that such a demand itself signals the 
existence of ‘the nation’. According to this arbitrary principle, any number of 
individuals may claim its own will to power in the form of political independence to 
be ‘the general will’ (as, indeed, people like Mazzini actually did), thereby asserting 
themselves as ‘the nation’, whose unity is presumed to have been expressed by their 
very claim to independence. Thus the arbitrary will to power, presented as ‘the 
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general will’ and centred around the hitherto unknown entity called ‘the nation’, may 
well bring such a fictional entity into being, while retrospectively depicting it as a 
‘natural division of the human race’. Or, as Gellner famously put it so many years 
later, “nationalism invents nations where they do not exist”. Acton’s great 
achievement was that he had recognised this arbitrary power of ‘the theory of 
nationality’, as promoted by both Mazzini and Mill, as well as its essential 
connectedness with another theory which he saw as a theory of arbitrary power, that 
of democracy.          
 
Democracy as Tyranny 
 
In Acton's view, both theories, one of democracy and that of ‘nationality’, inevitably 
lead to the establishment of absolute power, insofar as the people’s sovereign power 
is, by the very definition of sovereignty, absolute:  
 
The true democratic principle, that none shall have power over the people, is taken to mean 
that none shall be able to restrain or to elude its power. The true democratic principle, that the 
people shall not be made to do what it does not like, is taken to mean that it shall never be 
required to tolerate what it does not like. The true democratic principle, that every man’s free 
will shall be as unfettered as possible, is taken to mean that the free will of the collective 
people shall be fettered in nothing.455 
 
Absolute power – to paraphrase Acton’s most famous statement – threatens 
individual liberty absolutely, more so since the latter, too, aims at being absolute. 
Unity, too, is the absolute threat to individual liberty, since the former, quite like the 
latter, by definition, also aims at being absolute. The sovereignty of the people, then, 
by being defined as absolute, one and indivisible, presupposes the people’s absolute 
unity; and, since this sovereign power, by virtue of being indivisible, cannot be 
divided among several states, it follows that the people, in order to assert their 
sovereignty, must possess not only moral but also physical unity within the 
boundaries of one state.   
Of course, an argument can be made that the physical extension of the state 
sovereignty may well determine ‘who are the people’, whose physical unity within 
the state boundaries is assumed to reflect the moral unity, centred in the allegiance to 
the state itself (this is what Acton calls ‘patriotism’). However, such an argument 
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would be directly opposed to the central assumption of the nationalist theory, that of 
the state boundaries being a product of historical accident, which must not determine 
the people’s destiny, since it would thus inevitably deny the sovereignty of the 
people’s will to determine its own destiny. And, although not being directly opposed 
to the democratic theory, this argument would nevertheless pose a problem for the 
theory itself: once it is admitted that the question of ‘who are the people’ may be 
determined by anything which is not the people’s sovereign will (e.g. by historical 
accident), the claim to sovereignty of the people’s will ceases to be absolute, and so 
does sovereignty itself. For Acton, this confirms the essential affinity between the 
nationalist theory and the democratic one, provided that the latter is consistently 
applied. Diametrically opposed to the democratic and nationalist theories, both of 
which Acton puts under the joint label of ‘the theory of unity’, is his theory of liberty: 
  
While the theory of unity makes the nation a source of despotism and revolution, the theory 
of liberty regards it as the bulwark of self-government, and the foremost limit to the excessive 
power of the State. Private rights, which are sacrificed to the unity, are preserved by the union 
of nations. (…) The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as 
the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation; and, as 
such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement 
than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism.456 
 
Thus a ‘multi-national’ state, modelled after the British and Austrian empires, 
becomes Acton’s ideal form of government, in terms of imposing “a firm barrier 
against the intrusion of the government beyond the political sphere”. In his favourite 
terms, “the presence of different nations under the same sovereignty is similar in its 
effect to the independence of the Church in the State”.457 Still, in Acton’s ‘multi-
national’ empire, unlike in the traditional ones, ‘nations’ do not merge into a 
numberless mass of empire’s subjects nor do they dissolve into an atomised society, 
consisting of isolated individuals: ‘nations’ remain not only present within the empire 
but internally fairly homogenous, in order to be able to act as corporate bodies and 
thus check and balance each other. This implies that the homogeneity of ‘nations’ 
within the ‘multi-national’ empire is still regarded as a useful means to liberty – 
which can only be achieved through a system of checks and balances – and not as the 
necessary precondition of liberty itself, as Mill tends to see it.   
  In this way, Acton’s ‘nations’ are portrayed as analogous (although not necessarily 
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as historical successors) to the medieval corporations,458 acting as a check against 
potential absolutism of the empire and balancing each other’s position within the 
empire. Thus it may be said that the level of homogeneity required for such ‘nations’ 
is lesser than that of ‘nations’ within ‘the nation-state system’: it never rises to the 
point of absolute collective individuality possessing a single collective mind and will, 
but remains on the level of corporate integration, where common will is not 
presupposed but is rather to be permanently opted for through complicated 
consensus-reaching procedures. Acton’s ‘nations’ are thus to be seen as corporate 
bodies, endowed with a means to produce their own corporate will, rather than as 
collective individuals endowed with their own individual will. However, ‘nations’, as 
a cognitive frame and a practical-political category, still remain uncontested in 
Acton’s account of the 19th-century political reality. What is contested, in relation to 
Mill’s account, is whether they should produce a state of their own (and state, for 
Acton, necessarily tends to be absolutist), which would remain unchecked and be 
balanced only against other such states (which, then, could only strengthen their 
inherent absolutist tendencies); or, they should only check potential absolutism of the 
existing empire and balance each other’s interests within the empire.  
  Clearly, Acton’s ideal society, in which corporations check and balance each other 
as well as the state, was to be found in the Medieval Europe: 
 
The three-cornered struggle of Pope, emperor and feudal lords left no room for ideas of 
absolute sovereignty. (...) From these cross-currents of interests there emerged a fund of 
constitutional principles: representative government, no taxation without representation, the 
moral right of insurrection, the extinction of slavery, trial by jury, local self-government, 
ecclesiastical independence, even the ideas of Habeas Corpus Act and the income tax. If there 
was any notion of sovereignty, it adhered primarily to the corporation, and it was in the 
impunity enjoyed by the corporation, by powerful classes and privileged associations, that 
liberty took refuge.459  
 
What Acton failed to see was that it was exactly the sovereignty of the corporation 
that was simply translated into the sovereignty of ‘the nation’, once a coalition of 
corporations or a single corporation – the middle class or the Third Estate – had been 
elevated onto the level of the entire ‘nation’, that is, proclaimed ‘the nation’ itself 
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and, as such, made coextensive with the state whose power it had forcefully 
usurped.460  
  
Christian vs. ‘National’ Unity 
 
However, it was far more important for Acton that the Middle Ages was also the 
period of undisputed supremacy of the Catholic Church, in which “all Western 
Europe obeyed the same laws, all literature was contained in one language, and the 
political unity of Christendom was personified in a single potentate, while its 
intellectual unity was represented in one university”. Thus “it was the mission of the 
Church to overcome national differences” from the previous epochs. For, unlike in 
the Middle Ages, “in pagan and uncultivated times”, 
 
Nations were distinguished from each other by the widest diversity, not only in religion, but 
in customs, language, and character. Under the new law they had many things in common; 
the old barriers which separated them were removed, and the new principle of self-
government, which Christianity imposed, enabled them to live together under the same 
authority, without necessarily losing their cherished habits, their customs, or their laws. The 
new idea of freedom made room for different races in one State.461   
 
Acton never claimed that the political and intellectual unity of the Christendom may 
have ever been an obstacle for liberty to develop, as he claimed to have been the case 
with ‘national’ unity. Thus Acton says that “the new principle of self-government” 
was imposed by Christianity, enabling ‘nations’ to “live together under the same 
authority”: in the European ‘society of nations’, established by the Universal Church, 
‘nations’ were, to use Rousseau’s famous paradox once again, forced to be free. 
Indeed, the old barriers which separated them were removed without necessarily 
depriving them of their cherished habits, their customs or their laws, but only 
provided that they all accepted one religion, obeyed one supreme authority of the 
Universal Church and subscribed to the unity imposed on them: thus, practically, no 
one was permitted not to be ‘free’ to “live together under the same authority”.   
  The fact that it was the authority of the Church and not the authority of ‘the nation-
                                                 
460
 Similarly, in the European part of the former Ottoman Empire ‘nations’ have developed from the 
former autonomous religious communities, called ‘millets’, which in such a multi-religious state 
played the role analogous to that of the medieval corporations in other, mono-religious European 
states.   
461
 Nationality, pp. 426-7.  
 205 
state’ was, of course, crucial to Acton; but, that does not necessarily provide his 
argument with moral authority, let alone with the authority of historical truth: the 
argument itself seems to be a simple inversion of the common nationalist claim that 
the principle of self-government, imposed by ‘the nation-state’, enabled people to live 
together under the same authority, without necessarily losing their cherished religious 
rites. Thus the nationalist may well claim that the new idea of liberty, embodied in 
‘the nation-state’, made some room for different Christian denominations within one 
state, provided that they all obey the same laws, the same political and intellectual 
authority (e.g. ‘national academy of arts and sciences’), and write literature in the 
same language. And, indeed, beginning with the French Revolution, nationalist 
ideologues regularly claimed that it was the mission of ‘the nation-state’ to overcome 
religious differences. Thus, to the nationalist, the worshiping of ‘the nation-state’ 
would be an ethical equivalent of what the worship of the Church was to the clerical. 
The fact that they would both refer to a transcendental being – invoking, respectively, 
‘the nation’ and God – does not make their allegiance to the earthly institutions less 
significant. In both cases, the degree of freedom in a society dominated by the 
institutions of the Church and ‘the nation-state’ was proportionate to the allegiance to 
these institutions, with freedom (and sometimes life itself) having principally been 
denied to all those who denied, or failed to perform, such a commanded allegiance. In 
this sense, the record of the Inquisition was no less notorious than that of the Terror, 
and Acton’s simple inversion of the nationalist claims fails to persuade an impartial 
reader.                   
 
The Isolation of ‘Nations’ 
 
However, Acton’s claim that “the combination of different nations in one State is as 
necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society”462 has 
much greater persuasive power. Thus, protesting against “the isolation of nations”463 
imposed by ‘the theory of nationality’, he warns – quite in the opposition to Mill – 
that “where political and national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and 
nations relapse into a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce 
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intercourse with their fellow-men”.464 It is significant that Acton does not extend the 
parallel with “men who renounce intercourse with their fellow-men” so as to label the 
phenomenon as ‘the self-isolation of nations’. His intuitive insight thus implies the 
existence of an unnamed external agency – which he tends to identify with ‘the theory 
of nationality’ itself  – that actually isolates ‘nations’ and thus prevents them not only 
from combination but, more importantly, from communication with each other.  
 It is not disputable for Acton that this agency’s goal – that of ‘isolation of nations’ – 
is contrary to the principles of civilised life. What is striking, however, is the hint that 
‘nations’ themselves do not freely choose to renounce intercourse with their fellow-
‘nations’, but that such a choice is made for them by an agency external to them. A 
successful ‘isolation of nations’ – provided that it is generated by an external agency 
– would soon promote such an agency into a power controlling actions and lives of 
these ‘nations’. Thus understood, Acton’s claim that the “greatest adversary of the 
rights of nationality” is exactly ‘the theory of nationality’ looks less paradoxical:            
 
By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces 
practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It 
cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because 
the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of 
its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that 
dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are 
exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence.465 
 
‘The nation’, for Acton, ought to be derived from the state in the political process, not 
supreme over it; hence, “a State may in course of time produce a nationality; but that 
a nationality should constitute a State is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation”. 
For, “the difference between nationality and the State is exhibited in the nature of 
patriotic attachment: our connection with the race is merely natural or physical, whilst 
our duties to the political nation are ethical”.466 The ‘nationality’ formed by the state, 
then, “is the only one to which we owe political duties, and it is, therefore, the only 
one which has political rights”.467 In this respect, Acton’s view is not unlike that of 
Rousseau.   
  However, in this way, far from entirely dismissing ‘nationality’ as an organisational 
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principle of (or within) the state, Acton only rejects the principles of ethnic 
nationalism, which advocates pre-political, ethnic units, as the bases for modern 
‘nations’. Inconsistently for someone who advocated the theory of checks and 
balances against the absolutist state, he practically endorses the principles of the state-
promoted, civic nationalism, regardless of whether these principles lead to a greater 
unity within society (and thus threaten the ‘liberty’ based on the system of checks and 
balances) or not.      
 
History of Freedom 
 
The historical unfolding of the concept of liberty in Acton’s account is regarded as 
the end of all human history. He considered the idea of liberty “the unity, the only 
unity, of the history of the world, and the once principle of a philosophy of 
history”.468 His ambition to write a history of liberty was thus conceived as no less 
than an effort to write a teleological history of mankind. History of mankind, thus 
understood, necessarily becomes the history of ideas: for, “the history of institutions 
is often a history of deception and illusions; for their virtue depends on the ideas that 
produce and on the spirit that preserves them; and the form may remain unaltered 
when the substance has passed away.”469 Still, liberty itself depends upon no single 
idea or institution; all ideas and institutions depend upon it.470  
However, despite its being understood as the end of all history, liberty for Acton is, 
paradoxically, clearly associated with a particular historical and geographic context. 
Taking a particular time- and space-bound concept as a universal end to which the 
human race ought to aspire is, of course, a highly problematic endeavour; as such, it 
tends to denounce all the diverging and opposed concepts and practices as a-historical 
or even anti-historical. This equally applies to diverging concepts and practices within 
the given historical and geographic framework, as well as to those that diverge from, 
and are opposed to, the proclaimed end of history simply by virtue of not belonging to 
that particular framework. Acton does not seem to be aware of this problem when he 
concedes that “at all times sincere friends of freedom have been rare, and its triumphs 
have been due to minorities, that have prevailed by associating themselves with 
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auxiliaries whose objects often differed from their own”.471 However, such a 
concession makes it difficult to appreciate the historical significance of the social 
concept that has almost always been opposed by the majority within the given 
historical, geographic and social context. And the problem is even worsened by 
postulating the concept of liberty so narrowly as to fit practically only one particular 
social stratum within such a context, as the opening paragraph of The History of 
Freedom in Antiquity suggests:  
 
Liberty, next to religion has been the motive of good deeds and the common pretext of crime, 
from the sowing of the seed at Athens, 2,460 years ago, until the ripened harvest was 
gathered by men of our race. It is the delicate fruit of a mature civilization; and scarcely a 
century has passed since nations, that knew the meaning of the term, resolved to be free. In 
every age its progress has been beset by its natural enemies, by ignorance and superstition, by 
lust of conquest and by love of ease, by the strong man’s craving for power, and the poor 
man’s craving for food.472  
 
The sphere of liberty’s application is thus conceived as confined to the intermediary 
social stratum, squeezed between those who ‘crave for food’ and those who ‘crave for 
power’. However, by demarcating the boundaries of liberty’s application as confined 
to a particular social stratum (practically, the middle class proper, plus the lower 
clergy and the lower nobility), Acton practically admits that liberty’s significance, far 
from being universal, is also confined to that particular class. The craving for liberty 
thus arises as a particular interest of the class that holds that the cravings for food 
and/or for power are to be dismissed as illegitimate or irrelevant and who regard their 
own craving for liberty as the only relevant and legitimate aspiration of human kind. 
The delicate fruit of liberty, in Acton’s interpretation, thus remains not only confined 
to a particular class (his own); it remains equally confined to a particular civilisation 
(his own), defined in terms of time (his own) and race (his own).   
However, what is striking in this account of liberty is that such liberty, whose 
meaning was known only to those who belonged to one particular social, racial and 
historical context, was actually known to, and realised by, ‘nations’ and not by 
individuals, as one might expect. Of course, it may be said that both ‘our’ class and 
race comprise a number of ‘nations’, as well as a number of individuals; but the 
statement nevertheless suggests that ‘nations’ have been, or were to be seen as, 
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proper (that is, legitimate) units for the historical realisation of liberty. In addition, it 
is also suggested that these ‘nations’ are to be seen as some kind of collective 
individuals, possessing both collective knowledge (of what liberty is) and collective 
resolution i.e. will (to actually be free). Rather inconsistently for someone who 
previously dismissed Mill’s ‘theory of nationality’, Acton thus portrays the eventual 
attainment of liberty not only as an inevitable (i.e. involuntary) fruit of a ‘mature 
civilisation’ but as a result of these collective individuals’ voluntary resolution to 
finally be free.     
It should still be noted that this view implies that ‘nations’ are to be seen not as 
ethnological (i.e. pre-political) but as voluntary (i.e. political) categories, subject only 
to the law of history, which unevenly distributes the knowledge of what liberty is and 
therefore unevenly distributes liberty itself among the units of (‘Teutonic’ or Anglo-
Saxon?) race called ‘nations’. What is also striking is that Acton sees liberty as 
having been historically realised only in the era in which ‘nations’, as collective 
individuals possessing their own will, “resolved to be free”; and, it is difficult to link 
this ‘resolution’ of ‘nations’ with anything other than the 18th- and 19th-century 
‘national revolutions’, which Acton had principally rejected as illegitimate.  
 
Liberty as Conscience 
 
In more individualistic terms, Acton defines liberty as, 
 
The assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes his duty, against 
the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion. The state is competent to 
assign duties and draw the line between good and evil only in its own immediate sphere. 
Beyond the limit of things necessary for its well-being, it can only give indirect help to fight 
the battle of life, by promoting the influences which avail against temptation – religion, 
education, and the distribution of Wealth. In ancient times the state absorbed authorities not 
its own, and intruded on the domain of personal freedom. In the middle ages it possessed too 
little authority, and suffered others to intrude. Modern states fall habitually into both 
excesses. The most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the 
amount of security enjoyed by minorities.473 
 
While for Mill liberty is a license to do what one pleases, whereby the only moral 
duty is not to inflict injury upon others, Acton’s conception of liberty seems rather 
related to the Kantian conception of the categorical imperative. However, while for 
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Kant obedience to this inward moral law alone can make the individual free, for 
Acton the individual is free only when it is assured that his doing what he believes to 
be his moral duty is not interfered with by any external agency or structure. Thus 
Acton practically made some kind of a not-so-happy compromise between these two, 
mutually contrasted, concepts of liberty. Mill’s hypothetical objection to this 
compromise might be that one’s highest duty is to do what he pleases (provided that it 
is about the pursuit of ‘higher’ rather than ‘lower’ pleasures), so that the concept of 
duty employed by Acton would simply appear to him as redundant. Kant’s objection 
might be that what one believes to be his duty does not necessarily correspond to 
what his moral duty actually is. While Acton would certainly dismiss the first 
objection as immoral and worthy of contempt, he would have more problems to 
address the second one. What he would probably do in response to it is to employ the 
external point of reference, by invoking the concept of ‘the higher law’, revealed to 
man in the form of religion. Thus what one believes to be his duty would be 
determined by ‘the higher law’, which he would flawlessly follow.    
But, the problem with this argument is contained in Acton’s own understanding of 
religion. Although Acton would undoubtedly declare religion as a matter of man’s 
conscience, it is difficult to relate his understanding of religion to anything 
resembling “a private matter between man and his Maker”, as Mill put it. There is 
very little in Acton’s account of religion that points to the essentially private sphere of 
personal faith. Religion is there rather understood as a set of socially institutionalised, 
externalised collective practices (and, as such, principally distinct from, but 
essentially related to, the public sphere), whose main quality is its presumed 
sovereignty in relation to any other external authority within the public sphere. Thus 
the central event in the whole history of liberty is the moment when the sphere of 
religion was distinguished and separated from the public sphere proper i.e. the state: 
 
The Stoics could only advise the wise man to hold aloof from politics, keeping the unwritten 
law in his heart. But when Christ said: “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and 
unto God the things that are God’s,” those words, spoken on His last visit to the Temple, 
three days before His death, gave to the civil power, under the protection of conscience, a 
sacredness it had never enjoyed, and bounds it had never acknowledged; and they were the 
repudiation of absolutism and the inauguration of Freedom. For our Lord not only delivered 
the precept, but created the force to execute it. To maintain the necessary immunity in one 
supreme sphere, to reduce all political authority within defined limits, ceased to be an 
aspiration of patient reasoners, and was made the perpetual charge and care of the most 
energetic institution and the most universal association in the world. The new law, the new 
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spirit, the new authority, gave to Liberty a meaning and a value it had not possessed in the 
philosophy or in the constitution of Greece or Rome, before the knowledge of the Truth that 
makes us free.474 
 
Therefore, liberty is understood as the point of distinction between these two realms 
and, as such, it is regarded as “the essential condition and guardian of Religion”.475 
Perhaps a more consistent believer in the Transcendental, Absolute Being would say 
that the essential condition and the only guardian of religion is one’s own faith, as a 
category beyond the sphere of temporal power. As such, faith – just like Kant’s 
categorical imperative – cannot be ‘essentially’ conditioned by any particular socio-
political concept; nor can it be conditioned by the scope of its application. On the 
other hand, by defining religion as essentially dependent on the existence of one 
particular socio-political concept, that of liberty, Acton practically reduced religion to 
a simple exercise of one’s religious ‘duties’, which is just another name for the set of 
socially institutionalised, externalised collective practices.    
Thus Acton practically took the idea of conscience out of metaphysics and placed it 
within the public sphere. While conscience itself was the metaphysical warrant for 
liberty, the conflict of consciences was its empirical security: “Our conscience exists 
and acts for ourselves. It exists in each of us. It is limited by the consciences of 
others.... Therefore it tends to restrict authority and to enlarge liberty. It is the law of 
self-government.”476 Compared to Mill’s concept of liberty, in which the scope of 
freedom of the individual – just like in Hobbes’s ‘war of all against all’ – is limited 
by, and potentially always in conflict with, the scope of freedom of others, Acton’s 
concept of liberty is essentially self-restrictive, in terms of limiting the liberty of 
action by the scope of conscience itself, thereby preventing a Hobbesian war of one 
liberty against others.    
Following the proposed logic of externalisation of conscience, Acton would 
probably claim that the adherence to a set of social practices that refer to the inward 
moral law is practically identical with the adherence to the inward moral law itself. 
And various 20th-century theories would certainly claim that such a set of 
institutionalised practices necessarily and decisively shape the inward articulation of 
what Kant termed as the categorical imperative. However, the problem with the 
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externalisation of Kant’s categorical imperative – be that its identification with, or 
causal linking to, the set of institutionalised social practices – is that it practically 
abolishes this concept’s essential features, one of being ‘categorical’ and that of being 
‘imperative’. For, there is nothing ‘categorical’ or ‘imperative’ in the public sphere 
where Acton places his conscience-based concepts of religion and liberty: as such, all 
the categories within society, including the dominant moral codes and practices, are 
essentially relational and therefore negotiable. Thus what one believes to be his duty, 
as referring to the commonly accepted religious and moral practices, does not 
necessarily correspond to what his moral duty actually is, as defined by the Kantian 
principle. Nor does the obedience to those practices necessarily make the individual 
free. While that might be conditionally true within the framework of Rousseau’s 
‘general will’, in both Mill’s and Acton’s accounts of liberty such obedience to 
‘authority and majorities, custom and opinion’ would be regarded as the exact 
opposite of individual freedom. 
 
Liberty as Privilege 
  
Notwithstanding the problem related to Acton’s flirting with the Kantian concept of 
categorical imperative, Acton’s more fundamental problem is to prove that the 
adherence to a set of socially institutionalised religious practices is in any way 
morally superior to adherence to any other set of socially institutionalised practices, 
which he contemptuously calls ‘authority’, ‘majority’, ‘custom’ or ‘opinion’, and that, 
as such, should be given a freer scope of expression, as compared to that of other 
social practices.  
A related problem is also present in his advocacy of a freer scope of expression and 
action for the socially privileged classes, as compared to that of the less privileged 
ones. As Acton’s public defence of slavery in America suggests, he seems to have 
considered the slaveholders’ claim to liberty morally superior to that of the slaves. 
While he may well have sympathised with the confederative principles advocated by 
the South rather than with the federative ones promoted by the North, it is hard to 
understand why the liberty of the slaveholders should principally take moral 
precedence over that of the slaves, unless one assumes that the former have some 
intrinsic moral quality which distinguishes them from the latter. This quality, then, 
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can only be related either to the former’s social, racial or religious superiority, all of 
which were appreciated in Acton’s accounts of the American Civil War.    
Along the same lines, it is morally equally problematic to prove, say, that the liberty 
of the Catholic minority in England and the liberty of the aristocratic minority in the 
same country (both of which he himself accidentally belonged to) should be given 
priority over the liberty of both the Anglican majority and the majority of the 
underprivileged. However, Acton never really attempts to address this problem: 
instead, he simply employs the axiom that liberty is essentially a matter of protection 
of minorities, regardless of whether it practically protects their rights or their 
privileges, and regardless of whether it checks the omnipotence of the majority or 
deprives it of any power. In both cases, the gap between the universalist nature of the 
concept of liberty and the rigid social stratification regarded as a conditio-sine-qua-
non of the liberty of a particular social class led Acton to employ an ideology which 
attempts to make the gap logically sustainable. That ideology is necessarily based on 
arbitrary exclusion of one racial or social group from the scope of liberty’s 
application by virtue of its being temporarily or permanently unprepared for liberty’s 
blessings. Regardless of whether such an ideology is to be labelled as ‘racism’ or 
‘classism’, it necessarily reduces the significance of liberty to an exclusive concept, 
designed for a particular social or racial group. 
 
Liberty Under Divine Authority 
 
While defining liberty as the essential condition of the exercise of religious practices, 
Acton finds the first illustration of this claim “in the history of the chosen People”. 
This example reveals once again that his understanding of liberty is essentially related 
to groups rather than to individuals (as much as that of the rest of authors analysed in 
this thesis). For Acton, however, it suffices that “the government of the Israelites was 
a Federation, held together by no political authority, but by the unity of race and faith, 
and founded, not on physical force, but on a voluntary covenant”, to recognise that its 
result was – liberty.477 Ironically, this understanding of liberty is, actually, not so far 
from that of modern nationalists, who regard the ideal collective individual called ‘the 
nation’ as being held together not only by a voluntary covenant but, much more 
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importantly, by ‘the unity of race and faith’. The difference between Acton’s view 
and theirs is that, for them, such a unity, based on a voluntary contract, is sufficient to 
preserve liberty – indeed, that it is liberty itself – while Acton regards federation as a 
necessary check against that unity, that is, against the potential hegemony of the 
majority within it. However, it is difficult to see how, actually, the breaking up of 
unity into sub-units can in itself protect individual liberty within these sub-units. 
These sub-units, once established, also run the risk of internal homogenisation and 
may well come to be perceived as collective or corporate individuals, within which, 
by definition, hegemony of the majority is absolute. What federalisation may 
certainly protect is the liberty of a particular sub-unit, against encroachments of the 
whole. As such, this liberty is not at all concerned with the individual and is 
necessarily a collective or corporate one.  
 Still, for Acton, “the example of the Hebrew nation laid down the parallel lines on 
which all freedom has been won – the doctrine of national tradition, and the doctrine 
of the higher law”. ‘The doctrine of the higher law’ certainly plays an important role 
in Acton’s understanding of liberty as a license for one to do whatever he thinks to be 
his duty. However, as demonstrated above, even this duty is less about one’s 
individual relationship with the Absolute; much more importantly, it is about 
exercising certain practices within the religious community to which one belongs. But 
the claim that all freedom has been won on ‘the doctrine of national tradition’ has 
even less individualistic implications than the doctrine of duty towards one’s religious 
community. As such, it shows that Acton’s departure from the 19th-century Millian 
‘national liberalism’ was much less radical than the rhetoric of his essay Nationality 
might suggest. For Acton, no less than for Herder, “the operation of these two 
principles”, one of ‘national tradition’ and one of ‘the higher law’, occupies the whole 
history of freedom.  
The history of freedom is thus seen as the history of “the conflict between Liberty 
under divine authority” – defined as the joint operation of the principles of ‘national 
tradition’ and ‘the higher law’ – and “the absolutism of human authorities”.478 “To 
that conflict of four hundred years,” says Acton, “we owe the rise of civil liberty.” If 
the struggle had terminated speedily in an undivided victory, “all Europe would have 
sunk down under a Byzantine or Muscovite despotism”. For, “the aim of both 
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contending parties was absolute authority”. Thus liberty was not the end for which 
they strove; but “it was the means by which the temporal and the spiritual power 
called the nations to their aid”. In the process of such group mobilisations in the name 
of liberty, “the towns of Italy and Germany won their franchises, France got her 
estates general and England her parliament out of the alternate phases of the contest; 
and as long as it lasted it prevented the rise of Divine Right.”479 
The logic of this asymmetric relation, consisting of ‘liberty under divine authority’ 
on one side and ‘the absolutism of human authorities’ on the other, suggests that 
Acton finds it axiomatic that ‘divine authority’ necessarily presupposes liberty, 
whereas the human one necessarily presupposes absolutism. While pessimists in all 
times would easily join him in the latter claim, he would probably find little support 
for the former one in the late modern, thoroughly secularised world, in which liberty 
is commonly portrayed in Mill’s terms, as a mere licence for doing as one pleases. 
However, what is much more problematic for Acton’s argument is his inability to 
develop the liberating principle of moral duty, as derived from that of ‘divine 
authority’. True, he quotes with approval the words of the Stoic Zeno, that “true 
freedom consists in obeying God”,480 which were also taken up by Kant and 
Rousseau respectively in their own concepts of freedom as obedience to ‘the 
categorical imperative’ i.e. to ‘the general will’. However, Acton’s understanding of 
‘duty’ remains confined to the sphere of practice, as an externalised exercise of the 
obedience to ‘divine authority’, thus falling too short of the sphere of inward 
principles. This externalised, institutionalised and ritualised exercise alone seems 
incapable of liberating its adherents; by virtue of being expressed as a social practice, 
such obedience to ‘divine authority’ requires a free scope for itself, that is, for its own 
externalised exercise.  
Liberty thus – contrary to Acton’s claim that it is the “highest political end”481 – 
arises as a means to the end of socially institutionalised religious practice, not as an 
end of that practice, as the formula ‘liberty under divine authority’ might 
misleadingly suggest. Although religion is thus granted priority over liberty, the 
former alone is unable to generate the latter: understood as a set of institutionalised 
practices, it can only demand liberty for its own social application and reproduction. 
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What, then, actually constitutes liberty, and thus provides religion with a free scope 
for its social application and reproduction, is the mere distinction between religion 
and the public sphere proper (i.e. the state). However, it remains obscure why liberty 
needs ‘divine authority’ for its own existence, unless it is understood as a mere 
instrument for ‘divine authority’ to manifest itself on the societal level. But, if that 
authority requires the temporal category of liberty to actually manifest itself 
(presumably, in the opposition to the state’s temporal power), its divine nature can 
then be rightfully put into question.                
 
National vs. Religious Communities 
 
Although Acton portrays the history of freedom as the history of the lasting conflict 
“between Liberty under the divine authority and the absolutism of human 
authorities”, the logic of his own statement does not prevent him from claiming that 
“Liberty is ancient; and it is Despotism that is new”.482 Regardless of whether one 
historically precedes another or not, it should be noted that the logic of the latter 
claim is based on Acton’s insight that “until societies are tried by the complex 
problems of civilisation they may escape despotism, as societies that are undisturbed 
by religious diversity avoid persecution”.483 Despotism is thus depicted as a matter of 
degree in development of civilisation. According to Mill’s supreme criterion of ‘the 
progress in civilization’, despotism should then be understood as necessarily superior 
to liberty. However, in Acton’s philosophy of history (very much like in Rousseau’s), 
what is ancient is necessarily superior to that what is new. Still, this does not clarify 
how a ‘mature civilisation’ can, and why it actually should, re-discover the 
supposedly ancient concept of liberty. For, the proposed logic suggests that the 
complexity of problems does not decrease with the maturity of civilisation, so that 
despotism, as a proposed solution to this complexity, does not wither away, but only 
strengthens as the complexity increases. And, then, the ancient concept does not seem 
adequate to respond to the growing complexities of a mature civilisation.   
The implications of the other claim, that “societies that are undisturbed by religious 
diversity avoid persecution”, are even more problematic. For, it is suggested that 
religious diversity as such ‘disturbs’ society, and that societies that are ‘disturbed’ by 
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religious diversity do not, and perhaps even can not, avoid persecution. Thus, in order 
to avoid persecution – which in Acton’s system of values is regarded as the most 
negative of all social phenomena – it may well be proposed for such a diversity to be 
broken up into several homogenous or semi-homogenous units, and thus prevent any 
possible ‘disturbance’ of society and avoid ‘persecution’. Acton does not go so far as 
to explicitly propose such a solution but, nevertheless, he seems disturbed by 
religious diversity and prone to simplification of such complexities. His discomfort 
with diversity thus corresponds with Mill’s suggestion that countries ‘disturbed’ by 
the presence of different ‘nationalities’ cannot possibly possess ‘free institutions’ that 
would make persecution unfeasible. The difference between the two, of course, 
resides in Acton’s adherence to the concept of religious community as the most (or, 
perhaps, the only) relevant social unit, and his refusal to adopt Mill’s unit of 
‘nationality’ as the most relevant for determination of the state’s character. 
Otherwise, a state that would be determined by, and demarcated as coextensive with, 
the unit of religious community would probably be quite acceptable to Acton, which 
can be seen in his frequent use of terms like ‘Christian country’, ‘Christian state’, and 
‘Christian people’. What is not clear, however, is whether Acton would go as far as 
Mill does in suggesting that the despotism of the state, as a response to religious 
diversity, should be overcome by breaking up all the societies ‘disturbed’ by such 
diversity into smaller homogenous religious communities, in order to eventually pave 
the way for liberty.  
Acton’s permanent swinging between individual and communal/corporate liberty 
makes it difficult to understand to which of these two he actually granted priority. On 
one hand, he denounced Protestantism for the abolition of medieval corporations and 
the isolation of the sovereign individual. On the other hand, with regard to the 
collective rights of ‘nations’ and races, he seems to have held the position that it was 
only “the individual man, created in the image of God and partaking of His sanctity, 
who possessed moral and political rights”, while races and ‘nations’ principally had 
no rights.484 However, unlike those of races and ‘nations’, the rights of religious 
groups were for Acton essential for the promotion, and indeed, for the very existence 
of liberty. Of course, he would probably claim that these groups’ relation to God was 
a result of individuals’ relation to God and that this relation was the essential aspect 
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of the latter’s liberty, implying both the right of individuals to relate themselves to 
God and their responsibility before God for doing so. But, this theological dimension 
in his understanding of individual liberty does not necessarily grant religious groups 
the collective rights he otherwise denied to races and ‘nations’. On the contrary, the 
fact that for most part of his life he was a militant Catholic only testifies to his 
personal biases with regard to the categories which he himself held important, but 
does not preclude racists or nationalists from exercising the same rights which Acton 
wanted to reserve for Catholics. While principally rejecting Gobineau’s doctrine of 
race as “one of many schemes to deny free will, responsibility, and guilt, and to 
supplant moral by physical forces”,485 Acton thus failed to apprehend that for a racist 
or a nationalist, racism and nationalism are both physical and moral categories. Thus 
they would probably claim that membership in a community of race or in ‘the nation’ 
presupposes certain moral outlook and that such a membership is, indeed, a condition 
of morality, regardless of whether this condition itself is practically conditioned by 
physical forces or not. Although it is convenient for a racist or a nationalist to think of 
their races or ‘nations’ as having been physically determined, it is nevertheless of the 
utmost importance for them to depict their membership as morally credited. In this 
sense, their advocacy of collective rights and liberties for their races and ‘nations’ 
was no less grounded than Acton’s advocacy of collective rights and liberties for a 
presumably purely moral community, such as the Catholic Church. Conversely, it 
may well be said that, within the category of religious community, the free will of the 
individual and therefore his moral outlook tend to be subjected to the will of the 
community and to its moral outlook, due to the permanent pressure on every 
individual to accept and defend the acts of the community, regardless of whether they 




Acton’s article named “Colonies”486 is certainly one of his most controversial texts, in 
which he advocated some of the ideas that nowadays would probably be labelled as 
politically and morally unacceptable. However, its significance lies in the fact that 
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Acton there pushes his concept of liberty – founded on the principle of checks and 
balances – to its ultimate conclusion, which leads him to adopt the stance that even 
slavery, based on the presumed racial inequality, serves the purpose of freedom. Its 
opening paragraph immediately exposes the core of Acton’s views on racial, cultural 
and religious equality:    
 
First we may assume (as part of the divine economy which appears in the whole history of 
religion) that the conquest of the world by the Christian powers is the preliminary step to its 
conversion. In paganism and in heresy there is a national and political character which 
identifies the religion with the nation, and requires for it the support of the State. The religion 
is the life of the State, and the pride of the people. The whole system of government, the 
whole condition of society, the literature, the cultivation, and the language are penetrated by 
it. Here the Church cannot at once find entrance. If the nation is civilised, the national 
religion must first have lost its strength, the national faith must first be weakened, and a 
longing for something new must first be awakened. But if the race is degenerate, something 
new must be done to elevate and to prepare it for the Church. For the Church cannot triumph 
either over a finished civilisation or over an extreme barbarism.487 
 
Acton thus assumes that the conquest of the world by the Christian powers was a 
matter of ‘the divine economy’, which inevitably leads to this world’s conversion. 
This assumption is, of course, highly problematic from the point of view of the entire 
non-Christian world, subject to the Christian powers’ conquest. However, it does not 
render any service to the concept of the Christian faith, either. By linking conversion, 
as a presumably voluntary act of the converted, to their entirely non-voluntary 
subjection to the political domination of, and to the economic exploitation by, the 
Christian powers, Acton makes conversion to Christianity a matter of further 
compliance with such a non-voluntary subjection: the subjected are thus expected to 
legitimise their own political and economic subjection by further non-voluntary 
subjection to ‘the divine economy’. This also implicates ‘the divine economy’ into 
the enterprise determined by the entirely non-divine economy of capitalist 
exploitation and self-interest, and thus seriously puts its ‘divinity’ into question.  
 Secondly, the assumption that in paganism and heresy religion is identified with 
‘the nation’ and therefore requires support of the state is also very problematic, since 
it depends on the specific definition of both ‘the nation’ and the state, which applies 
the concepts of Acton’s time to the ages and places very different from his own. 
‘Nations’ to which Acton actually refers may, at best, be understood as tribal 
societies, in which religion, indeed, deeply pervades social life, but in which, then, 
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there can hardly be any place for the state in the modern sense. It is really difficult to 
apply the image of the modern state, with its system of surveillance and control, as 
one that corresponds to pre-modern, tribal societies in which religion plays an 
important role but, without the means of the modern state, is wholly unable to 
penetrate “the whole condition of society, the literature, the cultivation and the 
language”.  
 What is also highly problematic is Acton’s teleological interpretation of history as 
the history of conversion to Christianity. He does not see non-Christian ‘nations’ as 
necessarily barbarian or ‘degenerate’; they may even be regarded as highly civilised 
but, as a rule, they necessarily advance as they convert to Christianity. And even then, 
Acton’s understanding of Christianity is reduced to his vision of the specific role of 
the Catholic Church in its relation to the modern state: thus even the conversion to 
Catholicism is seen as a means to the end of checking the presumed absolutism of the 
modern state, regardless of whether there is a need for it (i.e. whether there is a 
modern state to check) or not; and this checking alone suffices to produce the 
condition which Acton labels as ‘liberty’. To this end, everything, including the 
Church itself, may legitimately be used as a mere instrument, and entire civilisations 
may legitimately be destroyed in order to create favourable conditions for checking 
the modern state. In this respect, colonisation – as a ‘great instrument’ by which the 
idea of conversion to Christianity “has been partially realised”, which, in turn, has 
established the necessary preconditions for checking the modern state – is regarded as 
more efficient and therefore more desirable than the military conquest by the 
Christian powers.488 Thus Acton concedes that “these colonies, however injurious to 
the natives, have been most advantageous in their reaction on the parent state. All 
colonies strengthen the element from which they originate in the home country – in 
Spain, the crown; in England, the middle class. In the former case, therefore, the 
influence was monarchical; in the latter, liberal.”489 Thus, following this logic, in 
order to eventually strengthen both the English middle class and its concept of liberty, 
it becomes legitimate (and even desirable) to “destroy the tenacity of old institutions, 
of social divisions, of moral customs, of political habits” of all those who are 
regarded as “the savage races.”490  
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 While distinguishing between the “real colonies” where English emigrants – having 
already destroyed the native civilisations and institutions – “form the nation” and the 
Asiatic possessions where the Englishmen “govern a foreign race”, Acton goes so far 
as to claim that “what we must desire, for the sake of religion, is that the oriental 
career of our country should extend beyond the destruction of Eastern politics, even 
to the demolition of Eastern society”.491 For, the assumption is that “in time these 
possessions will exercise the same powerful reaction on the mother country which the 
others have already exerted”,492 and for that purpose, and for the “sake of religion”, it 
is desirable to destroy the very foundations of the conquered societies. To what extent 
the demolition of society may be regarded as ‘governing’ remains contestable; 
however, regardless of such a dubious end, Acton admits that even the means of 
‘governing a foreign race’ may be the opposite from those desired at home. For, as a 
matter of principle, it is admitted that “we cannot be so free from State control in our 
intercourse with them as in our intercourse with men of our own country”. Thus the 
principles of liberty, craved for in the ‘mother country’, are to be simply inverted in 
the colonies, where “the State ought to step in… with regulation which we would not 
tolerate at home”.493  
  
Racism as Paternalism 
 
The case for liberty of the English middle class is to be further promoted by confining 
the scope of its application only to the colonists themselves: “The colonists were free; 
at least they enjoyed more liberty than the people at home. They governed 
themselves. An inferior race could not have existed among them on terms of equality. 
Such a race would have been quickly reduced to pauperism, and would have fallen 
into bondage, and have been exposed to unmitigated cruelty.”494 Along the same 
lines, it is claimed that “the exclusion of the Red-skins has been the safety of North 
America, and the introduction of the Blacks only fails to be a fatal evil because they 
are slaves. If they were free, there would be an end of freedom, both for them and for 
the whites”.495 
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 Of course, according to some zero-sum logic, it might be said that the freedom for 
the slaves would be ‘an end of freedom’ for the masters. But, Acton’s is not a zero-
sum logic, and he claims that the liberation of slaves would be ‘an end of freedom’ 
both for the masters and for the slaves. It is difficult to follow such a logic, since it 
goes well beyond the point of a most striking paradox; however, it would be too easy 
to dismiss it as simply absurd: after all, Acton’s consistency in the pursuit of this line 
of thought obliges the reader to try to understand its underlying assumption. And 
then, it seems that the only grounds for a possible explanation can be found in 
Acton’s previous claim that ‘inferior races’ could not exist among the white colonists 
‘on terms of equality’. If they were to exist among the members of the ‘superior’ race 
‘on terms of equality’, it would necessarily aggravate their presumed natural 
‘inferiority’ and therefore lead to the actual worsening of their social position and 
thus ‘reduce them to pauperism’. The presumed ‘bondage’ and ‘cruelty’ to which 
such a race would be exposed by the ‘superior’ one if the two of them were to 
compete ‘on terms of equality’ would be presumably much graver than the actual 
bondage of slavery and the cruelty of the slaveholders. Thus, according to the 
proposed logic, slavery arises as an institutional protection for the ‘inferior’ races 
within the context of capitalist society. For, the capitalist principle of free competition 
applies only to ‘equals’ without producing the gravest effects on society. The 
‘inferiors’ have to be protected by institutional checks, and slavery supposedly plays 
this role, balancing the existing disproportion between the ‘superior’ and the ‘inferior’ 
races within one society. This means that, far from being the most ruthless form of 
capitalist exploitation, racially-based slavery is regarded as effectively checking the 
degree of exploitation and balancing the ‘natural’ racial inequality. Thus racism 
employed in defence of slavery necessarily arises as a form of paternalism; perhaps it 
may even be said that paternalism itself finds its ultimate logical conclusion in 
racism. That Acton’s understanding of Catholicism is not inconsistent with this 
ultimate form of paternalism can be seen in his claim that,  
 
The Church alone can undertake the spiritual care of the savage, and protect him against the 
rapacity of the invader. For she is not the Church of the invader alone, she belongs to both, 
and has duties toward both; the conversion of the heathen is as much her business as the 
preservation of the faithful. She does not allow the natives to be oppressed; she does not even 
allow them to be neglected or ignored. She also differs from Protestantism in her influence on 
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the State, on its laws, and on the clergy; and she has in her provincial councils the means of 
legislating for the good of the savage natives.496  
 
Therefore, the exclusion of other races that constituted the system of slavery in North 
America “was possible only with Protestants. The [Catholic] Church must have 
resisted such a policy, and then the colonies would probably have assumed a totally 
different shape.”497 The commercial spirit of Protestant capitalism is thus, for Acton, 
fundamentally opposed to the spiritual mission of the Catholic Church: 
 
By themselves the laws of trade and economy must ruin the natives, as soon as they come in 
contact with us, and establish an exchange between us. The promotion of our trade requires 
us to awaken new desires in them; indeed, these new desires are the inevitable consequences 
of new knowledge and new ideas. Their old manner of life does not suffice to satisfy these 
new ideas—to purchase spirits, weapons, gunpowder, domestic animals, and medicine. As 
hunters they are destitute of stored wealth. The craving for the new commodities, irrespective 
of their immoral or dangerous character, must gradually exhaust their means. So the 
missionaries justly dread the contact. But they cannot prevent it without the closest alliance 
with and support of the civil power. But how can commerce tolerate such restrictions, or the 
missionary hold his own against the trader?498  
 
Acton thus suggests that both extremes – ruthless capitalist exploitation and racial 
exclusion – are consistent with other principles and values of the Protestant 
colonisers, such as republicanism, self-government and liberty. This is explained by 
the fact that “the English colonies had not, like those of Spain, the protection of a 
supreme controlling power in the sovereign at home.” For, when “there is no supreme 
power to keep repulsive forces in combination, there can only be equality among 
equals”. But, “where there are several unequal races in a republic, the political 
domination of race over race is sure to arise”. Since this in itself is “an evil and a 
political enormity”, “the races require a supreme power to secure their several rights”. 
Without this supreme control, which monarchy alone cannot exercise without the 
assistance of the Church, “self-government slides into the independence of the several 
races, and this into anarchy”.499 Therefore, it follows that only racial exclusion and 
slavery can check the presumed ‘natural’ inequality of races in a secular republic, and 
thus prevent society from sliding into anarchy and abolishing the very system of 
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checks and balances which Acton sees as the necessary and sufficient condition of 
‘liberty’.  
 
Slavery as Freedom 
 
It still may be questioned whether slavery to which they are to be subjected is to be 
called ‘liberty’; but, it should be borne in mind that Acton’s concept of liberty, 
entirely based on the principle of checks and balances, is not one of absolute liberty: 
 
The ideal of an absolute liberty .... is necessarily incompatible with the kind of Liberal spirit 
that governs English institutions. Liberty in English sense is a modest conception. It is 
tolerant of opposing philosophies, parties and interests. It welcomes diversity and pretends to 
no final truth. It takes expediency and practicability as its criteria. It is a philosophy of 
moderate means and limited ends ... it is in short, Whiggism, “a policy aiming at a 
philosophy”, not a “philosophy seeking a policy”.500 
 
For such a ‘moderate’ concept of liberty, it suffices that the system of checks and 
balances is present in the form of fixed social institutions, which check the absolute 
forms of power, be that absolute power of the modern state or absolute anarchy. Since 
slavery is one of such fixed social institutions (quite unlike raw capitalist exploitation 
under the condition of free competition which may lead to an unchecked, un-
institutionalised, absolute domination of one race over another), it is believed that 
slavery prevents society consisting of ‘unequal’ races from sliding into either absolute 
domination of one race over another or absolute independence of races from each 
other (i.e. anarchy). Thus slavery may legitimately be employed to protect society 
from these extremes and promote the ideal of moderation, which is crucial to this 
concept of liberty.  
 Of course, moderation in the public sphere is an eminently middle-class ideal, and 
so is liberty derived from it. Since this ideal of liberty tends to gradually abolish all 
the possible extremes and further advance moderation as its own conditio-sine-qua-
non, it may easily lead to the promotion of mediocrity as the chief ideal of society, 
and Mill was warning against exactly these tendencies in modern society.501 For 
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Acton, this danger was to be avoided by promoting moderation as a mechanical 
principle (which he himself would probably call ‘organic’). Moderation would thus 
be an optimal outcome of the process of checking and balancing rather than the ideal 
state of unity to which – as most of the 19th-century liberals believed – society 
‘naturally’ aspired. In this respect, it is obvious why Acton so strongly opposed 
nationalist claims to ‘organic’ unity and homogeneity; however, his ideal of 
moderation led him to employ equally dubious mechanical means of institutionalised 
racial and social segregation. Slavery is one of these extreme institutional tools, fixed 
aristocratic privilege another one; Acton passionately defended both of these extreme 




The significance of Acton’s critique of Mill’s ‘theory of nationality’ – and, 
consequently, of all nationalist theories – can hardly be overemphasised, since Acton 
was the only one among the classical liberals who has openly rejected the idea of ‘the 
nation-state’ and instead endorsed the idea of a ‘multi-national’ one. In this way, 
Acton created an alternative to the mainstream of the liberal doctrine (presented in the 
previous chapters through its paradigmatic authors), the alternative in which the 
pursuit of liberty could be detached from the pursuit of state for the particular 
‘nation’, based on the presumed unity of this ‘nation’s’ presumed collective will. 
Since ‘the nation-state’ attempted to become the embodiment of both ‘unity of the 
nation’ and absolutism of the state – and these two, both respectively and jointly, 
were regarded by Acton as the gravest threats to liberty – such a state was to be 
rejected as eminently anti-liberal. Hence a liberal state could only be a ‘multi-
national’ one, and Acton praised both the British and the Austro-Hungarian empires 
for having realised the ideal of ‘multi-nationality’ while preserving a rigid social 
stratification founded on aristocratic privilege.  
 However, in this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate that a consistent 
application of the liberal doctrine of checks and balances, which Acton saw as the 
only barrier against the threat to liberty posed by ‘national unity’, logically leads to 
the adoption of principles of rigid social stratification and, ultimately, of social and 
racial segregation. Thus the only alternative to the ‘isolation of nations’, based on the 
presumed unity and homogeneity of these ‘nations’, would be to isolate intra-state 
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units instead of the inter-state ones. These intra-state units – be they ‘nationalities’, 
classes, corporations, religious communities or other social and racial groups within 
one state – would enjoy a degree of internal unity and homogeneity analogous to that 
of the inter-state units called ‘nations’; still, that degree of unity and homogeneity 
would serve as a principal check against, and not as the main pillar of, the 
omnipotence of the modern state. This assumption sufficed for Acton to endorse the 
most radical forms of social and racial segregation, provided that they played a role of 
a check against both ‘national unity’ and absolutism of the modern state and balanced 

































































From its earliest beginnings, liberalism promoted ‘nations’ as the only legitimate 
units through which its ideals of ‘liberty’ and liberal democracy could be articulated. 
Comprising the common conceptual core, which is constituted around the very term 
‘the nation’, liberalism and nationalism were also overlapping in their historical 
application to the modern political system; indeed, they jointly constituted the modern 
system by promoting the case for ‘liberty’ and democracy through ‘national 
revolutions’ and the consequent establishment of ‘nation-states’.    
In fact, to be more precise, nationalism is being constantly perpetuated within a 
wider, omnipresent umbrella-discourse of liberalism. Due to the omnipresence of 
liberalism’s principles, norms and values in modern society, which serve as an 
umbrella under which nationalization of all aspects of human life takes place, 
nationalism’s perpetuation passes largely unnoticed. However, it is exactly this 
discrete but permanent and omnipresent nationalization of narrative and 
interpretative frames, of perception and evaluation, of thinking and feeling 
(Brubaker’ ‘nationhood’) that makes people ‘behave the nation’ (Beissinger), thereby 
substantiating it as a social fact. This omnipresent nationalization, including its 
ability to make people ‘behave the nation’, is an inherent property of liberalism as an 
umbrella-discourse under which nationalism is being perpetuated. As such, it 
ostensibly stands in sharp contrast to the sporadic but vigorous mass-manifestations 
of the nationalism-proper, which rather happen in social reality as ‘contingent events’ 
(Brubaker’s ‘nationness’), assertively signalling the existence of ‘the nation’. 
However, these simultaneous and mutually pervasive processes both substantiate ‘the 
nation’ and make it omnipresent in everyday life. Still, the omnipresence of the 
umbrella-discourse of liberalism in modern society, rather than the sporadic mass-
manifestations of the nationalism-proper, is what makes ‘the nation’ essentially 
omnipresent, thus marginalising all non-nationalist discourses and nullifying 
“complex identities by the categorical simplicity of ascribed nationality”.502 ‘The 
nation’ is being embraced by the majority of population as a natural political and 
social arrangement precisely because it is promoted by the liberal elite, through 
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permanent nationalization of everyday life, as the only conceivable form of 
existence.503 Nationalism is thus being perpetuated and ‘the nation’ is being 
perpetually substantiated under the umbrella of liberalism, unchallenged by other, 
individualist or cosmopolitan, aspects of liberalism, which thus appear 
simultaneously with nationalism (rather than in opposition to it).   
Through the analyses of the paradigmatic liberal thinkers, I have demonstrated that 
nationalist principles are deeply built-in into the very core of mainstream liberalism. 
From that, it logically follows that practical-political efforts to create a liberal-
democratic state by projecting liberalism’s principles, norms and values onto the 
societal level necessarily produce not only the omnipresent nationalization of 
everyday life, but also the sporadic, homogenising, illiberal mass-manifestations of 
the nationalism-proper. The societal projection of liberalism's built-in norm, the norm 
which prescribes ‘the nation-state’ as the only legitmate unit of governance, 
necessarily generates and perpetuates nationalism as a social phenomenon, as a means 
to produce on the societal level such a prescribed unit. This point, of course, can only 
be logically proven within the scope of a theoretical analysis, and I have convincingly 
done so by demonstrating to what extent ‘the nation-state’, as a built-in norm, 
permeates liberalism in its most relevant, paradigmatic versions.   
The first chapter of this thesis answers the question “What do ‘nations’ and ‘liberty’ 
mean in the liberal discourse and how has that specific interpretation established the 
nationalist doctrine?”. The analysis of Algernon Sidney’s Discourses Concerning 
Government clearly demonstrates that for both early and contemporary liberals the 
title of ‘the nation’ has served to legitimise claims to legislative power (labelled as 
‘liberty’) by those parts of society which practically demonstrate the ability to impose 
their claims onto the rest by monopolising the title of ‘the nation’ for themselves. 
Nationalism, as a doctrine of political legitimacy, takes up this principle and makes it 
its own main postulate. Sidney’s theory shows that the sociological content of the 
term ‘the nation’ is, by both early and contemporary liberals and by nationalists of all 
types, treated as a variable, subject to arbitrary adaptations that always depend on 
particular political circumstances. The very term ‘the nation’, however, is treated as 
the constant cognitive frame that universally legitimises claims to legislative power 
by those who can practically manage to impose their monopoly on the use of this 
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term to brand themselves. Whatever their original constituting principles and their 
political, sociological, ethnic, or religious profile, they constitute themselves as ‘the 
nation’ by monopolising legislative power for themselves, by eliminating or absorbing 
other claimants to that power. The struggle for this type of monopoly is the essential 
property of the nationalism-proper as a social phenomenon. Sidney has established 
the word ‘the nation’ as the sole source of political legitimacy, whose semantic or 
sociological content is essentially arbitrary. This principle of political legitimacy, in 
which the source of political legitimacy is verbally fixed and politically and 
sociologically arbitrary, has become the founding principle of liberalism, as an 
umbrella-discourse under which the nationalism-proper is being perpetuated in the 
form of contingent events.  
The second chapter answers the questions “How do individuals ‘liberate’ 
themselves by perpetually identifying themselves with ‘their nations’ as abstract 
concepts, and how do these individuals’ mass-identifications with ‘their nations’ 
substantiate these ‘nations’ as really existing social phenomena?”. The analysis of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory of liberty demonstrates that ‘the nation’ as a social 
phenomenon is perpetually being brought into existence through the socio-
psychological process which perpetually establishes identity between the will of the 
individual and the presumed ‘general will’ of the entire society. Through the 
articulation of society’s ‘general will’ (that is, through the procedure of society’s 
making its own laws), society is being homogenised and thereby rises to the status of 
‘the nation’ (as already implied in Sidney’s theory). In this process of perpetual 
identification between the individual’s will and the will of ‘the nation’ (this process is 
by Rousseau defined as the only path to ‘individual liberty’), ‘the nation’ is being 
substantiated and the term ‘the nation’ gains its sociological content. Rousseau’s 
theory, defining ‘individual liberty’ as the process of perpetual identification of the 
individual’s will with the presumed ‘general will’ of the entire society, has thus 
produced the socio-psychological mechanism through which the nationalism-proper 
is being manifested, through the mass-manifestations of the individual’s identification 
with ‘the nation’, in pursuit of ‘individual liberty’. This mechanism is the mechanism 
through which the nationalism-proper actually substantiates ‘the nation’ as a social 
phenomenon. Still, this process of perpetual identification is mainly carried out in the 
form of discrete but permanent nationalization of the individual’s everyday life under 
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the umbrella of liberalism’s pursuit of ‘liberty’, rather than through the contingent 
manifestations of the nationalism-proper. 
The third chapter answers the question “How is ‘the nation’ being perpetually 
substantiated and homogenised on the person-to-person level, through uniform ritual 
procedures of members’ reciprocal recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’?”. 
This answer is contained in the analysis of John Rawls’s theory of ‘justice as 
fairness’, which provides the most elaborated philosophical framework and socio-
psychological micro-mechanism through which permanent nationalization is being 
intensively perpetuated within the liberal umbrella-discourse, in the form of 
permanent inter-personal mobilisation. Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is based on the 
idea of perpetual display of procedural reciprocity in individual relations, through the 
intensive perpetual extension of the ritual recognition of one another as ‘free and 
equal’ between ‘the nation’s’ individual members. This ritual recognition, 
reciprocally extended between the members, that is, between ‘co-nationals’, is non-
reciprocally denied to all non-members. They can only be recognised collectively, as 
members of analogous collective bodies i.e. of other ‘nations’. However, between 
‘the nation’s’ members, this ritual recognition of one another as ‘free and equal’ does 
not remain only procedural: an abstract procedure of individuals’ mutual recognition 
of one another as ‘free and equal’ evolves into a ritual of members’ perpetual 
endorsement of one another as members of ‘the free nation’, equal to all other 
‘nations’. This collectivistic ritual practically imposes ‘national’ homogeneity and 
uniformity on all individual members of ‘the nation’. In this ultimate form of 
nationalization of all inter-personal relations, which permanently takes place under 
the umbrella-discourse of liberalism, individuals can not even be recognised as 
persons outside ‘the nation’, which is the only form of inter-personal and social 
cooperation that provides their recognition as persons.  
The fourth chapter answers the question “Is liberalism’s concept of ‘liberty’ 
inevitably conditioned by the existence of the homogenous ‘nation-state’ and its 
institutions?”. John Stuart Mill’s ‘theory of nationality’, analysed in this chapter, 
demonstrates that his advocacy of individual ‘liberty’ is derived from the eminently 
collectivist utilitarian principle of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’, 
whereby a full assertion of ‘the sentiment of nationality’ (through the establishment of 
the ‘nationality’s’ own ‘nation-state’) is regarded as the fullest realisation of both the 
principle of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ and ‘the principle of 
 232 
liberty’, as projected onto the collective level. The existence of ‘free institutions’, as 
essential for the promotion of individual ‘liberty’, is held by Mill as “next to 
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities”, so that only in ‘the nation-
state’ can the individual actually be free, and the square of individual ‘liberty’ can 
only be circled through the collectivist enterprise of ‘nation-building’. Mill’s ‘theory 
of nationality’ thus establishes the full conceptual convergence between the 
seemingly opposed doctrines of liberal individualism and ‘national’ collectivism, 
which actually coexist as mutually pervasive under the umbrella-discourse of 
liberalism.  
The fifth, final chapter, analysing Lord Acton’s theory of liberty, addresses the 
question “Is it possible for a liberalism that rejects nationalism and ‘the nation-state’ 
to remain faithful to liberalism’s true nature?”. Lord Acton was the only among the 
classical liberals who openly rejected the idea of ‘the nation-state’ and instead 
endorsed the idea of a ‘multi-national’ one. Acton advocated a consistent application 
of the liberal doctrine of checks and balances, as the only barrier against ‘national 
homogeneity’ that leads to ‘state absolutism’. This led him to the adoption of 
principles of rigid social stratification and, ultimately, of social and racial segregation. 
Acton’s alternative to the ‘isolation of nations’ (as Acton saw the consequences of 
Mill’s ‘theory of nationality’) would be to isolate intra-state units instead of the inter-
state ones. These intra-state units – be they ethnic groups, classes, corporations, 
religious communities or other social and racial groups within one state – would 
enjoy a degree of internal unity and homogeneity analogous to that of the inter-state 
units called ‘nations’. Still, that degree of unity and homogeneity would serve as a 
principal check against, and not as the main pillar of, ‘the omnipotence of the modern 
state’. This assumption led Acton to endorse the most anti-liberal strategies, such as 
radical forms of social and racial segregation, provided that they could serve as a 
check against both ‘national homogeneity’ and ‘state absolutism’. Given the eventual 
triumph of the concepts of social and racial equality, democracy and ‘the nation-
state’, such ideas nowadays sound clearly anti-liberal, so that Acton’s liberalism 
looks like a total betrayal of the basic liberal principles. However, the episode with 
Acton demonstrates that liberalism does not have a capacity to produce a conceptual 
alternative to the homogenous ‘nation-state’, no matter how illiberal the latter may 
have proved in its practical incarnations.  
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This thesis demonstrates that application onto the societal level of the concepts and 
norms developed under the umbrella-discourse of liberalism logically leads to 
nationalist practices, through which ‘nations’ are actually being substantiated. This 
symbiosis between liberalism and nationalism is a logical consequence of liberalism’s 
endorsement of ‘the nation’ as the exclusive unit of political legitimacy, and of 
nationalism’s endorsement of ‘liberty’ as the exclusive concept to legitimise its own 
political claims. This research into the common history of liberal/nationalist ideas 
shows that attempts to conceptually separate these two nominally separated ideologies 
inevitably remain futile. That, I believe, gives a definite answer to the question of 
nationalism’s philosophical roots and intellectual and historical origin, as well as to 
the question of the conceptual, political and historical framework within which it 
perpetually reappears. The answer to both questions is: liberalism, as an umbrella-
discourse whose principles, norms and values are built-in into the foundations of 
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